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Chapter I 
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE LINER 
SHIPPING INDUSTRY 
Together with ports, Customs authorities, inland transport, banks, insurance 
companies and others, ocean-liner transport is part of a diverse group of ser-
vices which support international trade. Before the advent of containerization 
in the late 1950s, these services were carried out in a largely independent and 
unco-ordinated manner. The persons providing such services were specialists 
and while aware of activities other than their own, almost no effort was made 
to ensure that the efficient carrying out of one group of activities contributed 
to that of another. Carriers, ports and others in the distribution chain were 
occupied with the efficiency of their individual endeavors, and not that of the 
overall system. For example, liner vessel operators would work diligently to 
unload their vessels without damaging cargoes, but if such goods remained 30, 
60 or more days in port, or were exposed to inclement weather, it was considered 
a problem created by the stevedore, port or Customs, as such operators had 
complied fully with th^ir obligations under the Hague Rules when the cargo was 
released from the ship's hook.1 
In the years following the introduction of containers, liner vessel 
operators have come to bffer transport services from origin to destination, with 
ocean freight rates often embracing the costs of not only ocean carriage and 
port charges but also 1 those for inland transport services. The extension of 
ocean freight rates to include other services is understandable when one con-
siders that the ever growing integration of vessels, ports, inland transport and 
other ancillary services has permitted the establishment of specialized inter-
modal transport systems which provide shippers with more-efficient, less-costly 
distribution services. 1 In addition, a growing number of liner vessel operators 
provide computerized information to ports, Customs authorities, banks, insurance 
companies and others in order to facilitate the efficient handling of goods, as 
well as their rapid release to consignees and payments to exporters. This 
broadening of activities of liner vessel operators has led to numerous changes 
in the composition of the industry. 
Some of the more important alterations in the composition of the liner 
shipping industry, which has come to include not only vessels and ports but also 
inland transport and ancillary services such as Customs and computerized infor-
mation systems, would be the change from general cargo vessels to specialized 
container ships, from individualized cargo handling and stowage services to 
those which mirror the handling and stowage of homogeneous commodities, from an 
adequate supply of transport capacity to one of chronic overcapacity, from 
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freight rates subject to upward pressures in a seller's market to those of a 
declining nature in a buyer's market, from modal efficiency to intermodal sys-
tems optimization, from a regulated to an increasingly deregulated structure, 
from common carrier services to a growing use of contract transport arrange-
ments, from mail, telex and voice communications to computer-based satellite 
systems and from ad hoc promotion to numerous forms and sources of institutional 
support. Each of these changes must be studied in the light of formulating new 
liner shipping policies and plans, but it must be recognized that, while impor-
tant, they are impermanent way-stations in an evolutionary process which is con-
tinuous, efficient, comprehensively synergetic and irreversible. 
The last 15 years provide clear evidence of the difficulties involved in 
trying to establish policies and plans for the liner shipping industry. Whether 
one looks to the industrialized north, the developing south or the centrally 
planned east, probably the most important lesson to be learned is that the liner 
shipping industry can no longer count upon either a positive cash flow or a 
favourable income statement at the end of an accounting period, just because 
there is general prosperity. Gone are the days when carriers and ports could 
rely on quasi-monopoly situations; there are no singular sources of raw mate-
rials, agricultural products or manufactured goods, there are no captive ship-
pers, consignees or hinterlands, there are no economic impediments to utilizing 
land transport instead of ocean carriage via major canals for certain unitized 
and bulk cargoes, and there are no closed-loop liner transport systems. 
One of the better examples in this region of a closed-loop liner operation 
being subsumed into a larger system would be that between Chile's principle port 
of Valparaiso and its port in the Straits of Magellan, Punta Arenas. Many of 
the cargoes in this service are transported to Valparaiso by deep-sea carriers 
and then transshipped to Chilean vessels for on-carriage to Punta Arenas. Dur-
ing March 1988 the services of Saguenay Shipping of Montreal (Canada, Colombia, 
Venezuela and various Caribbean countries, those of a separate chartered service 
northbound from Brazil to Canada) and its subsidiary Great Lakes Transearibbean 
Line (Canada, Central American and the west coast of South America) were com-
bined. The vessels of GLTL now pass through the Straits of Magellan and north 
to Brazil after discharging in Valparaiso. This joint service was started to 
eliminate the logistical problems of finding empty containers for Brazil and 
cargoes for those on the west coast of South America. The detour for GLTL ves-
sels to call at Punta Arenas is no more than five nautical miles, so the most 
important factor to make its participation commercially attractive would be the 
volume of cargoes in the trade between Valparaiso and Punta Arenas.2 
To formulate appropriate policies and plans for the liner shipping indus-
try in an environment of constant change, vessel operators, land transport 
companies, ports, shippers, consignees, banks, insurance companies, Customs 
authorities and others must provide an equally diversified group of persons in 
numerous government ministries with information which permits them to understand 
not only the repetitive daily activities of that industry but also the direc-
tions in which it might be moving. The daily activities merit serious consi-
deration because they point out the problems facing the execution of transport 
functions, while the direction aspects are even more important as they deal with 
forces which influence longer term decisions concerning national economic goals, 
trade relations, financial markets, legal regimes, technologies and many more. 
3 
Without a long-term directional orientation such policies and plans can become 
rigid structures which perpetuate historical practices, institutions and tech-
nologies , instead of providing needed flexibility and instruments to deal with 
the future. 
A. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TRANSPORT 
Some would suggest that the structural changes occurring in the liner shipping 
industry are merely a continuation of those which started with the introduction 
of containers in the late 1950s. It is true that containers have contributed 
to the current alterations, but so have the increasing deregulation of transpor-
t modes, use of computers and communications technologies, employment of con-
tract carriage arrangements, establishment of liner consortia and utilization 
of intermodal landbridge systems. To equate the structural changes now occur-
ring in the industry to a continuation of the "container revolution" is to miss 
the profound and permanent transformation which is taking place in transport as 
well as the trade flows it serves. For example, the integration of liner vessel 
operations, port and inland transport services was always a theoretical possi-
bility, but there were numerous market, service, technological and legal res-
trictions which precluded it from happening. The removal of many of these 
restrictions has brought about a transformation of the characteristics of each 
component of the liner shipping industry, their fundamental purposes and even 
the goals sought. 
During a period of structural change, traditional problems seem to defy 
customary solutions. Probably the best example of this would be the market 
control functions of liner conferences. Before containerization, conferences 
were able to control the offer of ocean-liner services and to stabilize freight 
rates. Today, ocean-liner transport has entered an era of chronic overcapacity 
and declining freight rates, and conferences seem unable to perform their histo-
rical functions.3 To formulate policies and plans which respond to nontradi-
tional problems, reliance must be placed on something more than historical trend 
analyses and projections, as the mechanical application of these tools can 
result in mere extrapqlations of already fossilized events. This is not to say 
that such analyses and projections are not useful, but rather that they provide 
their greatest benefits when guided by an thorough understanding or strategic 
vision of the liner shipping industry and the market, service, technological and 
legal forces which are restructuring it. 
The policies and plans that might be utilized by the liner shipping 
industry to remain viable in a time of structural change will be determined by 
a correct interpretation of the market, service, technological and legal forces 
which are bringing about those changes. While all of these forces contribute 
to a restructuring of the industry, some of the more important for this evalua-
tion are related to (i) the introduction of containers into international trade, 
(ii) the impact of market forces on homogeneous liner cargoes, (iii) the inter-
changeable nature of container transport services and its impact on conferences, 
(iv) economies of scale and (v) computerized information processing and communi-
cations . 
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1. Thç introduction of containers into international trade 
In the decade following World War II, international trade volumes were increas-
ing rapidly, national economies were exhibiting sustained growth rates and 
workers in many industries were making demands for large wage increases. For 
port labour it was a most exceptional time—expanding volumes of goods had to 
be handled in a system that was labour-intensive, costly, inefficient and 
damage-prone. At that time, port workers played a pivotal role in international 
trade and directly influenced not only the condition and prices of goods but 
also the cost effectiveness of transport modes. To avoid ports, goods began to 
be carried by road and rail over long distances. One land transport operator, 
McLean Trucking, providing services between New York and Houston, Texas, took 
a revolutionary step when it recognized that, if the wheels were removed from 
the cargo compartments of trucks and corner fittings added to facilitate 
handling by capital-intensive techniques, they could be carried indiscriminately 
by liner vessels, trucks and railroads. These modifications permitted the 
carriage of the same sacks, crates and barrels in which goods had traditionally 
been transported, but rather than being handled individually, they were placed 
in reusable cargo grouping units which would come to be known as containers. 
McLean Trucking modified a T-2 tanker, renamed the "Ideal X," to carry 
these reusable cargo grouping units, and on 26 April 1956 it departed on a voy-
age from New York to Houston carrying 58 containers. After 10 years of service 
between the U.S. east and Gulf coasts, as well as to Puerto Rico beginning in 
1958, the first international voyage of a container vessel, the "S.S. Fairland" 
of Sea-Land Services, took place between the ports of New York and Bremen, Ger-
many, arriving at the latter on 5 May 1966 with 226 Sea-Land Services standard 
35' x 8' x 8' (10.67 m x 2.44 m x 2.44 m) containers. 
Even though the container had become the accepted liner transport unit by 
1970, it was not until 1972 that the first cellular vessel, the "S.S. Galloway" 
of Sea-Land Services, was designed and constructed. In cellular container 
ships, cargo holds are fitted with guides to facilitate the loading, discharge 
and stowage of containers. Guides may also placed on top of cargo-hold hatch 
covers to eliminate the need for lashing containers transported on deck. These 
vessels may also have their own cranes for loading and discharge of containers. 
Since the first cellular container ship made its appearance, ocean-liner 
transport has utilized specially designed and constructed vessels for the carri-
age of containers. These vessels form part of distribution systems that also 
include specialized port facilities and inland transport equipment. Further-
more, there is not only a specialized physical infrastructure for the transport 
and handling of containers but also a supporting institutional infrastructure, 
including the valuable experience of liner operators, port authorities, inland 
transport companies and many others. 
For over 100 years, any attempt by operators of general cargo vessels to 
reflect the characteristics of trade demand and reach new scale economy levels 
was restricted by slow loading and discharge rates. As these rates limited the 
maximum  size of general-cargo vessels, if more cargoes were to be moved on a 
particular route additional vessels had to be placed in service. Containeri-
zation did not eliminate this requirement, but it raised cargo-handling rates 
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enough to permit the size of ocean-liner vessels to be increased considerably. 
For example, most general cargo vessels spend about three days In port per call, 
or about 50% of the time for an entire round-trip voyage. In contrast, con-
tainer ships have an average port-stay time of less than one day, which is 22-
28% of the time for a round-trip voyage.* 
A general cargo vessel of approximately 10 000 dwt would customarily 
require around 125 port workers during four to five days and nights to load all 
cargoes, and a similar number of workers and period to discharge them. The 
president of the International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union recently 
reported that, in 1960, U.S. west coast longshoremen used 29 million work-hours 
to move 29 million tons of cargo. By 1980, they used 18 million work-hours to 
move 114 million tons of cargo, and in 1987, they used 16 million work-hours to 
move 158 million tons of cargo. Port labour accounted for some 50-60% of total 
ocean-liner transport costs with general cargo vessels.5 
Containerization reversed the "more-with-more" requirement of general 
cargo vessels by permitting increases in productivity with fewer vessels. The 
"more-with-less" trend of containerization can be seen, for instance, from a 
declaration of Peninsular & Oriental Containers Limited (P&0CL) that it would 
need about 140 general-cargo vessels to transport the cargo now carried by its 
present fleet of 20 container ships.6 
The speed with which containers were adopted by liner vessel operators 
varied from trade to trade. After an initial period of reluctance, most operat-
ors serving trades between industrialized countries began carrying containers 
as deck cargo on their general cargo vessels. When the advantages of cellular 
container vessels were inescapable, many of them made the necessary investments 
while others entered into joint operating schemes such as consortia to reduce 
the high cost of this new technology.7 In the period 1966-1976, many Caribbean 
and Central American countries, which are predominately users of shipping ser-
vices, began to make investments in their port infrastructures to facilitate 
the handling of such units. In contrast, it was not uncil the mid-1970s that 
South American countries began to make major investments in containerization. 
The reason for this difference is that the latter countries are not only users 
but also providers of liner shipping services. Many South American countries 
had made significant investments in their shipbuilding industries and relatively 
new fleets of general cargo vessels, and were understandably reticent to make 
additional expenditures which would render their fleets obsolete as well as add 
to their already high levels of unemployment. 
Liner operators offer regular services on almost every conceivable route 
as well as multiple loading and discharge ports. This service pattern continues 
to be valid for operators of general cargo vessels. However, starting with the 
first international voyage of a container ship in 1966, and up until the early 
1970s, the service pattern of vessels carrying traditional homogeneous cargoes, 
i.e., limited routes and ports of call, was utilized. With the ever-widening 
use of containers and the construction of appropriate port facilities, container 
ship operators began to increase the number of routes and ports served. How-
ever, the multiple-route, multiple-port service pattern appears to be changing. 
Since the mid-1970s operators of container vessels have begun to limit the 
number of ports served, making extensive use intermodal landbridge distribution 
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systems. For example, Cast Ltd. (1983) offers a weekly trans-Atlantic service 
only between Montreal and Antwerp, but reaches a large hinterland behind each 
of these ports through fully-integrated inland transport systems and door-to-
door services.8 
The use of intermodal landbridge distribution systems has not only reduced 
the number of ports of call for liner vessels but also increased the hinterlands 
of ports served. With the extension of port hinterlands, there has been an 
enormous increase in competition between ports which historically served dif-
ferent geographical areas. The ports of Houston and New Orleans, for instance, 
find that their major sources of competition are not each other but rather ports 
on the U.S. west coast (Los Angeles and Long Beach) and east coa?t ^Charleston 
and Atlanta).9 Railroads presently charge approximately US$850 for the movement 
of a 40' container from Los Angeles to Houston,10 while shipping lines using the 
all-water route would charge around US$1 400 to US$1 500. The rail movement 
should take less than two days, while approximately seven days are required for 
the all-water route via the Panama Canal. According to one estimate, those 
ports are losing around 2.3 million tons of liner cargoes a year to intermodal 
landbridge operations, and the Port of New Orleans calculates that the twin 
effects of landbridges and transport deregulation have resulted in its losing 
approximately 1.4 million tons of general cargoes a year.11 
2. The impact of market forces on homogeneous liner cargoes 
Ocean transportation can be divided into two types of services—liner and tramp. 
Liner services are offered by vessels which sail fixed routes on preannounced 
schedules and transport general cargoes. Liner operators providing services 
within a defined geographic trade are organized into conferences, whose main 
purpose is to establish standard rates and limit competition. Tramp, contract 
or charter services are provided by vessels which offer their capacity for the 
carriage of cargoes such as grains, minerals, petroleum, lumber, paper, pipes, 
automobiles and sugar. Usually a liner vessel carries cargo belonging to many 
exporters and importers on each of its voyages, whereas it is more common for 
a tramp ship to carry cargo belonging to a single exporter or importer. With 
the growing use of time-volume rates, service contracts, and slot-charter 
arrangements in ocean-liner transport, the differences between liner and tramp 
carriage have become less distinct. 
If one begins with the age of modern liner shipping, which started with 
the development of the steam engine and establishment of the liner conference 
system during the 1860s, the impact of market forces on homogeneous liner 
cargoes can be clearly seen. During the early history of ocean transportation, 
all cargoes were carried by liner vessels—whether they were grains, minerals, 
petroleum, passengers or what is today referred to as general cargoes. When 
these and other homogeneous cargoes such as automobiles, pipes, paper rolls and 
lumber reached appropriate volumes, they were spun off or separated from liner 
shipping and began to be carried in specialized vessels under contractual or 
charter arrangements. 
The ocean carriage of petroleum is illustrative of the spin-off of homo-
geneous cargoes from liner transport. On 16 June 1886 the first ocean-going 
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vessel purpose-built for the carriage of bulk oil was launched, the "Gluckhauf," 
of 3 070 dwt. There were difficulties with early tankers, such as leaking from 
rivetted bulkheads, but the carriage of oil in bulk rapidly undercut the rates 
for its transportation in barrels and cans, and by 1889 over 40 tankers had been 
constructed. By 1890 there were two main routes: from Batum on the Black Sea 
to either Liverpool, Antwerp, Bremen, Hamburg or Amsterdam,  and from either New 
York or Philadelphia to those same ports. With only very minor exceptions, 
since 1890 the transportation of this homogeneous cargo has been carried out in 
specialized vessels under charter arrangements.12 
It is worth noting that vessel technologies which reduce labour require-
ments ashore are seldom immediately accepted by stevedores, and the "Gluckhauf" 
was no exception. Soon after her delivery on 9 July 1886 she arrived in Phila-
delphia to load 2 880 tons of petroleum. The stevedores at that port mounted 
a violent protest against her because there were no barrels or cases of oil for 
them to handle, and they tried to prevent her taking on any coal for the return 
voyage. It was well into the month of August before the "Gluckhauf" was able 
to sail for Europe. As a result, the vessel's owner had her bunker capacity 
enlarged to enable sufficient coal to be carried for the round voyage.13 
General cargoes have resisted the separation trend due to their nonhomo-
geneous nature and the need to handle and stow each individual unit. However, 
with the carriage of general cargoes in standard containers, they now constitute 
a homogeneous transport unit. The homogeneity of containers leads certain 
industry leaders to consider that ocean-liner transport has evolved into a bulk 
market.1'1 On the other hand, it could be argued that the trend towards the 
separation of homogeneous cargoes from liner shipping might not be applicable 
to containers, as they are homogeneous transport units rather than a homogeneous 
cargo. Another argument might be that homogeneous cargoes are usually carried 
for a relatively small number of shippers and consignees, while the goods in 
containers customarily belong to numerous shippers and consignees. It might 
also be argued that the liner shipping industry already utilizes specialized 
vessels, handling equipment and inland transport systems and has an extensive 
institutional infrastructure, whereas such infrastructures were nonexistent when 
the more traditional homogeneous cargoes separated from liner shipping. 
During the era of general cargo vessels the separation trend led to the 
removal of homogeneous cargoes from liner transport, but a substantial and grow-
ing volume of heterogeneous cargoes always remained. If the historical trend 
were applicable to the container-intensive ocean-liner environment of today, for 
all practical purposes there would be very few remaining cargoes. The reason 
for this i s that the ocean transport of containers commenced by grafting itself 
onto and then slowly taking control of—not separating from—an ailing general-
cargo industry that was labour-intensive, costly, inefficient and damage-prone. 
From the earliest days of containerization lists have been prepared and continu-
ally modified of the growing volume of general cargoes which are compatible with 
this system. For example, a liner operator recently estimated that 80% of all 
Brazilian general cargo exports are capable of being carried in containers. 
However, even this percentage could be inaccurate, as manufactured goods are 
increasingly designed to ensure full use of the cubic capacity of containers, 
to fit into a container or a specific number of container spaces. It would thus 
appear that the historical trend is not applicable to ocean-liner transport 
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because the productivity and cost-effectiveness of bulk-carriage systems have 
already been attained. 
3. The interchangeable nature of confiner transport services 
and its impact on conferences 
For more than a century, liner conferences provided operators of general cargo 
vessels with market stability for investments and income security. However, due 
to structural changes in the industry they have become increasingly unresponsive 
to trade requirements. Symptoms of this unresponsiveness can be seen in a num-
ber of areas, such as the failure to deal satisfactorily with overtonnaging and 
freight-rate fluctuations. Liner conferences have been subject to increasing 
criticism by shippers. The chairman of the British Shippers' Council recently 
stated, "European shippers have already come to the conclusion that they no 
longer benefit from the [conference] system."15 
Before goods began to be carried in containers, all ocean-liner companies 
offered a package of services with four common elements: technology, route, 
frequency and price. More important to shippers and consignees, however, were 
the service aspects involved in handling and stowing general cargoes. Handling 
and stowing were an art as well as a science, and great experience was required 
to place compatible cargoes in the same hold and to stow them appropriately for 
the rigors of ocean carriage. Shippers were known to forego vessels of one com-
pany specifically because they knew their cargoes would be better cared for by 
another. 
With the growing use of containers in ocean-liner transport, most compa-
nies which operate cellular vessels are no longer involved in the handling and 
stowage of general cargoes. To an ever increasing extent these functions are 
carried out at interior cargo terminals and factories where containers are 
filled and emptied. Such a change might appear minimal, but its impact is enor-
mous. Without the service aspects of cargo handling and stowage, ocean-liner 
services have become undifferentiated and substitutable. Containers have not 
only made ocean-liner services interchangeable but also largely deprived them 
of characteristics which would make them individually unique. Where different 
shipping companies offer similar vessel technologies, routes, frequencies and 
prices, ocean-liner services are identical. Probably the most important lesson 
to be learned from the interchangeable nature of ocean-liner services is that 
a shipping company no longer needs the 125 years of experience of Hapag-Lloyd 
to successfully engage in ocean-liner transport. 
The loss of cargo handling and storage activities by liner vessel operat-
ors also has begun to alter their legal obligations towards the goods carried. 
As an instance of this, a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, Australia, absolved an ocean carrier of any responsibility for the loss 
of goods, where the container into which they were loaded was sealed and locked 
at the shipper's warehouse, and held that the container, not its contents, is 
the subject of the statutory and contractual provisions which preclude ship-
owners from denying receipt of cargo acknowledged in a bill of lading.16 This 
decision mirrors the operational reality of liner shipping; that is, not only 
are containers filled and emptied at factories and interior cargo terminals but 
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the speed with which vessels are loaded and discharged precludes any knowledge 
of their contents by ship operators. Indeed, ship operators are informed of the 
contents of containers only when they carry refrigerated or dangerous goods. 
It would appear, therefore, that there is a trend to define the container as the 
"cargo" of ocean-liner transport. 
In response to these trends, many liner operators have followed the pat-
tern found in uniform product industries by extending the scope of traditional 
services or offering new ones in an effort to create even a transitory degree 
of uniqueness. For example, certain liner operators offer a variety of services 
such as through bills of lading, interior point rates, harmonized inland trans-
port systems, computerized cargo information systems, cargo consolidation and 
disconsolidation, pick up and final delivery of cargoes, and "just-in-time" 
deliveries. This last service is especially important for a growing number of 
clients, since it involves the integration of transport systems into production 
and distribution activities so that frequent and uninterrupted deliveries of 
goods can permit a reduction in the volume, the carrying costs, and the amount 
of capital tied up in inventories. 
Notwithstanding the differential advantages these activities might provide 
a liner operator in the short term, it must be understood that the tendency of 
firms in uniform product industries to duplicate or competitively match the of-
ferings of their rivals almost guarantees that liner services will become undif-
ferentiated and substitutable once again. Where competing ocean-liner companies 
offer the same technology, route and frequency, price becomes the deciding 
factor in the selection of a carrier. 
The growing influence of nonconference carriers and the weakening of the 
liner conference system are directly related to the interchangeable nature of 
ocean-liner services. When containers were introduced into Australian trades 
in the early 1970s, for instance, liner conferences were estimated to be carry-
ing slightly in excess of 90% of all cargoes. By late 1986 that amount had 
fallen to 40% in the Australia-U.S. west coast trade.17 In the westbound trans-
Atlantic trade, the North Europe U.S. Atlantic Conference (NEAC) now controls 
less than 50% of the market. Non-NEAC members include major trans-Atlantic 
carriers such as Evergreen Line, Maersk Line, Mediterranean Shipping Company, 
Orient Overseas Container Line and a number of smaller independents. NEAC 
members are Atlantic Container Line, Compagnie Générale Maritime, Gulf Container 
Line, Hapag-Lloyd, Nedlloyd Lines, Sea-Land Services and Trans Freight Lines, 
and they have not made any larger commitment  to the trade than the previously 
mentioned nonconference lines.18 
Another example would be the April 1988 announcement of Maersk Line that 
it is to begin a nonconference service in the trade covered by the U.S. Pacific 
Coast European Conference (PCEC). This prompted Gearbulk Container Services 
(GCS) and Johnson ScanStar (JSS) to withdraw from the PCEC in early June 1988. 
Gearbulk Container Services not only withdrew from the PCEC but also terminated 
its operations.19 In order to maintain its service, JSS is to slot charter a 
minimum  of 300 spaces weekly with Evergreen Line's round-the-world service. The 
chairman of the PCEC indicated that, before these withdrawals, conference 
carriers controlled only 55% of the trade. In response to the Maersk, GCS and 
JSS decisions, Sea-Land Services has announced its own withdrawal from the PCEC. 
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With only Hapag-Lloyd and Pacific Europe Express remaining in the conference, 
and their overall share representing only 20-25% of the market, one might 
question the extent to which the PCEC will have an influence on the trade. 
Sea-Land Services, Trans Freight Lines and Nedlloyd have entered into a 
three-year slot-charter agreement to jointly utilize the 12 ex-United States 
Lines' econoships in Europe-U.S. east coast trades, For U.S. west coast cargoes 
they offer a minibridge service through the port of Houston. Vessel and slot 
allocations are as follows: (i) four vessels to a weekly North Europe-U.S. North 
Atlantic service (SLS 55.3%, TFL 25.2% and Nedlloyd 19.2%); (ii) five vessels 
to a weekly North Europe-U.S. South Atlantic and Gulf Coast service (SLS 62%, 
TFL 24% and Nedlloyd 14%); and (iii) three vessels to a 10-day Mediterranean-
U.S. North and South Atlantic service (SLS 60%, TFL 20% and Nedlloyd 20)%.20 In 
early September 1988, those three carriers requested approval from the U.S. 
Federal Maritime Commission to enter into a another slot-charter arrangement for 
approximately 150 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit, a measure of volume equiva-
lent to the space occupied by a 20' x 8' x 8' container) weekly with Hapag-Lloyd 
and Pacific Europe Express, who are the remaining members of the PCEC, so that 
they might also offer an all-water service to Europe from the U.S. west coast.21 
The Spanish liner operator Compañía Transatlántica Española announced in late 
September 1988 its plans to enter into a slot chartering arrangement with SLS, 
TFL and Nedlloyd in their Mediterranean-U.S. North and South Atlantic service.22 
Liner conferences are composed of one or more of three distinct elements: 
consortia, the traditional breakbulk or general cargo functions, and rate 
agreements. However, this composition is evolving toward a new structure, as 
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While the reasons for establishing general cargo conferences are well 
known and documented, most commentators consider the creation of consortia and 
rate agreements to be merely an extension of the original conference framework. 
However, these new arrangements have come about due to a myriad of factors such 
as the interchangeable or identical nature of container transport systems, new 
legal regimes such as the U.S. Shipping Act of 1984, intermodal ism, large-scale 
vessels and overtonnaging, which are exogenous to and often in contradiction 
with the conference system. 
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In this most international of businesses, shipping lines without joint 
operating arrangements with other ocean carriers are the exception rather than 
the rule. Ship operators have gone from total independence and loose combina-
tions in the form of general cargo conferences to tighter relationships such as 
consortia, slot chartering and joint marketing arrangements. A consortium al-
lows individual liner companies from one or more countries to operate as though 
they were one line, with each member maintaining its identity and control over 
certain activities such as marketing, whereas in an consolidated line (CL), par-
ticipants lose their identity and permit control over activities to be carried 
out by a new central organization. In order to establish consortia, CLs or 
joint operating agreements, there must be a willingness among participating 
liner companies to compromise in areas such as objectives, ownership of shares, 
investments (types, amounts and frequency), duration and financial compensation. 
The need to compromise does not necessarily mean that national interests will 
not be satisfied, because all arrangements should be evaluated in the light of 
these interests. 
A fundamental corollary of the need to compromise in order to achieve 
common objectives is the requirement that participants utilize or combine the 
inherent advantages and least-cost factors available to each. The search for 
least-cost factors could give rise to CLs on a global scale. For example, the 
flag or even the ownership of a vessel could become meaningless when a ship is 
crewed in one country, managed from another, financed elsewhere and is part of 
an international distribution chain which might see the ship operating between 
two other countries for its entire economic life.23 The question then becomes 
how to formulate national maritime policies and plans in order to take into 
account not only national interests but also the trend towards tighter and more 
extensive relationships between liner operators. 
If the trend towards ever tighter and more extensive relationships between 
liner operators continues, Latin American liner companies run the very real risk 
of becoming part of large, extraregionally controlled CLs. Currently, vessel 
operators of this region are slowly being absorbed into extraregional consortia, 
with the attendant risk of becoming minority stockholders or single vessel 
operators in resulting CLs. This could mean a loss of control over their ocean-
liner activities and over the important role of shipping in trade promotion. 
On the other hand, the establishment of regional consortia, which could include 
appropriate arrangements with extraregional consortia, should lessen the risk. 
However, the long-term impact of this trend should be studied in order to answer 
numerous questions, such as: What is an appropriate presence in ocean-liner 
transport for Latin American and Caribbean countries, and what would be the 
response of extraregional CLs to the individual transportation needs of this 
region? Responses to these and other questions will help shipping lines and 
governments of this region to elaborate common policies and plans for ocean-
liner transport. 
Rate agreements have replaced traditional conferences on numerous trade 
routes, especially those to and from the U.S. A major reason for this is that 
the U.S. Shipping Act of 1984 has given individual lines numerous new tools 
which enable them to respond more rapidly to shippers' requirements. These 
legislative tools include the right to quote independent freight rates, enter 
into service contracts and offer time/volume rates, all of which contradict the 
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traditional conference structure that allows competition between its members 
only on service activities, never on price. Service contracts are agreements 
by which a shipper or group of shippers offers a certain volume of cargo over 
a fixed period of time in exchange for a guaranteed rate and service commitment 
from a carrier or conference. The gains shippers derive from such contracts are 
lower administrative costs, reduced inventory levels, stabilized freight rates 
and a reduction of errors in trade and transport documentation. On the other 
hand, carriers find that service contracts have resulted in liner tariffs becom-
ing increasingly meaningless. Without the traditional conference powers to 
ensure compliance with standard rates and to minimize competition, rate agree-
ments have become "talking shops" for carriers. Rate agreements could evolve 
into meeting places for owners' and charterers' brokers to negotiate and formal-
ize contractual arrangements for the carriage of containers. 
4. Economies of scale 
Economies of scale in manufacturing refer to a reduction of average production 
costs as the size of a plant increases. Applied to liner shipping this would 
mean increasing vessel sizes to lower average transport costs per container. 
Full exploitation of economies of scale in the liner shipping industry is limit-
ed by the size of the demand for transport services. For individual liner 
operators, this means that the overall demand in the trade routes served must 
be measured against factors such as competition, frequency requirements of ship-
pers and consignees, balance and seasonality of cargo flows, etc. In this con-
text, economies of scale in ocean-liner shipping can exist at almost any vessel 
capacity range. For example, short-sea transport operators might have economies 
of scale at a maximum  of 250 TEU per ship, whereas for deep-sea operators in 
north-south trades the figure could be 1 500 TEU, and for those in east-west 
trades it might reach 4 000 TEU. 
In general terms, when selecting a vessel for an ocean-liner service the 
following three areas are normally considered: (i) costs (operating, invest-
ment, charter, etc.), (ii) physical limits (ports, canals, etc.) and (iii) trade 
requirements (volumes and types of goods, degree of imbalance, seasonality, 
frequency needs of shippers and consignees, competition, etc.). To achieve the 
desired economies of scale, the now-bankrupt United States Lines, for instance, 
focused heavily on investment costs and physical limits in the trade route and 
constructed 12 large-scale 4 458 TEU vessels to a length of 949.8' (289.5 m) and 
a beam of 105.7' (32.2 m). These dimensions were selected to obtain a very low 
container transport cost per mile (US$0.034 at 100% utilization) while ensuring 
that the vessels could transit the Panama Canal in the company's round-the-world 
service.. Based upon a crude petroleum price of US$30 and an estimated price of 
US$50 by 1990, these vessels were equipped with main propulsion diesel motors 
that would provide a maximum  speed of 18.5 knots, which is 25% slower than the 
vessels of its major competitor Evergreen Line. With the reduction in the price 
of crude petroleum to betwe en US$10 and US$18, this speed became uncompetitive. 
The United States Lines operational strategy also contributed to its down-
fall. Of the three principal east-west container trades (Asia-U.S., Europe-U.S. 
and Asia-Europe), the eastbound-only round-the-world service of United States 
Lines permitted it to participate in the import demand of the U.S. from Asia but 
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excluded it from the demands of the U.S. from Europe and of Europe from Asia.24 
To avoid competition with its all-water service, United States Lines withdrew 
from five Far East-U.S. east coast conferences when they refused to set rates 
15% lower than those of minibridge services via the U.S. west coast.25 
Among other factors contributing to the failure of United States Lines 
were daily labour costs more than five times greater than those of Evergreen 
Line, and the focus of its service on ISO 40' containers where the traffic ten-
dency was toward 20' units. Furthermore, the 12 ships previously mentioned were 
designed with an electrical generating capacity adequate for only 146 TEU each 
of refrigerated containers. Every 30 TEU by which this capacity was increased 
required the installation of a separate diesel generator and a tank container 
for fuel that together take up two TEU of cargo space.26 The experience of 
United States Lines indicates that scale-economy vessels are those which lower 
the average transport cost per container and, at the same time, reflect trade 
characteristics in areas such as types and volumes of cargoes in movement, 
degree of imbalance, frequency requirements of shippers and consignees, actual 
and projected competition, etc. 
That trade requirements and not technological possibilities determine 
vessel economies of scale was clearly demonstrated In 1858 by Isambard Kingdom 
Brunei, a British marine engineer, who constructed the 692' (210.9 m) "Great 
Eastern." This ship dwarfed every other vessel built before the twentieth 
century, but she was not a success because, apart from a lack of adequate main 
propulsion engines, she lacked ports and trade flows to match her capacity.27 
Even though liner shipping companies dimension their fleets and utilize 
operational strategies which are appropriate for the trade requirements in the 
routes served, shippers and consignees might find that the economies of scale 
offered do not lower transport costs sufficiently to ensure the competitiveness 
of their goods in very demanding international markets. The reason for this is 
that, in the determination of appropriate scale economies, vessel operators must 
take into account the aforementioned factors not only on the trade routes in 
which they participate but also on the routes of the major competitors of the 
shippers and consignees served. For example, if leather shoes of the same qual-
ity and cost are manufactured in two distinct regions for export to the U.S., 
those shoes which must absorb higher ocean-liner freight rates will have a smal-
ler market share. Although approximately 50% of such rates are related to port 
and land transport services, carriers can lower the portion corresponding to 
vessels by using larger ones to increase economies of scale, but only up to a 
point that reflects trade requirements. Further increases require that addi-
tional cargoes be obtained, either from the use of flexible vessel designs which 
permit the carriage of normally incompatible cargoes, or from neighboring coun-
tries which have similar origins and destinations. 
To illustrate the relation between economies of scale and the competitive-
ness of goods in international markets, data were taken from the Containerisa-
tion International Yearbook. 1987, regarding (i) all liner shipping companies 
offering trans-Atlantic services between Canada and the U.S. on the one hand, 
and European countries on the other, and (ii) all liner shipping companies of-
fering services between southern hemisphere countries of this region (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) and Canada, Europe, and the 
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U.S. From this survey it was found that there are 66 companies serving trans -
Atlantic trades with 256 vessels of 309 342 TEU capacity. In contrast, there 
are 81 companies providing services between southern hemisphere countries of 
this region and Canada, Europe and the U.S. with 280 vessels of 146 965 TEU 
capacity. The average vessel sizes for east-west and north-south trades, 
respectively, are 1 208 TEU and 542 TEU. This difference in average vessel size 
clearly shows that ocean-liner transport between northern hemisphere countries 
achieve greater economies of scale, which contribute through lower freight rates 
to the competitiveness of goods manufactured in those countries as compared with 
southern hemisphere products. 
Evidently, the carrying capacity of vessels to achieve economies of scale 
varies from trade to trade. For example, the Baltic Shipping Company is to 
lengthen six of its cellular container vessels to increase their capacity from 
900 TEU to 1 200 TEU each. It was found that their original capacity was inef-
ficient in the growing Asia-Baltic Sea trade, as the optimum is around 1 300 TEU 
per vessel.28 
It was mentioned earlier that north-south economies of scale might result 
in a vessel of 1 500 TEU, but that size might be insufficient to provide freight 
rates low enough to make goods from this region competitive in the North Ameri-
can market with those from other regions. If compatible origin and destination 
cargoes of neighboring countries could be carried, the size might be increased 
to—for instance—2 000 TEU, which would contribute to the competitiveness of 
these goods in the North American market. Notwithstanding this gain, it must 
be recognized that, if such a 2 000 TEU vessel were to continue on to Asia or 
Europe after reaching North America, the scale economies of vessels on those 
routes is currently somewhere between 3 000 and 4 000 TEU. While numerous liner 
operators such as American President Lines, Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd are building 
vessels in this range, there is nothing immutable or sacrosanct about it. For 
example, plans were recently announced for a US$150 million vessel capable of 
transporting 12 000 TEU in six barges. Project designers estimate that two ves-
sels could provide a weekly two-port service between Europe and the U.S. east 
coast with a cost reduction of 30% to 40%.29 
The final objective of creating these economies of scale is to enhance the 
competitiveness of Latin American and Caribbean products in Asian, European and 
North American markets. In order to accomplish this, the differences between 
vessel scales in east-west and north-south trading must be reconciled, not only 
through the use of flexible designs but also by transporting the cargoes of 
neighboring countries and by offering cross-trader services between countries 
of the northern hemisphere. 
5. Computerized information processing and communications 
In 1966, the international transportation of containers was a visionary under-
taking, but a mere four years later containers had become the basis of ocean-
liner transport. Twenty years later, the use of computers in the liner shipping 
industry is likewise often a matter of vision, but within a very short period 
of time computers will become the basis for the operation and control of con-
tainers and their cargoes, charter arrangements, consortia, port operations, 
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Customs formalities, inland transport services and many other distribution chain 
activities. The liner shipping industry has been slow to see the advantages of 
computer applications in its daily activities, but the prospects of real commer-
cial gains will be an important incentive for their utilization. 
Computers are no longer just a "management aid," but rather a "production 
tool" that will accelerate the market, service, technological and legal forces 
now transforming the liner shipping industry. The computer as a production tool 
and as a means of accelerating change is so important that the impact of the 
silicon chip on the industry has been compared to that of the container in 1960: 
just as the container totally transformed ocean-liner transport, so also will 
computerized information processing and communications. The Port of Rotterdam 
considers computerized information processing and communications its "fifth mode 
of transport."30 The areas in which computers find their greatest applications 
in the liner shipping industry are related to ship operations, container opera-
tions, communications between ships and ports, and between ports, inland trans-
port modes, interior cargo terminals, national Customs authorities, shippers and 
consignees. 
Computers and communications technology permit vessels to prepare and 
transmit to ports data regarding container stowage, tank contents, etc. , so that 
port officials can prepare discharge and loading plans, determine equipment 
requirements and identify shoreside storage locations for incoming and departing 
containers. These communication links also provide information related to navi-
gation and weather routing. In a like manner, the same technology permits ports 
to communicate with inland transport modes, interior cargo terminals and nation-
al Customs authorities. For example, Customs can receive information regarding 
goods which are to enter and leave the country many days before the vessel 
arrives. With such information containers can be preselected for inspection, 
while others can be precleared if all required documents have been filed. In 
addition to the rapid clearance of imports, the electronic handling of infor-
mation has enabled the U.S. Customs Service to reduce its processing costs from 
US$28 per document to US$3.31 
Computer-to-computer communications between vessel operators, ports, 
Customs authorities, land transport companies, shippers and consignees who use 
electronic versions of common business documents is referred to as electronic 
data interchange (EDI).32 In effect, EDI is "paperless trading" by which 
commercial activities may be carried out on the basis of electronic documents. 
EDI is not just a convenient method of moving data but also a new form of man-
agement. On the Burlington Northern Railroad in the U.S., for example, before 
a train departs Chicago carrying containers bound for the port of Seattle, 
Washington, computers in Chicago automatically transmit data about the contents, 
destination and status of those containers to other computers in Seattle. 
The growth rate of this new industry has been estimated at 73% a year 
through 1992.3* The major obstacle to even greater growth is the lack of data 
interchange standards, a subject that is now being addressed through development 
of the United Nations Rules for Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, 
Commerce and Transport (UN/EDIFACT). This standardization effort is being car-
ried out under the joint leadership of the Economic Commission for Europe and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), whose Working 
Party 4 seeks to establish standards for data elements and automatic data inter-
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change. The group is composed of three rapporteurs representing, respectively, 
the member countries of the European Economic Community and the European Free 
Trade Association, the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance, and Canada and the United States.35 
Electronic information systems already have transformed air transport, 
whether one looks at passenger or cargo movements, and the changes in that 
industry often provide a preview of what could take place in the liner shipping 
industry. For example, the national Customs authorities of many Latin American 
and Caribbean countries utilize the same regulations at airports and seaports. 
However, when one compares the different procedures employed to apply those 
regulations at each location, it become clear that enormous strides have been 
made to simplify them at airports so that passenger and cargo movements can be 
expedited. Freight forwarders working in air and ocean transport often refer 
to this anomaly in terms of, "One would think that they were in two different 
countries." Similarly, it is entirely conceivable that the liner shipping 
industry could follow its air counterpart and, in the not so distant future, 
begin to sell container slots and make cargo routings by computer. 
Computerized information and communications systems are restructuring 
trade routes, decreasing the importance of certain ports and increasing traffic 
flows through others, lessening the cost implications of time and distance to 
markets, emphasizing the need for harmonization of all transport modes and lead-
ing the transportation industry towards a greater involvement in manufacturing 
and retailing.36 Certain commentators even gone so far as to suggest that EDI 
will make a major contribution to the creation of a single European Community 
market (evaluated below in part III C) by the end of 1992.37 The general manag-
er of container control for Rotterdam's Europe Container Terminus has indicated 
that the introduction of EDI can lead to an average 7% decrease in the price of 
consumer goods, and the offer of such systems by liner vessel operators has be-
come synonymous with service quality.38 Ship-to-shore satellite links make it 
possible for data to be exchanged between shipboard and shoreside computers. 
One vessel operator has found that, by changing from telex to satellite data 
transmission, its annual communications costs were reduced from US$180 000 to 
US$30 000.39 
Another example of the application of satellite communications technology 
is that of trucking company, which by this means can locate its trucks to within 
one-sixteenth of a mile and determine the exact condition of the goods carried. 
The company is so confident of its ability to make precise "just-in-time" deliv-
eries that it offers to pay a US$30 000 penalty for each hour of delay.40 
To take full advantage of intermodalism, all activities in the distri-
bution chain must be co-ordinated. Only computers and modern communications 
technology can cope with the complexity of integrating an astronomical number 
of diverse activities in the distribution chain in order to create the necessary 
institutional and physical ties. Computers and communications technology not 
only place seemingly disparate elements of the distribution chain together in 
imaginative ways but also can permit a total, global dialogue between all such 
elements. As a result, computers and communications technology are making an 
important contribution to the modification of traditional industry concepts such 
as "acceptable times" for the movement of goods, "necessary space" for goods 
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handling and storage, "location" of the goods and "responsibility" for delays 
and damage to them. In effect, the integration of activities in the distribu-
tion chain by computers and communications technology precludes any considera-
tion of them individually, as integration has changed such activities both in 
nature and scope. 
B. THE CREATION OF NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN PURCHASING, 
MARKETING AND DISTRIBUTION 
Integration of the physical elements and institutional activities in a trade 
route to create an intermodal distribution system became an operational reality 
with the removal of numerous market, service, technological and legal obstacles. 
The initiative to eliminate such obstacles came from producers, who found them-
selves facing an increasing proliferation of goods in very competitive world 
markets. Producers customarily responded to such competition by increasing 
marketing efforts, manufacturing efficiency and labour productivity. However, 
the fruits of these measures decreased markedly in the years following the first 
oil crisis of October 1973. With producers unable to obtain a competitive 
advantage from the above measures and facing an uncertain commercial-monetary 
environment, they turned to logistics or physical distribution management. 
The concept of logistics management has been described as the grouping 
together of all activities in a business that are related to product flows and 
associated services, so as to handle them collectively. In order to understand 
this concept it is essential to apply to logistics management what is called the 
"systems approach," which consists in optimizing the system as a whole rather 
than trying to optimize any Isolated element or part of the system.41 
Logistics or physical distribution management is the sum of inbound and 
outbound transportation plus inventory carrying costs, as well as the costs 
associated with measures utilized to specialize, integrate, improve, control and 
reduce those factors. For example, in the early 1980s a European automobile 
manufacturer found that, due to port congestion at a Middle East country, its 
deliveries were being delayed by as much as nine months. After failing to con-
vince liner operators of the opportunities for action, it established a roll-
on/roll- off service and spent US$8 million on terminal facilities in order to 
release US$100 million investment in inventory.*2 American President Companies, 
the parent of American President Lines, estimates that logistics can account for 
approximately 20% of the cost of manufactured products.*3 Once intermodal sys-
tems have been established, producers and sellers of industrial products move 
into the logistics intensive business which encompasses the transportation of 
raw materials, the distribution of finished goods and inventory control. 
The logistics systems established to control such activities vary greatly 
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The relevance of the intimate relation between transportation and purchas-
ing, on the one hand, and marketing and distribution, on the other, can be seen 
from the importance given to inventory conversion velocity (ICV) during the last 
five years. ICV is usually defined as the time period from the purchase of raw 
materials until they are transformed into accounts receivable.44 During this 
period, most manufacturers incur expenses for the acquisition, transportation 
and storage of raw materials in their plants, and the fabrication, storage and 
distribution of the finished goods. Logistics focuses on raw materials and 
finished goods inventories and their transport systems. It involves the use of 
computerized information and communication technologies to integrate activities 
in a distribution chain, as well as to time the arrival of raw materials and the 
departure of finished goods, so that carrying costs of and investment in inven-
tories can be reduced. 
In the past, transport services were considered consumer in nature, merely 
increasing the cost of the raw materials and manufactured goods carried. Today, 
however, the seamless integration of all activities in the distribution chain 
permits transportation to make a contribution to the value of the goods in move-
ment. When the transportation of raw materials and the distribution of finished 
goods are incorporated into productive processes and supported by computerized 
information and communications systems, for instance, much greater control can 
be exercised over inventory levels and related costs. This control has two 
facets: first, the movement of raw materials and finished goods can be monitored 
so closely that they can be considered part of inventory even while in transit; 
and second, the reliability of transport systems is so high that inventory 
levels can be reduced. The reduction in inventory levels permits capital that 
would be tied up in them, or utilized to pay for storage, handling and insurance 
costs, to be employed in other remunerative activities. 
Probably the best example of this would be automobile manufacturers which 
utilize computers to link up with all their subcontractors providing components. 
Both manufacturers and subcontractors establish quality control and ensure the 
flow of components for final assembly is continuous and in the right amounts, 
to eliminate the need for large inventories and equally large carrying costs. 
For carriers this process means that if they are not connected to manufacturers' 
and subcontractors' computer networks they would find themselves locked out of 
a market for their services. This is especially drastic for developing country 
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carriers who might lack the funds and critical mass of skills to purchase and 
utilize such systems. A similar instance of this would be the need to have 
access to global hotel and airlines computerized reservation systems in order 
to promote and attract tourists and tourism earnings. 
When selecting a carrier, ocean-liner rates are important, but they are 
only one of the factors taken into consideration by shippers. Indeed, shippers 
and consignees have begun to utilize wider parameters such as total distribution 
costs for shipments and give considerable weight to the impact on inventory car-
rying cost if one carrier's frequency and transit time are more convenient than 
another's. To minimize inventory investment and holding costs cargo owners look 
for a continuous flow of goods which permits them to reduce the volume of goods 
held in inventory and, at the same time, ensures that their productive processes 
will not be interrupted due to a late delivery. The emphasis on precisely-timed 
deliveries could also lead to time limit guarantees and thus to basic changes 
in the contractual relationship between shippers and carriers.43 
The increasing use of contract arrangements in the liner shipping industry 
should permit manufacturers, integrated trading companies and others to view 
transportation as part of their purchasing, marketing and stock departments, 
with shippers, consignees and carriers jointly devising systems and procedures 
to reduce cargo damage and ensure timely deliveries. With service contracts, 
public carriers have begun to look more and more like private carriers.46 In 
fact, through service contracts public carriers become part of private logistics 
chains. Such chains are designed through the collaboration of carriers and 
shippers and seek to provide a high level of personalized service. Through 
service contracts, shippers and consignees have begun to seek creative and inno-
vative transport partners who will share risks and rewards and offer total co-
operation in order to obtain the objectives of safe product transportation, 
economy, forward planning, incorporation of new technologies and expanded use 




STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN INLAND TRANSPORT 
The profound structural changes being experienced by liner services affect what 
happens in the field of inland transport, and vice versa. As mentioned in chap-
ter I, these changes are causing the activities of ocean shipping companies to 
be increasingly integrated with those of land transport modes. This is not 
merely a general consequence of change but, in many cases, comes about as a 
direct result of shipping lines' needs to increase their presence in and influ-
ence over markets for transport services from origin to destination. What hap-
pens today in one part of the world will affect transport decisions taken tomor-
row in another, whether in the developed or in the developing countries. 
Because ocean and land transport are inseparable, Latin American and the 
Caribbean are not isolated from structural changes occurring in the interior of 
countries with which they carry out their foreign trade. To ensure that its 
products remain competitive in world markets, the region must thoroughly under-
stand such changes, especially those occurring in Europe and in North America, 
two areas which purchase the majority of this region's exports and are also 
large suppliers of its imports. At the same time, it must carefully study the 
best way to ensure its full insertion in new transport structures that emphasize 
a systems approach for the integration of all modes within a context of trans-
port deregulation, changes in the dimensions of containers and the transfer of 
many port services to interior cargo terminals. 
A. INTERMODALISM  AS A SYSTEMS APPROACH 
With the advent of containerization in the late 1950s, the terms combined trans-
port, multimodal transport and intermodal transport came into use. These terms 
are often considered to be equivalent and thus employed interchangeably, yet in 
fact they represent distinct services. In the early years of containerization, 
the differences caused few difficulties. With the continuing evolution of liner 
services, however, it has now become useful to assign a precise meaning to each 
of these terms in order to clarify the fundamental difference between them. 
1. Definitions 
Combined transport involves the conveyance of one transport vehicle by another 
—for example, a semitrailer on a railway flatcar or a rail wagon on a ferry.48 
Combinations of this type permit the extension of one means of transportation 
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by another as a function of the best features of each, and offer advantages such 
as reductions in cargo handling operations and in port stay times for vessels. 
Multimodal transport Is an institutional concept that involves the car-
riage of goods by two or more modes while covered by a single bill of lading, 
which is issued by a multimodal transport operator (MTO) who assumes responsi-
bility as a principal, not as an agent, for the entire operation from origin to 
destination. The United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Trans-
port of Goods, although not yet in force, provides the institutional and legal 
structure for such operations. 
Historically, intermodal transport was simply a transfer of goods between 
different modes. Today, this term implies a systems approach to all activities 
and functions in the distribution chain in order to reduce and, where possible, 
eliminate interruptions in the continuous movement of goods and transport equip-
ment from origin to destination. No distribution chain activity can be treated 
in isolation, because each has interfaces with others that can increase or 
reduce system efficiencies. 
While combined, multimodal and intermodal transport are different con-
cepts, they can be utilized simultaneously. For example, an MTO can issue a 
single bill of lading for goods carried by a truck which will later be loaded 
on a rail wagon for part of the journey, in the interest of integrating distri-
bution chain functions and optimizing the resulting system. The MTO is thus 
linking the multimodal institutional concept and a combined transport service 
with an intermodal systems approach. 
2. The systems approach to transport services 
Intermodalism marks a change in concept from "modal fragmentation" to "modal 
integration"—that is, from the independent optimization of each mode to the 
optimization of the entire system. This is not to say that the efficient opera-
tion of each separate mode is not important, only that it becomes necessary to 
define this importance in terms of overall system efficiency. Indeed, the rela-
tive inefficiency or lower productivity of one mode may be acceptable if it 
results in proportionately greater gains for the entire system. For example, 
in the transfer of containers between vessels and railway wagons, use of a tem-
porary storage area may be preferable to direct transshipment if it reduces the 
overall investment in facilities and container handling equipment, even though 
it involves double handling of the containers. A systems approach eliminates 
the compartmentalization of individual activities in the distribution chain and 
joins them in new and more powerful combinations to achieve increased levels of 
efficiency. With system optimization, the challenge is no longer to design and 
construct vessels, rail wagons or trucks, but rather to design and construct 
distribution systems that include these as well as many other elements. 
Due to the growing interdependence of all activities in the distribution 
chain, there is a need to create and strengthen structural ties between modes 
and functions to take advantage of the benefits of system optimization. Such 
structural ties, which are both institutional and physical, seek to ensure the 
continuous movement of goods and transport equipment from origin to destination. 
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Apart from containers themselves, probably the most common physical ties are 
computers and communications technology, which bring the diverse elements of a 
distribution chain, together in order that they may function as a system. Some 
of the more important institutional ties include the reduction, simplification 
and harmonization of trade procedures and the requirements of national Customs 
authorities, banks and insurance companies, and an international regime to 
define the rights and obligations of all participants in the distribution chain. 
The establishment of intermodal systems is not always attractive to tradi-
tional modal operators. Senator Linie, for instance, emphasizes that it will 
adhere to the port-to-port concept and provide only limited inland transport 
services within about 250 miles of the ports it utilizes. The major reason for 
such resistance is that liability levels for inland services exceed those estab-
lished for maritime transport by the Hague Rules.*9 Some vessel operators who 
offer origin-to-destination services stipulate in their bills of lading that 
they will act only as agents for shippers in contracting inland transport ser-
vices. Others who provide all-water services to two or more of the U.S. coasts 
consider that these services largely preclude the need to invest in land trans-
port equipment or establish transcontinental double-stack train operations.50 
For liner vessel operators, inland services represent a radical shift of direc-
tion from—and often a negation of—their traditional operating procedures. 
In spite of the resistance put up by some shipping firms, the ocean trans-
port sector is leading the way in the introduction of intermodal services. One 
of the most important reasons for this is the cost of moving containers between 
the dockside and the forwarding or shipping agent in the interior of the coun-
try. Some liner services point out that land transport costs are four or five 
times higher per TEU-km than are ocean transport costs, which represent less 
than 30 to 35% of their overall costs. They have therefore been forced to 
explore the monitoring of inland operations as a measure necessary to keep their 
total costs under control.51 
Cargo control is another matter of importance. In Europe, for example, 
unitarization and other changes in the management of physical distribution make 
it possible for freight to be moved door to door rather than only between ports. 
This has given rise to a large variety of transport conditions to which liner 
companies have had to respond by offering greater control along their entire 
routes, either by providing warehouses, fleets of trucks and boats, and facili-
ties for the distribution, storage and packing of freight, or by working through 
designated agents. In some regions, highly organized networks of agencies are 
available, whose members have their own transshipment terminals and facilities 
that can be used along with other services they provide. Non-vessel operating 
common carriers (NVOCC) also often establish warehousing sysems for collecting 
and delivering less-than-container-load (LCL) traffic (goods in different lots 
within a single container) and full-container-load traffic (a container loaded 
with a single consignment of goods) as a means of maintaining control over 
freight whose transportation will later be entrusted to liner services,52 
A similar trend is evident in North America. Although there are now ample 
opportunities for greater co-operation between railways and road transport 
companies, the ocean transport sector is still taking the lead in the move to 
intermodalism. Shipping lines that specialize in the carriage of containers 
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have been particularly active in promoting the use of direct port-to-port trans-
portation covered by a single document and subject to a single tariff ("through 
transport") as a means of exercising control over all intermodal movements of 
containerized freight. Cast Line of Canada, for example, adopted this approach 
several years ago, but it could not be put into practice in the United States 
until transport deregulation was started in 1980.53 
Another innovation favoured by shipping lines was the use of double-stack 
rail wagons for transporting containers. In 1972, Sea-Land collaborated with 
the Southern Pacific railway to initiate the carriage of containers between the 
U.S. west and Gulf coasts.54 Since then, an ever-growing number of liner 
operators and railways have followed in their footsteps. In another pioneering 
move, Sea-Land and Southern Pacific introduced the double-stack rail wagon on 
services between Los Angeles and the U.S. Gulf coast in 1981. Going a step fur-
ther, in April 1984 American President Lines established a regularly-scheduled 
double-stack block or unit train service after successfully testing the concept 
a year earlier.55 Innovations such as these have been cited as evidence that 
intermodalism is the most recent step in the container revolution, which was 
originally instigated and Is still promoted by the liner shipping industry.56 
B. TRANSPORT DEREGULATION 
It has always been theoretically possible to integrate liner shipping, ports, 
inland transport and their support activities. Nonetheless, the practical 
realization of this possibility could not occur without the removal of numerous 
restrictions, the most importait of which were national regulatory regimes that 
prohibited not only the merger or consolidation of transport companies but also 
price competition between operators of the same mode.57 The purpose of these 
regimes was to avoid the creation of monopolies, provide a basic remuneration 
to carriers and ensure services to small communities. They sought to achieve 
national objectives and were not unduly burdensome on international trade as 
long as domestic economies were largely self-sufficient. However, with the 
creation of a global economy in which countries must trade in very demanding 
international markets, such regulations burden exporters and importers with 
unnecessary costs that can reduce the competitiveness of their products. 
In Europe, transportation has always been subject to strict government 
control. However, recent proposals for policies that would tend to liberalize 
at least international transport would probably diversify the offer of transport 
services. It may therefore be predicted that, in the European Economic 
Community (EEC) , competition and intermodal co-operation will be promoted and 
a wider range of transport services will probably be available after 1993, when 
the Single European Act (which will be dealt with in greater detail in the next 
chapter) comes into full effect. In addition to pressures within the EEC 
itself, the increased flexibility and efficiency resulting from the deregulation 
of transportation in the United States have become too important to be ignored. 
Prior to U.S. deregulation of rail and highway transportation, carriers 
were interested not so much in whether they used their equipment efficiently as 
in whether they could use it profitably, They made little effort to locate 
backhaul cargoes, and merely added the cost for the empty part of a trip to the 
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rate for the loaded portion. Any carrier desiring to operate in all 48 conti-
nental states was required to file 708 different annual reports and make pay-
ments to 76 government agencies with separate checks, which was estimated by 
the U.S. Department of Transportation to cost in excess of US$1 000 Billion each 
year.50 If a trucking company had an Interstate Commerce Commission permit, it 
did not even have to own trucks to make a profit, since it could rent the permit 
to a second company for actual operations. So inflexible and costly was the 
U.S. regulatory scheme for land transportation that manufacturers were able to 
justify establishing their own private fleets of trucks, even though these were 
operating empty 30-40% of the time.39 
This situation change dramatically in 1980 when the U.S. ended the regula-
tion of inland transport by adopting the Staggers Rail Act and the Motor Carrier 
Act. In March 1981, the scope of the Staggers Act was extended to exempt from 
regulation rail and truck transportation provided by rail carriers in connection 
with highway trailer on railway flatcar (T0FC) and container on railway flatcar 
(COFC) services, including such services when performed with cargo having a 
prior or subsequent movement by ocean carrier.60 These deregulatory measures, 
together with the Shipping Act of 1984, eliminated bureaucratic constraints on 
competition between modes of transportation and increased productivity through 
service and technological innovations. They have permitted carriers to compete 
with each other on price, extend the scope of their operations and make cross -
modal mergers such as the acquisition of liner operator Sea-Land by the CSX Cor-
poration, which has extensive interests in rail and barge transport.61 Deregu-
lation has also been the factor most responsible for the growing importance of 
intermodalism in the U.S., since carriers can now legally enter into joint 
transport arrangements and quote through intermodal rates. 
C. CHANGES IN CONTAINER DIMENSIONS 
The history of containerization during its first two decades shows that the 
technological changes it induced in other parts of the transport industry re-
quired a fairly long period for commercial, financial, legal and social accept-
ance. These changes rarely followed a straight path, often proceeding as part 
of a dynamic but erratic process. Recently, however, the pace of change has 
accelerated in response to the Incentives of both the systems approach and 
transport deregulation, which may bring about significant increases in the 
dimensions of freight containers. 
Since 1970, the dimensions of marine freight containers have been set by 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) at a width of 2.44 m 
(8'), heights of 2.44 m (8') and 2.59 m (8' 6"), and nominal lengths of 3.1 m, 
6.1 m, 9.1 m and 12.2 m (10', 20', 30' and 40').62 These standards have formed 
the foundation of the whole international system for container handling, includ-
ing the construction of vessels, port equipment and inland transport vehicles. 
However, North America in recent years has seen the appearance of containers 
with different dimensions that might pose a dilemma for the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, which would have to choose between (i) maintaining 
the present dimensions in order to avoid altering their equipment and infra-
structure for container handling, or (ii) changing their equipment and infra-
structure in order to increase the competitiveness of their exports. 
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The maximum  dimensions permitted for land transport vehicles in the United 
States have always had a major influence on marine container sizes, due the 
broad trade relations of that nation and the pioneering status of its carriers 
in the field. In 1956, Sea-Land Services was the first shipping company to 
begin carrying containers, whose dimensions of 35' x 8' x 8' (10.67 m x 2.44 m 
x 2.44 m) were selected for two reasons: 35' was the maximum  length permitted 
on the highways of New York, New Jersey and Texas, and 8' was the maximum  height 
permissible on then-existing chassis for movements between New Jersey and New 
York via the Hudson Tunnel. Two years later, Matson Navigation Company began 
transporting containers with the same width and height but 24' (7.32 m) long on 
the U.S. west coast, for similar reasons.83 
When ISO published its reconmended dimensions for freight containers in 
1977, it did not include either the 24' or the 35' lengths, considering that 
the range of sizes adopted was sufficiently flexible to encompass the trades 
served by Sea-Land and Matson. Nonetheless, the impact of the ISO dimensions 
on liner vessel operators was such that even Sea-Land, after 20 years of using 
35' containers in its wholely-owned and operated highway services and container 
terminals, found it necessary to adopt the international standard. Approximate-
ly 10 years ago it began the costly conversion from 35' to ISO 40' lengths, a 
process that by the end of 1988 will still be only 98% complete.6* 
The growing use of intermodal systems makes it Important for ocean-liner 
technologies to be compatible with inland transport systems. In 1979, Canada 
adopted domestic container dimensions of 44'3" (13.49 m) long by 9'6" high by 
8'6" wide that permit the carriage of two units on an 89' (27.13 m) railway 
wagon.65 Similar dimensions were adopted by the U.S. in the Surface Transpor-
tation Assistance Act (STAA) of 1982, which increased the maximum  dimensions 
allowable on the national interstate highway system to a width of 8'6" and a 
single trailer length of 48' or two trailers of 28' (8.53 m) The STAA also 
allowed the 27 states that had previously authorized trailers up to 53' 
(16.15 m) long to continue to use them.67 This permitted American President 
Lines to put 53' containers into service on its domestic double-stack rail 
operations between Los Angeles and Chicago, with both pickup and delivery pro-
vided by AP Trucking.68 
Approximately six years ago, American President Lines also began experi-
menting with non-ISO marine containers in its services between Asia and the 
United States, The dimensions tested were 45' and 48' lengths with 8' and 8'6" 
widths, respectively, and 9'6" heights. To ensure compatibility with existing 
container handling equipment, corner fittings were placed at the ISO 40' posi-
tions. The results of these experiments showed that 48' containers provide a 
substantial increase in productivity, leading a meeting of the U.S. National 
Railroads Intermodal Association to affirm in January 1986—just two months 
after the 48' units were introduced—that this dimension should become the na-
tional domestic container standard.69 American President Lines is also testing 
53' containers in its domestic services. Recognizing the added efficiencies of 
larger units, during January 1988 Mitsui-OSK Lines also introduced 45' units 
into its Far East-U.S. services. Numerous other lines such as Sea-Land, Maersk 
and Hapag-Lloyd have built vessels with cell structures capable of handling 45' 
containers.70 
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Table 1 summarizes recent developments in freight container dimensions. 
Table 1 
FREIGHT CONTAINER DIMENSIONS 
Containers for ocean/land transoortation 
ISO-Series One: Non-ISO: 
10' X 8'(or 8'6") X 8' Sea-Land Services 
3.1 m X 2.44 ra (or 2.59) X 2.44 m 35' X 8' X 8' 
20' X 8'(or 8'6") X 8' 10.67 m X 2.44 m X 2.44 m 
6.1 m X 2.44 m (or 2.59) X 2.44 m Matson Navigation Company 
30' X 8'(or 8'6*) X 8' 24* X 8' X 8' 
9.1 m X 2.44 m (or 2.59) X 2.44 m 7.32 m X 2.44 m X 2.44 m 
40' X 8'(or 8'6") X 8' American President Lines 
12.2 m X 2.44 m (or 2.59) X 2.44 m 45' X 9'6" X 8' 
13.72 m X 2.9 m X 2.44 m 
48* X 9'6" X 8'6" 
14.63 m X 2.9 m X 2.6 m 
Containers for land transportation onlv 
U.S.-STAA (1982): Canada (1979): 
Single trailer 44'3" X 9'6" X 8'6" 
48' X 9'6" X 8'6" 13.49 mX 2.9 m X 2.59 m 
14.63 m X 2.9 m X 2.59 m 
53' X 9'6" X 8'6" European swap-bodies: 
16.15 m X 2.9 m X 2.59 m Currently not standardized, 
Double trailers (each) but the common size is 
28' X 9'6" X 8'6" 23' 5.5" X 8' 2.4" 
8.53 m X 2.9 m X 2.59 m 7.15 m X 2.5 m 
Source : ECLAC. 
It would appear that tendencies toward the use of non-ISO dimensions for 
marine containers could provide an important incentive for the adoption of new 
international standards. At present, only some 12 000 of the 45', 48' and 53' 
units are being utilized by a limited number of carriers, compared with over 
four million standard ISO containers.71 Nonetheless, a new ISO standard has 
been proposed that would take full advantage of highway width limits of 2 . 59 m 
(8' 6"), permit heights of up to 2.9 m (9' 6"), and increase lengths to between 
48' and 49' (14.63-14.94 m), while remaining compatible with present container 
handling equipment.72 
A tendency toward larger dimensions has also appeared in Europe. Swap-
bodies, which are a type of inland container peculiar to Europe, are not now 
standardized but are often 2.5 m (8' 2.4") wide. A swap-body of this width that 
is 40' long will accommodate 24 pallets of 1.0 mX 1.2 m or 30 of 0.8 mX 1.2 m. 
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whereas only 21 or 24 of these pallets, respectively, will fit in an ISO 40' 
standard container.73 The European Committee for Standardization, which is com-
posed of national standards bodies from 16 EEC and European Free Trade Associa-
tion member states, has agreed on 2.6 m (8' 6.4") as a basis for discussions of 
swap-body widths.7* EEC directive 88/218 increased the maximum  width of refrig-
erated swap-bodies from 2.5 m to 2.6 m. This same width has also been adopted 
by important non-EEC markets such as Sweden. The United Kingdom maximum  width 
for swap-bodies is 2.58 m.75 Swap-body dimensions in themselves have little 
relevance to international trade, but the fact that they are becoming wider 
indicates that Europe is also subject to the same influences toward increased 
productivity that are expanding the dimensions of marine freight containers. 
Initiatives to increase container dimensions may create problems for some 
countries but not for others. Japan, with an average inland haul for containers 
of only some 40 km,76 could fill and empty these units in or near ports without 
greatly Increasing overall distribution costs, and most Japanese ports already 
have the warehouse and distribution facilities required for these operations.77 
In Europe, as noted, greater widths are already appearing in swap-bodies, but 
45' and 48' lengths would not presently be permitted on most highways. Nonethe-
less, exporters in both Europe and Japan may well come to see the use of these 
lengths as a means of taking greater advantage of highway and rail transport 
economies. It appears likely that any large-scale move by either of those 
regions to adopt one or both of the new dimensions would probably oblige the 
other region to do the same. Wide-spread acceptance of these dimensions in the 
industrialized countries would then put pressure on Latin American and Caribbean 
exporters also to ship their products in larger units, to remain competitive. 
D. INTERIOR CARGO TERMINALS78 
Interior cargo terminals (ITCs) in industrialized countries are of particular 
importance to exporters in Latin America and the Caribbean. It has been noted 
that liner services have increasingly become synonymous with the carriage of 
containers, and the region thus cannot avoid dependence on this technology for 
its external trade. It will not be sufficient, however, for containers to ar-
rive at ports in importing countries, since both in Europe and in North America 
their final destinations are for the most part located at some distance from the 
coast. The systems approach, together with considerations of economic and 
operational efficiency, have been largely responsible for containers not being 
emptied in ports as was originally the practice, but rather continuing on to 
their final destination (or very close to it) unopened. A similar procedure is 
followed in the case of containers carrying goods for export. 
Interior cargo terminals play a key role in this process of bringing 
containers close to the origin or destination of the freight they carry. Such 
terminals also make it possible to take advantage of intermodalisra in a "hub-
and-spoke" systems configuration. This approach combines the economy and speed 
of long-distance rail transportation with the economy and flexibility of local 
truck transportation, through the hub formed by the ITC. In some cases, a con-
tainer will begin or end its journey in one of these terminals, while the goods 
it contains are picked up or delivered separately. In other cases, the terminal 
serves as a centre where services of various kinds are provided to containers 
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in transit to of from the shipper's or consignee's premises. Although all ter-
minals share certain general characteristics, others vary considerably depending 
not only on the specific purpose of the terminal, but also on differences pre-
vailing in the transport systems of the European Economic Community on the one 
hand and North America on the other. 
1. General characteristics of interior carpo terminals 
It should be noted that there is no universally acceptable definition of what 
constitutes an interior cargo terminal. Indeed, the very concept of a "ter-
minal" may be misleading, since it suggests the end of a shipment when what is 
really meant is a place where transshipment may be made between two links in a 
transport chain. Terminology was one of the main topics dealt with at the sixth 
seminar on Transport Terminals and Interchanges held in Paris In 1987, whose 
participants concluded that there is no exhaustive definition but that the 
following is relatively complete: cargo terminals and interchanges are those 
locations and facilities specifically provided for the transfer of goods either 
within a single mode or between two or more modes. 
Interior cargo terminals are created either because an opportunity is per-
ceived for promoting certain kinds of transport activities and Increasing their 
efficiency, or as a means of surmounting problems such as labour difficulties 
or operational delays experienced in other places on the route. Such problems 
and opportunities tend to vary considerably depending on location or circum-
stances, and thus may result in different types of development. Similarly, an 
interior cargo terminal may perform a large variety of functions ranging from 
the simplest modal interchange to the most complex set of intergrated services 
for the transshipment, distribution, handling and repair of containers, Customs 
control, and storage and distribution of freight. As a result of this variety, 
few ITCs are identical with regard to services offered, methods of operation, 
physical layout or history of development, but many of them share certain common 
characteristics as regards the basic services they provide and the modes of 
transportation they serve. 
a) Services offered 
The principal function of an interior cargo terminal is to serve as a 
location for transshipping freight from one carrier to another of the same mode 
of transportation (unimodal), or to a carrier of another mode (intermodal). 
The second important service provided by these terminals is freight stor-
age. Freight in transit may be stored briefly while awaiting reshipment, or it 
may be stored in custody, in which case it remains in the terminal longer and 
the entire shipment is not necessarily transferred at one time. 
A third important service is the concentration and déconcentration of 
shipments by filling and emptying ("stuffing and stripping") LCL containers. 
Recently, other related services have been gaining importance as a result 
of innovations in logistics and physical distribution. As interest has grown 
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in inventory management with respect to the costs of storing, shipping and 
distributing goods, firms are increasingly contracting out not only storage but 
also packing, labelling, invoicing and insurance. All these services may be 
carried out in an interior cargo terminal, where independent companies are often 
set up to offer them. 
It is even possible to provide still more services, such as repair, clean-
ing, and rental of transport equipment, financial services and even food ser-
vices for vehicle crews. Services may also be performed in connection with the 
importation or exportation of goods, such as Customs and sanitary inspections, 
that require government offices to be located within the terminal itself. 
b) Modes of transportation 
Modes of transportation are intimately related to the services provided 
them by interior cargo terminals. Modal interchange may involve solely the 
cargo unit—i.e., the container or highway trailer—without the handling of its 
contents, or it may involve the goods themselves. Aside from airports and sea-
ports, modal interchange may be (i) highway to highway (interchange between long 
and short haul shipping), (ii) railway to highway, (iii) inland waterway to 
highway, or (iv) inland waterway to railway. 
Unimodal transshipment is well-known and Is extensively practiced at sea-
ports, airports, rail classification yards and other facilities. In the case 
of highway transportation, transshipment is effected in the place where freight 
Is concentrated and deconcentrated, which is traditionally known as a freight 
station. A carrier or industrial company that handles its own transportation 
might establish a terminal of this kind. 
With respect to intermodal transshipment, a number of terms are used that 
refer to the modes participating in the operation, including rail terminal, in-
land waterway terminal and air terminal. These are terminals In the strictest 
sense of the word in that they constitute the end point for shipment by train, 
barge or aircraft, and freight is transferred to another mode which in nearly 
all cases will be the final one used in the transport chain—i.e. , a truck. 
However, sometimes no final mode of transportation is necessary, because the 
consignee is located within the terminal area itself. 
Rail terminals are important links in the combined railway-highway trans-
port chain. This term covers transportation on railway flatcars of road trac-
tors with trailer attached, trailers alone and swap-bodies, as well as contain-
ers. Such units comprise the majority of transshipments made at rail terminals. 
Since special handling facilities are required both for containers and for the 
other types of equipment, rail terminals may be subdivided according to the 
installations they offer. 
Inland waterway terminals are attracting increasing attention in Europe. 
Barges have traditionally been used for transporting goods of little value or 
great weight, and for that reason inland waterway ports are fairly common. In 
recent times, however, unitarization has been stimulating the construction of 
special facilities for handling container and roll-on/roll-off traffic in these 
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ports, with the result that their role as a link in the transport chain is 
becoming increasingly important, 
2. Ipterjor gargg çerainajLg in the European Economic Community 
There are some problems, such as those posed by labour practices or delays due 
to paperwork, which are difficult to solve in ports but can often be dealt with 
more easily in inland terminals. Such factors tend to determine the role these 
terminals play In the Community. 
a) Labour practices 
European seaports often suffer from labour practices and agreements that 
are inefficient when it comes to container handling, which tends to make their 
operation inflexible and expensive. These difficulties arise especially in 
places where containerlzation has been regarded as a threat to traditional 
labour systems and where organized labour is strong. What usually happens is 
that stevedores in the port and adjacent areas acquire "rights" over work with 
containers often has a decided effect on costs. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, the very high costs charged by the National Dock Labour Scheme for the 
handling of containerzied freight constitute one particularly important reason 
for the creation of inland depots, where costs have decreased to slightly more 
than one-fourth of what is charged in a Scheme port. 
Another problem deriving from port labour practices is related to cargo 
safety. Freight under the control of dock workers Is subject to more instances 
of damage, loss and theft. At inland centres not controlled by dock worker 
unions, containers may be loaded and unloaded under the supervision of the ship-
ping company or its agent, with a substantial increase in security. 
b) Delays due to formalities 
Delays in ports may also provide an incentive for transferring some opera-
tions to interior terminals. For example, Customs dispatch formalities are 
often cumbersome as a result partly of procedural problems and party of heavier 
workloads imposed by growing volumes of traffic. Some countries and ports are 
worse than others, and in these cases the possibiity of handling Customs formal-
ities at interior terminals may be important. The transfer of these procedures 
to interior cargo terminals is especially desirable in cases where there is a 
high proportion of LCL freight or where the goods originate in trade zones to 
which complex quotas or tariffs are applied. 
The establishment of an extensive network of interior Customs depots in 
the United Kingdom was motivated in part to delays in Customs formalities in 
ports. In other countries, such as Spain and Portugal, it has been mandatory 
for all international transport units to carry out Customs formalities at 
interior terminals. It should be noted that Customs regulations vary greatly 
from country to country and that factors which cause delays in one country may 
not do so in another. 
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c) The role of interior cargo terminals 
No single set of reliable data exists for use in evaluating the role of 
interior cargo terminals on the basis of the traffic they handle. All that can 
be done is to make an estimate on the basis of data taken from a study carried 
out in 1983 regarding the total volume of traffic handled in ports in terms of 
the mode used for interior transportation (see table 2). 
Table 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF PORT TRAFFIC BY MODE IN 1983 
Country LCL traffic as a Inland mode used (%) 
percentage of port high rail- inland 
traffic served way way waterway 
Belgium 16 70 24 6 
Denmark 8 88 12 -
Federal Republic of Germany 15 48 50 2 
France 15 63 36 1 
Italy 13 74 26 -
Netherlands 12 77 13 10 
Portugal 2 89 11 -
Spain 8 64 36 -
United Kingdom 2 63 37 -
Average 11 69 27 4 
Source : Netherlands Economic Institute. 
In 1986, the total traffic served in the ports of the countries referred 
to in table 2 amounted to some 13.9 million TEU. This figure includes direct 
transshipments between ocean vessels for feeder or combined-route services, for 
which the same operation was counted twice in approximately 8% of the cases. 
If this 8% and the 11% represented by 1£L traffic were deducted from the total 
traffic, total inland FCL movements would be approximately 11.26 million TEU. 
The proportion of FCL traffic is greater in the cases of inland waterways 
and railways. Both modes thus require the use of at least one terminal for one 
transfer operation. In addition, some containers are moved to another terminal 
for additional cargo handling, temporary storage, repairs, etc. It is estimated 
that total FCL traffic through such terminals in 1986 was: 
TEU (millions) 
By railway and inland waterways 3.49 
Thus, transfers movements through ITCs 3.49 
Plus, movements through additional ITC 0.38 
Total estimated ITC traffic 3.87 
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As for containers shipped by road, the overall average in respect of chose 
handled in intermediate depots is 38%. However, not all these depots may be 
classified as interior cargo terminals. It is estimated that about 4% of them 
are nearly relief stations where drivers on long-distance hauls between ports 
and the interior change tractor units. Even so, the volume of traffic served 
by ITCs in 1986 was 2.64 million TEU. 
Summing highway, railway and inland waterway traffic, the aggregate number 
of marine freight containers using interior cargo terminals in western Europe 
amounts to approxmately 58% of the total Inland flow, or some 6.51 million TEU 
in 1986. Any increase in the proportion of inland traffic moving by rail or 
inland waterway will result in a direct increase in traffic through interior 
cargo terminals used as modal transfer points. On the other hand, the extent 
to which traffic moving inland by highway passes through such terminals is 
related to the proportion of LCL traffic in the overall flow, as well as to the 
transport practices adopted for serving more distant inland markets. 
Each port has its own hinterland, in which the population and industrial 
activities generate a high demand for pick-up and delivery services that may be 
difficult to meet from the port. This is particularly true when there is an 
imbalance between export and import cargoes that produces a large number of 
empty containers. In such circumstances, a terminal established in a strategic 
location may offer substantial advantages as a deposit for empty containers, so 
that the trips required to collect or return them or to perform maintenance or 
repair work on them are kept to a minimum. 
In addition, freight often requires storage services, and distribution to 
regional markets that are not easily accessible from the port and are better 
served from a depot close to the principal areas of origin or destination. The 
transport profile of pick-up and delivery is very different from that of long 
distance trunk service. Therefore, once a centralized interior terminal or a 
network of such terminals has been established, it may prove more efficient to 
separate long distance transportation from local distribution services. An 
integrated system is thus formed that allows optimal use of available transport 
resources. 
3. Interior cargo terminals in Canada and the United States 
Most of the remarks made with regard to the role played by interior cargo termi-
nals in the EEC also apply to Canada and the United States. However, the phy-
sical extent of these two countries has a special impact on some aspects of ITC 
development, through its effect on the transport systems. The growing import-
ance of railways in intermodal transport in these countries has already been 
referred to, in particular as regards double-stack rail wagons. The high level 
of efficiency of these wagons, due to the fact that they weigh much less than 
conventional wagons, has done much to promote the implementation of the "hub-
and-spoke" distribution concept previously mentioned, in which terminals con-
stitute hubs in the interior of the country. 
Although there are numerous variations in their design, double-stack con-
tainer wagons tend to be approximately 280' (85.34 m) long and consist of five 
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articulated platforms, each of which carries four TEU. A train will be composed 
of 20 to 28 of these wagons with a total capacity of 400 to 560 TEU. However, 
American President Lines places one 48' X 9'6" X 8'6" container on the second 
tier of each platform, permitting a 20-wagon train to carry 490 TEU. A standard 
railway flatcar weighs approximately 31.9 metric tons, whereas the double-stack 
platform weighs only 14.6 metric tons.70 Furthermore, a five-platform wagon has 
80% fewer couplers and 40% fewer wheels and brakes than the equivalent five con-
ventional flatcars.80 A train composed entirely of these double-stack wagons 
can thus accommodate more than twice as many containers as a conventional train, 
with little increase in locomotive power and no increase in crew size.81 
It has been estimated that locomotives pulling double-stack container 
wagons will consume only 60-67% as much fuel per container as conventional 
container-on-flatcar and trailer-on-flatcar operations. One U.S. railway has 
indicated that double-stack container wagons will average 225 000 miles per 
year, instead of about 80 000 for standard flatcars, with maintenance costs per 
container as low as 12% of those for conventional equipment.82 Line-haul cost 
savings of double-stack trains over conventional COFC and T0FC operations are 
estimated to be approximately 40%, and actual costs may be as low as US$0.40 per 
container mile.83 This may be less than half as much as comparable costs for 
highway transportation.84 
As may be seen, the use of double-stack wagons offers the possibility of 
achieving sizeable economies in transportation with far-reaching repercussions 
for the entire distribution chain. In order to make better use of the produc-
tive advantages offered by these wagons they should be operated in block trains, 
which means they cannot be uncoupled to drop off one or two containers along the 
way. In order to operate in this manner, pick-up or delivery of individual con-
tainers or their contents must be made at a location intended for consolidation 
and deconsolidation of freight—i.e., an interior cargo terminal. 
The task of consolidating and deconsolidating freight has always been 
performed in railway terminals. Interior cargo terminals differ from railway 
terminals, however, in that the focus of their operations is on intermodalism 
and involves the transfer of containers between long-distance trains that carry 
them to and from ports, and trucks that perform local pick-up and delivery. In 
this context, "local" is relative in meaning, since theoretically the distance 
between terminals should depend on the differences in costs between rail and 
highway services. It may be said that, on the average, the competitive radius 
of truck operations is about 500 km, which would imply that terminals should be 
about 1 000 km apart.85 Although in actual practice this distance is much 
shorter, a tendency to reduce the number of interior terminals is beginning to 
appear. Canada is more advanced than the United States in this respect, 
although the spacial distribution of interior terminals has started to become 
more rational in the United States as well, especially since deregulation. 
The most important conclusion that can be derived from the preceding 
analysis is that, both In Canada and the United States and in the countries of 
the European Economic Community, the distribution chain is increasingly oriented 
towards intermodalism and the use of interior cargo terminals as interchange 
points. This situation means that there are two options open to exporters in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. On the one hand, they can ignore the trend and 
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rely on the original procedures whereby containers are emptied in ports. On the 
other hand, they can make a special effort to take full advantage of this modern 
approach to the distribution chain, knowing that in the years to come it will 
be the predominant form of transportation in Europe, Canada and the United 
States. The first option would probably be very convenient for exporters, since 
to a large extent it amounts to a continuation of present practices. It could 
also be risky for them, since their goods might lose commercial viability in the 
market due to the high cost this option entails. 
To take the second option would require a radical change in the way 
exporters use containers. They would have to regard them as integral to the 
process of marketing their products, like other forms of packaging that reach 
the very doors of their clients. This option would also require the liner ship-
ping industry of Latin America and the Caribbean to change its attitude, since 
it would be forced to promote the transportation of containers to the final 
destination of the cargo rather than emptying them in port. Such changes would 
allow this region's exports to be fully incorporated into the distribution 
systems of the purchasing countries, so that they could compete for markets on 




STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 
AND THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN TRANSPORT 
The fundamental objective of economic geography is to provide an understanding 
of and insights into the spatial distribution of economic activities. It might 
be thought that economic geographers limit their investigations of a region to, 
for instance, its resources, climate and topography, but such is not the case. 
Economic geography deals not only with the aforementioned physical characteris-
tics of our environment but also man as a member of a community. How man in 
society interacts with his physical environment creates a need to understand his 
productive activities and the distribution of output. The link between physical 
and human geography brings together natural resources, industry, economics and 
transportation, as well as urban, social and political themes. Economic geogra-
phers seek to treat these and other topics in relational terms so that they will 
be better understood individually as well as collectively.86 
In this part, an evaluation will be made of certain trends in economic 
geography which might have an impact on policies and plans of the liner shipping 
industry. Within such trends there are many aspects that should be considered 
to establish policies which might orient future decisions of shipping lines, 
ports and land transport enterprises. Some of the more important for this 
investigation are (i) population, industry and purchasing power, (ii) multiple 
sources for the principal exports of Latin America, (iii) trading blocs and the 
European Community in 1992 and (iv) the Impact of changes in transport on com-
mercial relations. 
A. POPULATION, INDUSTRY AND PURCHASING POWER 
With the exception of demographers, social scientists and a few strategic think-
ers, the birth of a child on 12 July 1987 in Zagreb, Yugoslavia, probably went 
unnoticed. For those in the liner shipping industry, this child simply was not 
part of their structured, repetitive daily activities of loading and discharging 
trucks, trains and ships, preparing trade and transport documentation, request-
ing cargo insurance policies and filing claims thereon, as well as of the thou-
sands of conversations, telexes, agreements and disagreements which contribute 
to the flow of manufactured goods between countries. Nonetheless, the birth of 
this child has important implications for the international commercial exchanges 
of southern hemisphere countries and their liner shipping industries. 
38 
The impo rtance of this child lies in what his birth means for world popu-
lation growth. He represents a milestone in growth of the world population to 
5 000 million. This figure seems relatively inconsequential until it is related 
to location. It has been estimated that approximately 90% of the world's inhab-
itants live in countries located north of the equator, with the remaining 10% 
in those not just south of but very close to the equator.87 When it is taken 
into account that around 77% of the land mass of the world, 95% of the purchas-
ing power and 95% of the industrial capacity are located in the northern hemi-
sphere,88 it can be seen that trade patterns and ocean-liner services already 
reflect this locational reality. Probably the most explicit example of this 
would be the 23 vessel round-the-world service of Evergreen Line, which com-
menced in July 1984. The vessels of that line call at 18 ports eastbound and 
19 westbound, and not one of them is in a southern hemisphere country.89 
The relevance of these global population trends for Latin American and 
Caribbean shipping lines, ports and land transport operators should not be 
underestimated. Just as world population, industry and purchasing power could 
become even more concentrated in the northern hemisphere in the future, so also 
could liner shipping services. Policy makers at all levels must understand that 
man, in the sociological sense, is a "northerner." The importance of "northern 
man" in the formulation of policies and plans for the liner shipping industry 
relates to not only where he lives but also what he produces and consumes. The 
assumption that the industrialized world is dependent upon this region's exports 
has gone from a fact to only a partial truth, taking with it a major source of 
income. Given the choice between northern and southern hemisphere suppliers 
available to industrialized countries, Latin American and Caribbean countries 
must ensure that their liner transport systems—vessels, ports and inland trans-
port—are cost-effective, efficient and technologically appropriate. 
B. MULTIPLE SOURCES FOR THE PRINCIPAL EXPORTS OF LATIN AMERICA 
Liner shipping services, as well as other maritime transport activities, exist 
to serve international trade, and when changes occur in the direction, level or 
composition of trade, these services must change as well. In turn, all coun-
tries are concerned to maintain and expand the markets for their exports in or-
der to be able to import the goods and commodities which they require or desire. 
As markets for a country's traditional exports cease to expand adequately be-
cause of lack of increasing global demand for them, or because of protectionism 
In importing countries or the incursion in their markets by new suppliers, the 
country turns to new products to increase its export earnings. For a country 
to maintain traditional markets and create new ones, as well as expand and 
diversify exports, it must have transport services which are competitive with 
those of other countries which supply the same products; but to obtain adequate 
transport services it must offer a sufficient volume of traffic to justify them. 
It is thus useful to examine the evolution of the exports of Latin America and 
the Caribbean in relation to world trade, and in particular the exports of pro-
ducts which utilize liner services. 
The increase in global world trade since 1970 has been dramatic: from 
US$312 000 million in 1970 to US$1 930 000 million in 1985, an average annual 
growth rate over the period of 12.9%.90 This increase, however, is influenced 
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by the sharp rises in the price of fuels during the decade of 1970, which led 
to an annual growth rate of fuel exports in dollar terms of 18.2% over the 
entire period 1970-1985. World trade in manufactured goods (which excludes iron 
and steel) also increased at a slightly higher annual growth rate than that for 
all trade: 13.2%. Annual rates of growth for exports of the other three major 
categories of products in which UNCTAD classifies exports were each lower than 
the global rate: 10.3% for all food items, 8.5% for agricultural raw materials, 
and 8.5% for ores and metals. In addition to manufactured goods, many indivi-
dual products in the latter three categories of products are also heavy users 
of liner services, as is the case with copper, steel, coffee, tobacco, wool, 
cotton, alcoholic beverages, etc. 
Exports of manufactures are of special interest due to their dynamic and 
catalytic role in the development process, and their evolution in relation to 
other categories of products can be better seen if the effect on the value of 
world trade introduced by the increased price of fuels is eliminated. For this 
reason, the percentages for different categories of products in world trade, as 
shown in table 3, have been calculated excluding fuels. 
Table 3 
WORLD TRADE 





All food items 45 850 16.6 198 742 13 3 
Agricultural raw materials 18 090 6.5 61 745 4 1 
Ores and metals 39 924 14.4 136 997 9 1 
Manufactured goods 172 m M, 5 1 103 695 73 5 Subtotal 276 659 100.0 1 501 179 100 0 
Fuels 23 695 355 035 
Total 311 905 1 929 537 
Source : UNCTAD, flandbook of international trftdç qnd development statistics: 
1987 supplement. table 3.3. 
Note : Columns do not sum in the source, in some instances, due to lack of 
information on breakdown by product category. 
The greatly increased demand for the transportation of manufactured goods 
between 1970 and 1985 has been met by liner services, in particular through the 
use of highly efficient container services. In turn, the high volumes of manu-
factured goods traded (as well as of goods in other product categories that 
utilize liner services and containers) has led to enormous investments in con-
tainer ships, containers, specialized ports, and inland transport infrastructure 
and equipment, principally in the industrialized countries. 
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The trading structure for manufactured goods among the developed market 
economy countries, the developing countries and the socialist countries has not 
changed significantly during the period 1970 to 1985. As can be appreciated 
from table 4, world trade in manufactures is still dominated by the developed 
countries, to the extent that 61% of trade in these products is carried out 
among themselves. This high percentage over 16 years supports the assertion 
made earlier in this document that industrialized countries are neither tied to 
nor dependent upon the exports of manufactured goods from developing countries. 
Nevertheless, during the period the exports of manufactured products from devel-
oping countries to developed market economy countries increased from 3.5% of the 
total to 8.8%, i.e., from US$5 900 million in 1970 to US$93 700 million in 1985. 
Table 4 
TRADE IN MANUFACTURED GOODS 





Trade among developing countries 3 136 1 8 41 704 3 9 
Exports from developing 
countries to developed 
market-economy countries 5 906 3 5 93 669 8 8 
Exports from developed 
market-economy countries 
to developing countries 30 848 18 1 189 063 17 7 
Trade among developed 
market-economy countries 109 305 64 2 648 390 60 7 
Trade of socialist countries 
with each other and with 
other groups of countries 20 981 12 4 95 693 8 9 
Total 170 176 100 0 1 068 519 100 0 
Source : UNCTAD, Handbook of international trade and development statistics, 
1987 Supplement, table 3.3. 
During the period 1970 to 1986, the rate of growth of the value of all ex-
ports of Latin America and the Caribbean closely followed that for global world 
trade. This evolution contrasts with prior periods, when the region lagged far 
behind the rest of the world, and even behind the other developing countries 
(see table 5). 
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Table 5 
ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH RATES OF EXPORTS, FOB 
(Percentages) 
1950-•1960 1960 •1970 1970- 1975 1975-•1986 
World 6 5 9 2 25 9 7 7 
Developing countries 3 1 7 3 36 0 6 6 
Latin America and the Caribbean 2 4 5 0 26 7 7 7 
Brazil -2 0 7 2 30 2 10 4 
Japan 15 9 17 5 26 0 11 6 
Source : UNCTAD, Handbook of international trade and development statistics. 
1987 Supplement, table 1.5. 
The lack of dynamism in the exports of Latin America and the Caribbean 
between 1960 and 1987 in relation to the rest of the world can be appreciated 
in figure 1, which presents export quantity indices for several of the world's 
regions. 
The provision of transport services along the world's trading routes is 
guided essentially by changes in the physical quantities of goods traded rather 
than their value. Despite the pitfalls inherent in using quantity indices, and 
the fact that the indices presented in the graph include all products traded, 
which utilize both maritime liner services and chartered ships to transport bulk 
commodities, it can reasonably be concluded that Latin America and the Caribbean 
were not offering volumes of cargo which would lead to greatly improved liner 
transport services when compared with other regions of the world. 
In the particularly important area of manufactured goods, for which the 
world annual average growth rate for the value of exports between 1970 and 1985 
was 13.2%, the rate for Latin America and the Caribbean was 18.1%, which still 
lagged behind the rate for all the developing countries of 19.9%. During this 
period the performance of the group of ALADI countries, led in particular by 
Brazil, was more favourable, as this group had an annual average growth rate for 
the export of manufactured goods of 20.6%, well above the average growth rate 
for all ALADI exports of 13.5%. As a consequence, Latin America and the Carib-
bean increased its share of world exports of manufactured goods from 1% in 1970 
to 1.8% in 1985. During the same period, South and South-East Asia increased 
its share from 3.5% to 9.9%. Even though the participation of exports of manu-
factured goods within total exports of Latin American and Caribbean countries 
increased from 9.5% to 18,9% during the period, it is clear that the region has 
not adequately taken advantage of the great growth in world trade in manufac-
tured products during the last decades. 
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Figure 1 
INDEXES OF EXPORT VOLUMES 
(1960 - 100) 
Source : UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics: 1987 
Supplement. table 2.1. 
A similar conclusion can be reached by an evaluation of maritime transport 
statistics. Table 6 presents the volume of dry general cargo—i.e., cargo that 
utilizes liner services—traded between the United States, South America, and 
far east Asia (Hong Kong, Macao, Japan and Korea) in 1978 and 1985. The ton-
nages transported between the United States and far east Asia in 1978 greatly 
exceeded those traded between the United States and South America (16.2 million 
tons versus 4.8 million tons). Moreover, the gap between Asia and Latin America 
increased dramatically by 1985: tonnages moved between the United States and 
the west coast of South America actually fell slightly during the period, while 
trade to and from the east coast of South America increased only 600 000 tons. 
In contrast, trade between the United States and far east Asia increased by 12.6 
million tons, reaching a total of 26.8 million tons in 1985 as compared with 
only 5.4 million tons with the combined east and west Coasts of South America. 
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Table 
MOVEMENT OF GENERAL CARGO 
(Thousands of metric tons) 
Port ranges West coast of East coast of Far east 
South America South America Asia 
1978 1985 1978 1985 1978 1985 
U.S. North Atlantic: 
As destination 182 193 500 1 365 2 210 2 208 
As origin 144 86 232 141 508 518 
U.S. South Atlantic: 
As destination 41 105 175 500 622 913 
As origin 127 114 117 32 287 839 
U.S. Gulf of Mexico 
As destination 124 98 373 1 132 561 286 
As origin 470 520 1 419 384 1 413 2 695 
Subtotal 1 088 1 116 2 816 3 554 5 601 7 459 
North American North Pacific: 
As destination 12 23 27 28 2 431 3 014 
As origin 94 76 229 197 2 041 4 126 
U.S. South Pacific: 
As destination 80 67 81 157 3 045 7 303 
As origin 112 44 253 89 3 100 4 925 
Subtotal 298 210 590 47 10 617 19 368 
Total 1 386 1 326 3 406 4 025 16 218 26 827 
Source: United Nations, Maritime Transport Study: Commodity Trade (by Sea) 
Statistics. 1981; United Nations, International Sea-Borne Trade Statistics Year-
book. 1984-1985. 
Notes : West coast of South America—Pacific ports of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru 
and Chile; east coast of South America—Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina; far east 
Asia—Hong Kong, Macao, Japan and Korea. 
As has been pointed out in earlier parts of this document, there are 
important economies of scale associated with liner transport, and in particular 
with cellular container ships. The enormous quantities of general cargo traded 
between the United States and far east Asia permit the use of large and effi-
cient ships which can offer frequent low-cost services to far east Asian export-
ers, giving them an important competitive advantage in the key U.S. market over 
their present or potential competitors on the east and west coasts of South 
America. This competitive advantage can only be overcome by increasing exports 
from the latter region, but to increase their exports, the Latin American coun-
tries must have liner transport services which are comparable to those of their 
competitors. 
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The basic issue for Latin America and the Caribbean is that it is not suf-
ficient merely to have liner services linking the region with markets in other 
regions: rather, the cost and quality of these services must not leave the 
region at a disadvantage In relation to its competitors in the developed coun-
tries and in other developing regions. To be competitive, Latin America and the 
Caribbean must be efficient not only in producing goods, but also in getting 
them to buyers at prices competitive with alternative sources of supply. The 
quantities of products traded which utilize liner services will be a key factor 
in determining whether the region can count on liner services which permit them 
to compete on equal terms with competitors from other regions. In addition, 
they must make much stronger efforts to reduce the cost of getting their pro-
ducts onto the ships through major improvements in land transport and ports in 
Latin America. Even though Latin America can take advantage of several of the 
minibridges for distribution within Europe and North America, the competitive-
ness of the region's exports will depend heavily on transport improvements made 
within che Latin American region. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that not only does the Latin 
American and Caribbean region face strong competition as it attempts to diver-
sify its traditional exports in an increasingly global world economy, but the 
traditional exports are also subjected to increasing competition from alterna-
tive sources of supply. While the region has maintained its share of world 
markets for some products that utilize liner transport services, such as coffee, 
bananas and cacao, shares of other products, such as meat, tin, copper, and 
hides fell between 1970 and 1985. The general tendency in Latin America and 
the Caribbean during this period was for traditional exports to reduce their 
incidence within the value of a country's exports as exports of manufactured 
goods increased and new products entered the export market or increased their 
importance. Argentinean meat exports, for example, fell from 10.2% of world 
meat exports in 1970 to 4% in 1985, at the same time that the incidence of this 
export in total Argentinean exports fell from 24.7% to 4.4%. Brazilian coffee 
exports went down from 30.6% of world coffee exports in 1970 to 27.5% in 1985, 
but during the same period the incidence within total Brazilian exports dropped 
far more dramatically from 34.3% to 9.2%. Chile's share of world copper exports 
dipped slightly from 16.7% in 1970 to 14.9% in 1985, but as a percentage of 
total Chilean exports copper represented only 46.1% in 1985, down from 67.3% in 
1970.91 Frequently, however, the products which took on more importance within 
Latin American and Caribbean exports are those that do not utilize liner ser-
vices, such as soya, iron ore, logs, and petroleum. 
In table 7, the competitive pressure on Latin American and Caribbean ex-
ports can easily be appreciated. No longer are there captive markets for tradi-
tional exports, and the region must constantly improve the efficiency of its 
production, marketing and distribution in order to obtain and maintain market 
shares. Maritime liner services and, in particular, container services will 
frequently be the key variable which will determine whether the Latin American 
and Caribbean region is successful or not. 
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Table 7 
PARTICIPATION OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN EXPORTS 
OF SELECTED PRODUCTS, 1983-1984 
(Number of countries, millions of US$ and percentages) 
Product Latin America Developed market- Other develop -
& the Caribbean economy countries ing countries 
N Value % Value % N Value % 
Meat fresh, chilled, 
and frozen 9 1 190 8. .7 11 630 85 .0 7 472 3. .5 
Fruit preserved, 
prepared 4 1 203 27. .1 2 367 53. .3 10 534 12. ,0 
Coffee 11 6 400 58 .6 1 029 9. .4 16 3 210 29. .9 
Leather 5 510 13 .7 2 551 68 .6 9 559 15. ,0 
Textile yarn 
and thread 4 519 4 .2 8 953 72. .5 14 2 061 16. ,7 
Cotton fabrics, woven 3 242 3 .6 4 138 62 .2 16 1 756 26. ,4 
Copper 4 1 501 15 .5 6 433 66. .5 9 1 326 13, .7 
Tin 2 329 16. .0 294 14. .3 6 1 418 68. ,8 
Telecommunications 
equipment 2 872 2. .7 24 657 75. .4 5 4 271 13. .1 
Office machines 3 505 1. .3 35 482 89 .9 5 2 255 5, ,7 
Travel goods, 
handbags 3 115 3 .8 1 072 35. .8 7 795 26. .6 
Footwear 2 884 7. .1 6 523 52. .3 8 2 192 17. .6 
Toys, sporting 
goods, etc. 2 139 1 .6 4 477 50 .7 7 2 178 24. .6 
Source : UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics; 
1987 Supplement, table 4.4. 
C. TRADING BLOCS: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN 1992 
The EEC was set up in 1958 with the entry into force of the Treaties Establish-
ing the European Communities (Treaty of Rome). The continuing importance of 
this economic integration initiative can be seen from, for instance, the in-
crease in the number of member States from the original six—Belgium, Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands—to include 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (which became members in 1973), Greece 
(1980) , and Portugal and Spain (1986) . It can also be seen in the establishment 
of a European Parliament, the central role of the EEC in world trade, and the 
ever-widening range of Community activities which come within the jurisdiction 
of its many directorates. 
Probably the greatest source of current uncertainty regarding the EEC 
relates to the Single European Act, which was approved in Luxembourg on 17 
February 1986 and ratified by the 12 EEC member States 11 days later in The 
Hague. Its entry into force, originally planned for 1 January 1987, had to be 
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postponed due to the need for a referendum on the matter in Ireland. The act 
was approved in that country during June 1987 and entered into force on 1 July 
1987. It is divided into four titles which seek to develop the internal Commu-
nity market and strengthen the economic and social ties between member States.92 
The Single European Act requires the progressive elimination of all physical, 
technical and fiscal barriers to trade in goods and services between member 
States by 31 December 1992. When fully implemented, the single EEC market will 
embrace 12 countries with an area of 2.3 million km2 and approximately 322 
million inhabitants who have an estimated purchasing power of US$4 trillion.93 
The establishment of one market represents an evolution from economic 
integration, directed at eliminating intermember trade obstacles, towards a more 
positive phase based on a common economic and financial policy. This consti-
tutes a fundamental change in the economic geography of a region and will accel-
erate the movement of capital and labour between member States, create a new 
basis from which to judge the efficiency of both the manufacturing and service 
sectors, permit the EEC to be self-sufficient in a larger number of products, 
and alter the nature of the EEC import demand. For example, EEC manufacturers 
of trucks, chemicals, machinery and a wide range of other goods already are 
making massive capital investments in new plants and equipment in order to meet 
an increase in demand which is projected to arise from the single market.94 
The EEC recently published a report listing the advantages that will flow 
from the single market. It estimates that the 12 member States could collect-
ively be about 200 000 million European Currency Units (ECU) (US$240 000 mil-
lion) richer by the late 1990s. Gross domestic product of the Community could 
rise by at least 4.5%, consumer prices might fall by 6% and nearly two million 
jobs would be created.95 The EEC nations will eliminate trade restrictions 
among themselves over the next four years, and it is important to follow these 
events closely in order to determine if such restrictions might be transferred 
to other countries. It is still unclear what effect the Act will have, when 
fully implemented, on trade and transport not only within the EEC but also 
between the EEC and other countries.96 
The principle question facing non-EEC manufacturers and service enter-
prises is whether and to what extent their access to the EEC might be restricted 
when it becomes a single market. In other words, will EEC manufacturers and 
service enterprises be given priority over their non-EEC counterparts? Even 
non-EEC enterprises which have production facilities in the Community must seek 
answers to these questions, For example, the cars Nissan produces in the United 
Kingdom have a local content of 70%, but the Government of France claims that 
with less than 80% they cannot be considered European. France treats these cars 
as part of Japan's import quota, which is 3% of its car market, so the United 
Kingdom has asked the European Commission to intervene in the dispute.97 
A partial response to these questions was given at a meeting in February 
1988 between representatives of the EEC and the European Free Trade Association, 
which is comprised of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
At that meeting, the EEC Trade Commissioner declared: "... only [EEC] member 
States can fully participate in this internal market."98 
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Whether this declaration will be translated into commercial policy is open 
to question, but subsidy and/or market reservation measures utilized by the EEC 
for its agricultural, textile, steel and shipbuilding industries might provide 
useful insights." For example, in response to pressure of EEC producers, the 
Commission of the European Community decided on 20 April 1988 to limit import 
quotas for apples to 521 731 tons. Of this total, the five leading southern 
hemisphere producers were assigned the following amounts: Argentina 79 000 tons, 
Australia 11 000 tons, Chile 142 131 tons, New Zealand 115 000 tons, and South 
Africa 166 000 tons.100 In this context, numerous Caribbean countries have ex-
pressed concern about the possible impact of the single market on their exports 
of bananas to EEC member States, and especially to the United Kingdom.101 
The success of an economic integration scheme is usually measured by the 
degree to which trade between its members has increased, but this does not mean 
that commercial activities between them and other countries should necessarily 
decline. Notwithstanding the special treatment given by the EEC to certain in-
dustries, and the ever-present possibility of an extension of such measures into 
other areas, the growth of trade between EEC member States should lead to its 
increase between them and the rest of the world. The EEC has always exercised 
an important influence on world trade because of the openness of its member 
States.102 That influence can be seen from, for instance, the fines it imposed 
on 26 non-EEC wood pulp producers for price-fixing activities which restricted 
free competition within the common market,103 and the agreements of West German 
industries which permit their capital goods to contain more local manufacturing 
content from importing countries.104 A single market can create a basis for 
taking better advantage of natural resources, making labour more productive and 
enhancing the competitiveness of certain products, but it cannot create such 
resources nor reduce wage rates. The preferences which EEC manufacturers and 
service enterprises probably will enjoy in the single market could alter Commun-
ity demand for certain products of this region, but it should create opportuni-
ties for others. 
Governments, carriers and ports both within and outside of the EEC are 
trying to formulate appropriate policies and plans which will prepare them for 
the coming of the single Community market. Before the Single European Act was 
adopted the ministries of transport of EEC member States largely carried out 
their activities in national settings, even though co-ordinating certain pro-
grams with each other, but now will begin to view themselves in a more united 
European context and to consolidate such activities. For example, the West 
German Ministry of Transport recently informed its shipowners that they would 
have to compete as best they could without subsidies after 1992, when the cur-
rent financial assistance program expires, and make full use of the possibili-
ties of rationalization to increase productivity and cost effectiveness of their 
operations.105 The single market could lead to a reduction in the number of 
European liner vessel operators and create a basis for multinational ownership 
among the EEC member States, as well as the establishment of a common Community 
vessel registration regime.106 
Probably the most important consideration for carriers will be the impact 
of the single market on vessel routings, port and inland transport services, and 
on transport economies of scale. With national market restrictions removed, 
ocean and land carriers from each EEC country should be able to participate on 
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an equal basis in the trade flows of all 12 member States. As a consequence, 
they may have access to cargoes on their routes which were historically unavail-
able,10 utilize ports which have greater inland transport connections,106 and 
find themselves becoming part of specific transport systems. This could lead 
to greater competition among EEC ports and to increasing scrutiny by the Commu-
nity with regard to the need for as well as the amount of subsidies given them 
by their governments.109 It should be noted In this respect that approximately 
two years ago the Chairman of Associated British Ports called for an end to port 
subsidies by both United Kingdom and Continental governments.110 
The Group of Twelve Railways of the EEC will have to deal with many impli-
cations of the single market, such as altered trade routes, increased competi-
tion from road carriers and government subsidies, so that its members can better 
assume their modal functions by 1992.111 As instances of this, the Government 
of Italy has made numerous proposals for extensive state-sector reform, one of 
which is to reduce the work force at the state railroad by 25%,112 and British 
Rail is consolidating all of its nonbulk intermodal activities in order to be 
better able to compete after 1992.113 
The establishment of a single market should accelerate the growing use of 
intermodal minibridge movements. This might result In the ports of the Medi-
terranean becoming the focal point for Asian-European trades through the Suez 
Canal. Other factors which should contribute to this trend are the Channel 
Tunnel and dispersion of the EEC's industrial center. That center was located 
relatively close to major ports in an area encompassing parts of Belgium, north-
ern Germany, and the Netherlands, but it has gradually expanded into southern 
Germany. Indeed, the single market could accelerate the relocation of 
labour-intensive industries to lower wage Mediterranean countries. The impact 
of this southward movement can be seen from the establishment of Netrail by the 
port of Rotterdam in order to organize the rail movement of containers and swap 
bodies between the port and the rest of Europe.115 Whether vessel operators in 
Asian-European trades will utilize Mediterranean ports to avoid making an 
additional 2 000 nautical mile voyage to north Europe depends on the efficiency 
of those ports, their prices, reliability, as well as the availability, 
frequency and cost of inland transport services, but there does appear to be a 
definite trend in that direction.116 
EEC liner operators have already begun to alter their policies and plans 
in anticipation of the single Community market. In essence, they seek to 
strengthen their participation in land transport and to extend the coverage of 
their services throughout the entire Community. To do this, shipping lines are 
combining not only with land transport companies but also with freight forward-
ers and port terminal operators. The resulting company can then offer an inte-
grated intermodal service which includes logistics or physical distribution man-
agement, rather than simple port-to-port services which may not be competitive 
in the single market.117 For example, CMB Transport of Belgium recently pur-
chased a terminal operator at the port of Antwerp, adopted measures to strength-
en its European agency network, indicated that it must increase its presence in 
Europe-South American trades, and announced that it will start an all-water 
nonconference service between the U.S. west coast and Brazil,118 while Nedlloyd 
of the Netherlands has purchased a large European road transport company and 
started a nonconference service betwe 611 tli6 cast and Gulf coasts of the U.S. and 
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the west coast of South America.110 Even European short-sea operators, such as 
Seacon Limited of the United Kingdom, are evaluating the possibility of expand-
ing operations to countries which are outside their customary trading bounda-
ries.120 
Non-EEC liner operators have begun to take steps to strengthen their 
competitive positions in the EEC in relation to large, vertically-integrated 
European companies. These steps will not only create needed links with the EEC 
prior to 1992, but will also respond to commercial opportunities. For example, 
Sweden's position as a major trade partner of the Community probably was taken 
into account by its conglomerate group of transport companies, Bilspedition, 
when it acquired the Dutch liner operator Incotrans.121 The Japanese liner 
operator Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha has expanded the activities of Kawasaki (London) 
Ltd. to act as owners' representative for all of Europe, and established K-Line 
(Europe) Ltd. to act as European general agent.122 Another Far East liner ves-
sel operator, Evergreen Line, believes that the single market will have an imme-
diate impact on its choices of European ports and inland distribution systems, 
and considers that the effect on Far Eastern-EEC trade will be positive.123 
There are a number of other enterprises which have adopted measures to 
safeguard their viability in the single Community market. For example, the 
Swedish Club, a Gothenburg-based protection and indemnity insurer, announced the 
establishment of a subsidiary in Luxembourg that is to begin operations on 
1 January 1989 in an effort to ensure its presence in the EEC prior to 1992.124 
In a similar manner, Swissair of Switzerland seeks to ensure its access to the 
single market through joint operating arrangements with and partial ownership 
of EEC airlines.125 
In an effort to meet the challenges which will arise from a single EEC 
market, the policies and plans of liner vessel operators of the Latin American 
and Caribbean region should take into account not only the single market but 
also the structural transformation now taking place in ocean-liner transport and 
the new requirements placed on them by major alterations in macroeconomic poli-
cies. Liner vessel operators of this region have numerous courses of action 
open to them. First, they can structure their scale of operations, and offer 
routes, frequencies, prices and technologies in order to respond to the trade 
needs of the country in which their vessels are registered. Second, they can 
Increase their participation in extraregional consortia which offer services to 
this region. Finally, they can combine cargo bases with other Latin American 
and Caribbean countries, and establish regional consortia which respond to the 
major north-south and east-west trade requirements of those countries. At the 
conclusion to this document these courses of action will be considered in 
greater depth, but it is important at this point to highlight that any workable 
policy must be based upon co-operation among Latin American and Caribbean liner 
vessel operators and will include elements from each course of action. 
D. THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN TRANSPORT ON COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 
The liner shipping industry is directly influenced by the needs of cargo owners 
and by changes in economic geography of our planet. Trade partners utilize the 
industry not only for moving goods but also for many other services which range 
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from special handling and care to precisely timed arrivals and deliveries. In 
a similar manner, changes in economic geography which shorten distances between 
markets, reduce freight costs or increase transport efficiency will have impli-
cations for both trade and transportation. Such changes in economic geography 
can be seen from (i) major interocean canals, (ii) the growing use of land-
bridges and (iii) tunnels and bridges which are to provide links between trans-
port systems of different countries. 
1. Interocean canals 
While the changes which led to mechanical traction in land transport, steam pro-
pulsion for vessels, containerization and to intermodal transport services have 
made a fundamental contribution to world economic growth, so have the major 
interocean canals. The Suez Canal was inaugurated 17 November 1869 with the 
transit of the royal yacht "Aigle" of the Empress Eugénie of France.126 
Compared to the route via the Cape of Good Hope, the voyage from London to 
Bombay was shortened by 51%, to Calcutta by 32% and to Singapore by 29%. Prior 
to opening of the Suez Canal, the fastest passages from London to Singapore in 
1867 was made by the "Eileen Radford" in 116 days, while a mere three years 
later the steamship "Shantung" took 42 days from Glasgow to Singapore with three 
intermediate ports of call.1 The cost of shipping a ton of cargo from Bombay 
to the United Kingdom fell from 10 or 12 pounds sterling in 1869 to 20 or 30 
shillings by 1893, a 90% decrease. It has been estimated that the time goods 
were in transit was reduced by 10 weeks. This period represents: 
"... a savings in interest on capital involved of 2-1/2 percent, 
which was itself important. More important still was the fact that 
money tied up in goods in transit was earning nothing. In effect, 
the changeover from sail via the Cape to steam via Suez more than 
doubled the earning capacity of a Singapore merchant's capital."128 
The Panama Canal was inaugurated on 15 August 1914 with the transit of 
the "S.S. Ancón." The Panama Canal considerably shortened the distances between 
countries on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Compared to the route via Cape 
Horn the voyage between New York and San Francisco was reduced by 8 000 nautical 
miles (1 nautical mile - 1.852 km), with other notable decreases of as much as 
3 500 nautical miles for voyages between the U.S. east coast and the west coast 
of South America and 2 000 nautical miles between northern Europe and southeast 
Asia and Australia. 
The economic impact of the Panama Canal on international trade is similar 
to that of the Suez Canal. To appreciate the benefits gained by shippers and 
consignees from the shorter distances involved in their transport operations, 
as well as the reductions in time required, a number of detailed studies have 
been prepared by ECLAC. One estimates that, for the period 1960-1970, direct 
savings of cargo owners or the difference in cost between using the Canal and 
alternative routes amounted to approximately seven times the total revenue re-
ceived by the Panama Canal from ship transits. During 1970, for instance, tran-
sit revenue amounted to US$100.9 million and the direct savings for cargo owners 
were estimated to be US$620 million.129 
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With the dynamic growth in the volume of containers utilizing North 
American intermodal landbridge services, the cost savings normally enjoyed by 
that specific sector might be placed in question. However, according to the 
Panama Canal Commission's Economic Research and Marketing Development Division, 
during the six year period 1982-1986, containerized cargoes passing through the 
Panama Canal have increased at a rate of 8.4% annually.190 This figure must be 
interpreted with care, as it indicates an increase in containerized transit 
traffic and not that it originated in or is destined for the U.S. In addition, 
it must be kept in mind that American President Lines has constructed five post-
PANAMAX  vessels (those with dimensions which exceed the maximum  for transitting 
the Panama Canal), and others are giving serious thought to doing the same.131 
The relation between the level of tolls and the demand for transit ser-
vices was demonstrated in two toll-sensitivity studies carried out by consul-
tants in 1976 and 1986 for the Panama Canal Commission. Both of these studies 
concluded that transit traffic is sensitive to the level of tolls and that such 
sensitivity will increase over time if the cost competitiveness of alternative 
routes is greater. The most recent study estimates that the volume of cargoes 
in transit through the Panama Canal can be expected to decline by a percentage 
equivalent to about one-fourth the toll increase, and that Canal revenues would 
increase by a percentage of about two-thirds of the toll increase.132 Applying 
these study results to the 1 October 1989 toll increase of approximately 10% 
being considered by the Panama Canal Commission suggests that there could be a 
decline in transit traffic of 2.5% and an increase in Canal revenue of 6.7%.133 
Faced with a similar toll sensitivity, the Suez Canal Authority announced on 
27 October 1988 that it was to raise tolls by up to 8% for 1989 after no 
increase for the last two years.134 The Chairman and Managing Director of the 
Suez Canal Authority indicated that they seek to lower costs so that tolls can 
be equated with vessel operating expenses via the Cape of Good Hope, thereby 
permitting shippers and consignees to benefit from the savings of time which 
results from Canal usage.135 
2. Landbridges 
A landbridge permits the substitution of land transport for part of an all-water 
carriage operation. There are three types of landbridges: (i) a microbridge 
involves ocean and land carriage operations to an interior point, (ii) a mini-
bridge consists of ocean and land carriage operations which terminate in another 
costal area, and (iii) a landbridge encompasses two ocean movements joined by 
a transcontinental land transport operation. There are numerous microbridges, 
which are merely extensions of a port's traditional hinterland, and minibridges, 
but the use of landbridges Is limited by port costs. As an Illustration, Asian 
cargoes which enter the U.S. at Los Angeles destined for Chicago or New York 
would entail microbridge and minibridge movements respectively, while the same 
cargoes destined for Europe would be an instance of a landbridge operation. A 
landbridge requires the use of four ports—one at the country of origin, another 
at destination and two in the transit country. Presently, the major landbridges 
are the U.S. for western Europe, the Soviet Union for western Europe and the Far 
East, the United Kingdom for Ireland, and Hamburg-Lubeck for Scandinavia. In 
this part only the first two will be discussed. 
52 
American President Lines, Atlantic Container Line and Gulf Container Lines 
have begun to offer a joint Asia-Europe service via the U.S. landbridge, which 
they claim is competitive with the all-water route.136 This initiative could 
prove viable, but it must be evaluated in the light of numerous factors such as 
the extra port and land transport costs involved, and the competitive reaction 
of all-water carriers and the trans-Siberian landbridge. At the same time, the 
demand for cargo by American President Lines has increased due to its recent 
introduction into the very competitive trans-Pacific trade of five 4 340 TEU 
vessels whose dimensions exceed the maximum  for transit of the Panama Canal. 
These vessels have a length of 896' (273.1 m) and a width of 129' (39.3 m), 
while the maximum  dimensions for transit of the Panama Canal are 950' (298.6 m) 
and 106' (32.3 m).137 Nonetheless, American President Lines announced lower 
profits for the second and third quarters of 1988.138 
With regard to competition from all-water carriers, it has been estimated 
that those belonging to the Asia North America Eastbound Rate Agreement will add 
nearly 40% more capacity during the next 18 months.139 The excess offer of 
transport services in trans-Pacific trades and the desire to avoid a rate war 
have both conferences and nonconference operators to establish the Transpacific 
Discussion Agreement in mid-October 1988.1*° 
In analyzing the costs and benefits of Intermodal microbridge and mini-
bridge services in the U.S., the experiences of certain liner vessel operators 
is illustrative. American President Lines offers Asian and U.S. shippers an 
intermodal system which utilizes those landbridges and articulated railway 
wagons that permit the carriage of containers stacked two-high. This arrange-
ment allows containers to be delivered to U.S. east coast destinations 87 hours 
after being discharged from vessels on the west coast,141 which is seven days 
faster and US$100-200 less costly than the all-water route.1*2 As early as mid-
1985, American President Lines indicated that stack-train services had reduced 
its origin-to-destination costs by 40% and Far East-U.S. east coast transit 
times by at least seven days.143 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) Line of Japan found that not only do all-water 
services generally lose money, but they require twice as much capital investment 
in vessels than those which utilize U.S. west coast ports and inland rail trans-
port.144 The Australia-New Zealand Direct Line analyzed the same matter and 
concluded that it would need only three vessels for a twice monthly intermodal 
service to the U.S. east coast via west coast ports, while a direct service to 
U.S. east coast ports would require 5.2 vessels. The analysis showed that, once 
vessel productivity was taken into account, the intermodal minibridge service 
via U.S. west coast ports provided a greater margin of profit.145 
Use of the North American continent for microbridge and minibridge cargo 
movements is growing rapidly. By January 1988, there were 67 double-stack con-
tainer trains, each carrying from 100 to 600 TEU, departing on a weekly basis 
from the U.S. Pacific ports of 28 Seattle and Tacoma, Washington, and Portland, 
Oregon (28 trains total), Oakland (2 trains), and Los Angeles and Long Beach, 
California (37 trains total).1*6 The quantity of containers filled with imports 
moving eastbound from those ports has been estimated at 29 000 TEU per week on 
double-stack container trains, which is approximately 25% of all U.S. intermodal 
movements. 
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One of the largest intermodal carriers in trans-Pacific trades, American 
President Lines, recently indicated that about 30% of its containers discharged 
at U.S. west coast ports are destinad fdr Rew Té*k.147 As large as these 
volumes of intermodal movements might seea, they account for only 3% of the 
total cargo base in the U.S."8 With reference to the future growth of double-
stack train departures from the neighboring ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, 
Wharton Econometrics of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, predicted an increase to 37 
by 1990, which has already been attained, and thereafter to 71 departures in the 
year 2 000 and to 146 in 2 020.UB 
The other major landbridge is the trans-Siberian (TSL) , whose operations 
are co-ordinated by Soyuztransit (SOTRA), an agency of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade of the Soviet Union. The TSL presently carries about 10% of Japanese and 
South Korean trade to Europe on block trains of 104 TEU with an average transit 
time of 30-35 days. Due to the different railway gauges of the TSL and of west-
ern Europe, containers are normally transferred between railway wagons at Teres-
pol, Poland, or between the TSL and vessels of the Latvian Shipping Company or 
United Baltic Corporation at Riga, Russia, for on-carriage to western European 
destinations. SOTRA recently changed from Leningrad to Riga not only to take 
advantage of lower port costs, but also because it wishes to consolidate cargoes 
at the latter port for transportation on the TSL from western Europe to the 
Soviet Union.150 
The volume of traffic using the TSL has varied greatly in the 21 years 
since the first containers started moving between the Far East and Europe. From 
a high of 127 305 TEU in 1983, for instance, there has been a steady decline to 
93 643 TEU in 1987. The four-year decrease has been attributed to factors which 
range from a lack of railway flatcars to facilities at the port of Vostochny, 
and from excessive delays to a lack of information concerning the location of 
goods.151 Other factors which no doubt contributed to the decline in TSL traf-
fic have been the low freight rates being offered by all-water carriers, and 
the appreciation of the Japanese yen.152 The decrease in TSL traffic is con-
sidered temporary by Intercontainer, which co-ordinates TSL container movements 
in western Europe.153 With completion of the second trans-Siberian line (the 
Baikal-Amur Magistral) in 19 90,154 and improvements in the port of Vostochny 
that permit it to handle 130 000 TEU annually,155 not only will the capacity of 
the TSL be increased to around four times that of the original line, but also 
the possibility exists for substantially reducing transit times. 
During September 1982, SOTRA decided to demonstrate the potential of the 
TSL and made the 11 000 km trip from the Far East port of Vostochny to Brest, 
Poland, in 12 days. For passengers trains, the same distance is covered regu-
larly in just seven days. The transit time for freight trains should be com-
pared with 24 days for the all-water route between Europe and the Far East,156 
which is approximately 22 000 km or twice the land transport distance. With 
reference to rates, the TSL costs 10-20%—and in some cases 30-40%—less than 
conference carriers. As a partial response, conference members grant reductions 
of between 10% and 30% to shippers of certain commodities who provide a regular 
volume of traffic. 
The long-term impact of intermodal landbridge movements of containerized 
cargoes is difficult to accurately access, but numerous questions come to mind. 
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What impact will landbridges have on the fleet development programs and trading 
economics of Latin American and Caribbean countries? What organizational and 
operational changes are needed for Latin American and Caribbean shipping lines 
to make use of these landbridges? Could U.S. landbridge services include Latin 
American and Caribbean cargoes which now utilize the Panama Canal? Are these 
long-distance inland movements merely a prelude to the use of the North American 
continent as a landbridge between two ocean transport operations for Asia-Europe 
cargoes, such as that now offered jointly by American President Lines, Atlantic 
Container Line and Gulf Container Lines? Will the need for greater cost effec-
tiveness, efficiency and economies of scale lead Latin American and Caribbean 
liner operators to establish regional consortia and construct post-PANAMAX  ves-
sels? Until these and many other questions are answered, liner shipping com-
panies of this region will be compelled to operate in a commercial environment 
so disperse that they literally cannot tell from one day to the next what poli-
cies and plans are most appropriate. 
3. International bridges and tunnels 
For transportation, the 1990s could easily be referred to as the decade of 
international fixed links or connections between domestic transport systems. 
These links, via bridges or tunnels or a combination of both, have been com-
pleted or are under construction in many parts of the world. For example, work 
has begun in the English Channel to link France and the United Kingdom, and 
plans are being made for such a connection between Sweden and Denmark, to join 
the Scandinavian transport infrastructure with that of continental Europe by 
1995.157 Connections across the Bosporus and between Morocco and Spain are also 
being contemplated.158 
A tunnel across the English Channel between the United Kingdom and France 
was an early dream. Feasibility studies were been carried out as early as 1802, 
and a certain amount of digging actually took place in 1874.159 With increasing 
trade flows between the United Kingdom and continental Europe since 1 January 
1973, when the United Kingdom became a member of the EEC, the role of that 
country's east coast ports has become dominant for both deep-sea and short-sea 
trades. This change in trade flows has resulted in a significant increase in 
the transshipment of United Kingdom goods via continental ports—especially 
those of Antwerp and Rotterdam—and  a dynamic expansion in United Kingdom short-
sea trades with Europe, both of which prepared the basis for the Channel Tunnel. 
The Channel Tunnel is scheduled to be open for traffic on 15 May 1993, at 
an estimated total cost of US$8 200 million,160 and many speculate on its impact 
for European deep-sea liner cargoes.161 That impact will arise not only from 
the Tunnel itself but also from the network of routes foreseen by Intercon-
tainer, which are to emanate from the French terminal at Lille and reach desti-
nations as far away as Italy, Spain and parts of eastern Europe. Freightliner, 
the container handling operation of British Rail, does not see cargoes destined 
for the United Kingdom being discharged at either Antwerp or Rotterdam, as the 
distances are too short to justify rail transport.162 The reverse probably will 
not happen either: unloading containers in the United Kingdom for movement by 
rail to continental European destinations. It is a foregone conclusion that the 
Channel Tunnel will change commercial routes and trade economics, but this does 
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not mean there will not be a role for both continental European and United 
Kingdom ports. Most likely, deep-sea liner operators will call at two or three 
continental ports before making a last call in the United Kingdom. The reason 
liner operators would offer a port rotation such as this is that it would give 
shippers an additional two or three days to get their cargoes to vessels in the 
United Kingdom via a Channel Tunnel rail movement, before these vessels depart 
on another voyage. 
Of even greater interest for Latin American and Caribbean countries than 
the port rotation offered by liner shipping companies would be the changes in 
commercial relationships brought about by the Tunnel and related European rail-
way network. Events such as the United Kingdom becoming a member of the EEC, 
the governments of France and the United Kingdom agreeing to build the Channel 
Tunnel, the Japanese using the TSL and becoming a major investor In the Tun-
nel,163 the Narodny Bank of the Soviet Union investing in the tunnel,164 and the 
plan to create a network of rail routes from the French terminal of the tunnel 
to numerous European destinations were undertaken independently but are not un-
related. Together they constitute a pattern that could result in, for instance, 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union playing an even greater role in Western 
European markets. With each change in transportation, trade relationships are 
permanently altered. Such alterations are an inevitable part of the Channel 
Tunnel, and their meaning for the competitiveness of Latin American and Carib-
bean goods in those markets must be determined. 
In summary, whether one looks at interocean canals or the growing use of 
landbridges, both seem to have a similar impact on trade. They have brought 
about enormous changes in locational linkages between production and consump-
tion, united geographically distant markets, required manufacturers to continu-
ally redefine production economies of scale and cost-effective distribution'sys-
tems, led to the unitization of cargoes, modified the cost structure of trans-
portation, influenced the maximum  dimensions of vessels, and greatly reduced the 
volume of shipping services utilizing trade routes via Cape Horn and the Cape 
of Good Hope. For the future, it is not difficult to foresee that international 
fixed links such as the Channel Tunnel will permit liner vessel operators to 
call at fewer ports and intensify their use of land transport services. The new 
dimension given to land transport by intermodal landbridge services and fixed 
links should favour Latin American and Caribbean countries, as they will not 
have to pay high freight rates for vessels to call at many individual ports but 
instead can utilize highly efficient European and North American inland trans-




STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICIES 
AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY 
Operators of liner vessels, ports, trucks and railways have always had to evalu-
ate the needs of other sectors when formulating their operating and investment 
strategies, but during a time of monetary and commercial uncertainty they must 
be especially receptive and make every effort to correctly interpret the ideas, 
changes, events, trends, circumstances and challenges facing the global economy 
and the international markets they serve. Some of the more important factors 
which must be considered to formulate appropriate strategies are (i) the mone-
tary- commercial environment which gave rise to current macroeconomic policies 
and (ii) the role of the liner shipping industry therein. 
A. THE MONETARY-COMMERCIAL  ENVIRONMENT THAT GAVE RISE 
TO CURRENT MACROECONOMIC  POLICIES 
The microfoundations of macroeconomics are usually presented in generic terms 
of households, firms and governments, with evaluations directed toward their 
aggregate consumption, saving, investment activities. In this part, an effort 
will be made to look more closely at one specific micro foundation—-the liner 
shipping industry—in order to identify the contributions it can make to the 
achievement of macroeconomic objectives. Latin American and Caribbean countries 
currently focus the objectives of their macroeconomic policies on expanding 
exports, increasing investment, creating employment opportunities and generating 
a positive trade balance. 
To accomplish these objectives, numerous "transmission mechanisms", as 
they are referred to in macroeconomics, are utilized by each country. They in-
clude (i) monetary mechanisms which encompass the purchase and sale of financial 
instruments to control the stock of money in the economy, (ii) fiscal mechanisms 
that involve government taxation and spending to guide the demand for goods and 
savings as well as investments and (iii) general policy measures such as import 
tariffs, quantity and exchange restrictions, export financing, loans from inter-
national agencies and currency valuations. Each macroeconomic "transmission 
mechanism" permits a response to specific circumstances and they are usually 
employed jointly to achieve policy objectives. To understand how countries of 
this region arrived at export oriented macroeconomic policies and what they mean 
for the liner shipping industry, it is necessary to briefly consider the changes 
in Latin American and Caribbean economies which began with the oil crises. 
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It will be recalled that, in October 1973, the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to raise the price of crude oil from US$1.88 
to US$3.15 per barrel, and on 1 December of the same year to US$11.65 per 
barrel.165 These price increases were followed by others, ultimately reaching 
US$34.00 per barrel in January 1982.166 Even though the price of oil has since 
decreased from that high, and in September 1988 was only US$11.78 per barrel,167 
increases in the price of crude oil during the 1970s brought about a massive 
transfer of income from oil importing countries to oil exporters. As a conse-
quence, the treasuries of OPEC member nations, as well as their accounts with 
banks in Europe and North America, began to swell with petrodollars from sales 
of crude oil. These banks found themselves in the position of having Co find 
persons, enterprises and governments wishing to borrow money. 
The economic environment for Latin America during the 1970s was one of 
positive economic growth and most opportune for undertaking desired national 
projects. As can be seen from table 8, with the exception of 1975, which had 
an annual economic growth rate of 3.6%, from 1971 to 1980 such rates remained 
between 4.5 and 7.7%. To better understand such rates for Latin America, a 
comparison with those of developed countries in the same table will disclose the 
strong growth environment in which countries of this region found themselves 
during each year of that period. 
Table 8 
RATE OF GROWTH IN REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1971-1985 
(Percentage) 
Year World Developed Developing Latin America 
countries countries and the Caribbean 
1971 3.7 3.3 6.0 6.6 
1972 5.2 5.0 5.6 6.7 
1973 5.8 5.7 6.4 7.7 
1974 1.8 0.7 6.6 7.0 
1975 0.5 -0.4 4.0 3.6 
1976 5.1 4.7 6.9 6.1 
1977 4.1 3.7 5.7 4.5 
1978 4.0 4.1 3.6 4.5 
1979 3.5 3.2 4.5 6.6 
1980 2.0 1.3 4.4 5.7 
1981 1.6 1.5 2.2 -0.2 
1982 - -0.2 0.9 -1.2 
1983 2.2 2.6 0.5 -2.5 
1984 4.1 4.5 2.8 3 . 5 
1985 2.8 3.1 1.7 2 . 5 
Source : International Monetary Fund, Estadj$ticas Financieras Internacionales, 
Anuario 1987. pp. 159 a 161. 
Note : In the column World in 1982, means that the figure is zero, close to 
zero or that data were not available. 
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From the viewpoint of the International banking community with excess 
liquidity, countries of this region were extremely good candidates for loans; 
that is, they had higher economic growth rates during the 1971-1980 period than 
did their developed counterparts, they were relatively unaffected by the world 
recession of 1974-1975 and the prices of their traditional primary product 
exports had risen with increases in the price of crude oil. In this high-growth 
environment, Latin American countries began to adopt expansive economic poli-
cies. These policies permitted them to supplement domestic savings with funds 
obtained from external borrowing and to invest in capital improvement projects, 
thereby maintaining and even raising their rates of economic growth. 
As can be seen from table 9, the global debt of Latin America and the 
Caribbean increased US$157 247.3 million or 64.9% during a seven-year period. 
Preliminary estimates prepared by ECLAC show the global debt has increased to 
approximately to US$420 000 million in 1987, or a 5.3% increase over 1986. 
Table 9 
GLOBAL DEBT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1980-1986 
(Millions of US$ and percentages) 
Year Amount Increment over 
prior period 
1980 242 176.3 
1981 295 501.6 22.0 
1982 332 029.2 12.4 
1983 359 650.3 8.3 
1984 376 902.4 4.8 
1985 386 437.6 2.5 
1986 399 423.6 3.4 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables. "External Debt of Developing Countries," 
p. 18, 1987-1988 edition, vol. 1, Washington, D.C. 
The above tables show quite clearly that, in spite of macroeconomic poli-
cies focused on expanding exports and limiting imports, the overall indebtedness 
of Latin American and Caribbean countries has continued to grow since the onset 
of the debt crises in 1982, although the rate of increase has lessened. The 
large amount of external financing flowing to countries of this region during 
the 1970s was reversed in 1982. Between that year and 1985 they transferred to 
creditors more than US$26 000 million each year, which represents more than 25% 
of their exports. Indeed, for the period 1983-1985, the average increase in 
real resource transfers from countries of this region to creditors increased by 
5.3% of real gross domestic product (GDP). These transfers can be closely cor-
related to the average decrease of investment in the region, which amounted to 
5.8% of GDP. This means that Latin American and Caribbean countries are post-
poning essential investments that are needed to generate new economic activities 
that can contribute to the servicing of their external debts. 
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Since 1870 the international monetary system has gone from the gold 
standard, in which the external sector of national economies was paramount, to 
internal sector domination brought about by the experience of the depression of 
1929 and crystallized in the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 and, finally, to 
a resurgence of the external sector. However, supremacy of the external sector 
today is more far-reaching than earlier shifts in economic orientation: it is 
a fundamental and permanent transformation in the nature and scope of national 
economic activities. This transformation is due not only to the oil shock and 
debt crises but also to the internationalization of markets and trade patterns. 
The era of relatively isolated national economies is fading as enterprises and 
governments search globally for market-access advantages and least-cost inputs. 
This search has led to, for instance, the employment of construction workers 
from the Indian subcontinent in the Mid-East Gulf, Filipino crews on Norwegian 
vessels, registration of U.S. vessels in Liberia, and the assembly of Japanese 
electronic products in Mexico for the North American market. The implications 
of such changes are profound not only for buyers and sellers of liner shipping 
services but also for countries which have and do not have market-access advan-
tages and low-cost inputs. 
B. THE ROLE OF THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY IN MACROECONOMIC  POLICIES 
Liner shipping is accorded, at best, only indirect attention in the formulation 
of national macroeconomic policies. The reason for this is that perfect ports 
and carriers are almost invisible; that is, if they are efficient, inexpensive 
and deliver goods on time and without damage they are not seen. On the other 
hand, they come into view when cargoes are damaged, costs are too high or deliv-
ery is delayed. With the burden of the external debt on many countries of this 
region, the objectives of macroeconomic policies are largely focused on expand-
ing exports, increasing investments and generating employment, and the earlier 
mentioned "transmission mechanisms" have come to the forefront. As the liner 
shipping industry is linked by a multitude of ties to other sectors of the econ-
omy, this part will consider how that industry can strengthen the functioning 
of such "transmission mechanisms." 
1. The "F" in CIF 
That the demand for shipping services is totally dependent on the demand for the 
products of other sectors is probably the first commandment  of ocean transport, 
which vessel operators have had to deal with since time immemorial.  The gener-
ally accepted corollary to this commandment  is that shipping lines have rela-
tively little influence over the demand for those products. Nonetheless, along 
with the costs of production and insurance, transport costs are added to the 
delivered price of goods. Transport costs include not only freight rates paid 
by shippers but also those which arise from vessel technologies, routings and 
frequencies, as the latter contribute directly to the gain or loss of market op-
portunities for cargo owners. If transport costs are excessive, whether through 
unnecessarily high freight rates, or inappropriate vessel technologies, routings 
or frequencies, they will reduce the competitiveness of goods in world markets, 
limit sales, decrease foreign exchange earnings and diminish the effectiveness 
of macroeconomic policies. 
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Due to the Inverse relation between foreign exchange earnings from exports 
and transport costs, if the latter are unnecessarily high they can weaken the 
effectiveness of "transmission mechanisms", or «ven render them impotent and 
frustrate macroeconomic goals. It is often considered that subsidies can 
compensate for excess transport costs, and this would be true if the national 
economy were relatively isolated and all direct and indirect expenses were paid 
in the national currency. From information provided by the Latin American Inte-
gration Association (ALADI) , in 1983 the trade relations of its 11 member coun-
tries generated US$11 587 million in ocean freights. Based upon an earlier 
analysis,160 it can be estimated that even with Latin American and Caribbean 
shipping lines earning a substantial proportion of those freights (as an exam-
ple, see Brazil in the following paragraphs), the net foreign exchange effect 
of an investment in liner shipping rang«s from 10% to 35% of gross revenues 
depending on a variety of factors. Thus, supposing average gross revenues of 
20%, of which 30% corresponds to net foreign exchange earnings, it can be esti-
mated that these countries probably reduced their outflows of foreign exchange 
by US$11 587 million x 20% x 30%, or approximately US$700 million. 
The basis for this estimate can be found in the large number of vessel, 
cargo and crew expenses in foreign ports, the need to import equipment and spare 
parts produced outside the region, the chartering of foreign vessels, and the 
repair and maintenance of vessels in extraregional shipyards, all of which must 
be paid In foreign exchange. For example, during 1986, Lloyd Brasileiro time-
chartered 79 foreign vessels and voyage-chartered another 141, at a cost of 
US$75.4 million,169 while all national shipping lines of Brazil together 
incurred expenses of US$580.3 million in the same year for similar purposes.170 
In 1987, chartering expenses for Brazilian ship operators increased to approxi-
mately US$587 million.171 According to the National Superintendency of the 
Merchant Marine (SUNAMAM),  between January and July of 1988 total chartering 
expenses were US$387 million, which was an increase of 21.2% over the US$319.37 
million spent during the same period in 1987,172 and the figure could reach 
US$700 million for the entire year.173 Notwithstanding such large amounts of 
foreign exchange that must be paid outside the region, vessel operators, ports 
and all those in the distribution chain can contribute to and strengthen the 
impact of macroeconomic "transmission mechanisms" through the "support mecha-
nism" of cost control, as well as by selecting appropriate technologies, routes 
and frequencies. 
The reasoning that there exists an inverse relation between foreign ex-
change earnings and transport costs is correct, but the magnitude of the latter 
must be understood to formulate appropriate policies for the liner shipping 
industry. With only minor exceptions, liner freight rates are ad vajoreff. 
calculated on the basis of the value of the goods carried. Further, liner con-
ferences offer lower rates for nontraditional exports and imports in order to 
promote their transportation, as well as higher rates for dangerous, refrigera-
ted and other cargoes requiring special care. Notwithstanding such diversity 
in the calculation of freight rates, from a survey of 174 Chilean exporters dur-
ing 1987 it was determined that the freight rates charged by conference members 
for the carriage of their manufactured goods to the Far East reached an average 
of 21% of the CIF (cost, insurance and freight) value, while 42% by weight of 
those cargoes incurred rates of over 40% of the CIF value.17* Even though cargo 
owners of all nations must pay transport costs to place their goods in world 
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markets, if those costs are unnecessarily high they constitute a leakage from 
the foreign exchange earnings a country would otherwise receive and a restraint 
on national investment spending. 
2. Zarti 
As approximately 70-75% of liner freight rates are utilized for the payment of 
port and land transport expenses,175 those activities represent an important 
focal point for the "support mechanism" of cost control. A closer look at these 
"shore-based costs" by the Government of New Zealand disclosed that 36.7%, or 
about half of the total, are port related; that is, stevedoring and terminal 
operations account for 29.7% and wharfage 7%.176 The equal division of "shore-
based costs" between inland distribution and ports is not unique to New Zealand, 
as a similar distribution of costs was found by P&OCL in its Europe-Far East 
service.177 
Most Latin American and Caribbean ports have an acute labour problem in 
four interrelated areas—surplus, high remuneration, low productivity and lack 
of interchangeability of tasks—which increases the cost of imports and exports. 
This problem has reached such a magnitude that many port directors ask them-
selves if they are a commercial entity or one dedicated to providing work for 
the unemployed of the surrounding city.178 One port director mentioned that he 
has 4 600 stevedores receiving wages but needs only 1 200. Another emphasized 
that he was required to find work for an additional 900 persons even though he 
already had a surplus of port labour. 
Excess port labour is not unique to this region. As instances of this, 
Port Louis Harbour, Mauritius, has found that it requires only 410 port workers, 
but due to rigid job classifications it must permanently employ 997 men. The 
port of Southampton, United Kingdom, negotiated overall manning reductions of 
900 persons to bring its total labour force down to 1 500.179 
The cost of labour as a percentage of overall port operating expenses has 
been calculated by a number of port authorities. Due to the variety of general-
ly accepted accounting practices which might be utilized for items such as de-
preciation, comparisons among ports must be treated with caution. Nonetheless, 
at the Fifteenth Conference of the International Association of Ports and Har-
bors, held in Seoul, Korea, in 1979, a group of port specialists headed by the 
executive director for the port of Houston estimated that labour costs for a 
container terminal should reach only 30% of overall operating expenses.180 It 
is instructive to note that, in the port of Acajutla, El Salvador, they reach 
76% of operating expenses, and in the port of Callao, Peru, they are 80%.181 
Container terminals in some developed countries also spend relatively large 
amounts on labour, as for example Australia, where this item accounts for more 
than 50% of all port costs.182 
Most ports of this region operate in a quasi-monopoly environment, with 
captive shippers, consignees and hinterlands. In contrast, liner vessel operat-
ors and the exporters and importers who must use their services face fierce 
international competition. Many port authorities of this region must comply 
with legislation requiring that each stevedore be paid a minimum  number of days 
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per month, whether worked or not.183 Others find they have been transformed 
into a "no-man's-land" by unions that are overly strong or excessive in number, 
thereby reducing cargo handling efficiency and creating an incentive to trans-
ship cargoes at the ports of neighboring countries.18* A noncompetitive port 
environment translates into higher ocean-liner rates, reduced competitiveness 
of exports in world markets, higher prices for imports, and a decrease in the 
overall volume of goods liner operators might transport. Ports cannot be viewed 
as if they were separate from the competitive environment in which ocean car-
riers, exporters and importers must operate. The need to create a competitive 
environment between ports and between terminals in the same port can no longer 
be avoided. 
According to the Business Council of Australia, ocean-liner rates for that 
country could be reduced by approximately US$150 million if its ports were as 
productive as those of their industrial neighbors. Australian shippers contend 
that such rates cost the country's economy an estimated US$1 500 million per 
year. The source of the port problem in Australia is the same for many of those 
in this region, that is, the high cost of port labour, its low productivity and 
the lack of competition between ports and between terminal operators in the same 
port. In an effort to solve these problems, port workers' unions and terminal 
operating companies in Australia have begun to establish co-operatives in a 
limited but growing number of ports. These co-operatives have reduced the costs 
and times vessels spend in ports without reducing wages or ignoring established 
working conditions. Even though it was agreed that any benefits would be passed 
on to shipping lines, it was found that workers were performing the tasks with 
enthusiasm due to their involvement in such companies.185 A similar co-opera-
tive system is utilized at the Mexican port of Tampico and has been suggested 
for the ports of Brazil by various commercial interests of that country. 8 6 
Another problem faced by liner shipping companies is the time their ves-
sels sit idle in ports. It will be remembered that general cargo vessels spend 
around 50% of their time in ports. With the arrival of containerization, total 
vessel time in port was reduced to 22-28%, since capital-intensive loading and 
discharge systems for containerships are utilized. Even with this decrease, 
there are many periods of total inactivity when vessels wait for clearance (doc-
tors, inspectors, fumigators, etc.), longshoremen, container handling equipment 
and cranes, and Customs officers, as well as for the resolution of labour dis-
putes and the passing of inclement weather. A Swedish consulting firm has esti-
mated that vessel idle time at berths is between 7 and 15% of total port time, 
or 25 to 40 days per year.187 To place the 40 day time period in perspective, 
it is sufficient for a round voyage between Valparaiso and the U.S. east coast, 
with approximately seven ports of call. In other words, the earning capacity 
of vessels in that trade for one voyage per year is needlessly lost. 
The president of the national shipowners' association (ANA) of Chile re-
cently indicated that its members had good earnings for 1987 due to an improve-
ment in the national economy, a realistic exchange rate, the simplification, 
reduction and elimination of many bureaucratic foreign-trade requirements, and 
the extraordinary increase in efficiency of their ports.188 In contrast, a 
spokesman for the national shipowners' association of Peru (AAP), indicated that 
the ports of his country are among the most expensive in the world.189 Accord-
ing to a joint news release of the AAP, the maritime association of Peru (AMP) 
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and the Peruvian association of shipping agents (APAM), Peru's principal port 
of Callao is 3.5 times more expensive than Guayaquil and seven times more than 
Buenaventura.190 During the latter part of 1986, the national shipping line of 
Brazil, Lloyd Brasileiro, discontinued its roll-on/roll-off service to Monte-
video because labour unions at that port required the employaent of 20 steve-
dores each eight-hour shift, while the same ships in the port of Buenos Aires 
utilize only four.191 Once the cost of low productivity, wages for persons not 
working, and excess wages of those working are taken into account, one can begin 
to translate the port labour problem into lost exports, reduced foreign exchange 
earnings and postponed capital investments. 
In response to the labour problem, certain port authorities of this region 
have begun to consider the privatization of terminals, or their operation by 
both the public and private sectors.192 Others have gone a step further and of-
fered early retirement benefits to longshoremen and purchased their work permits 
through voluntary severance schemes.1 Such efforts are being made not only to 
reduce the cost of labour and increase its productivity, but also to promote 
private-sector investments in ports. The union of shipping enterprises (SEN) 
of Brazil recently estimated that, due to inefficiencies in loading and dis-
charging ships at Brazilian ports during 1987, approximately US$300 million were 
paid to the operators of vessel which suffered delays. The SEN recommended  that 
international trade activities of Brazil be conducted through six ports instead 
of 40. This would permit needed investments to be channelled toward specific 
ports, and efficient operating systems to be developed.194 
3. Vessels 
Shipping lines can also contribute to a strengthening of macroeconomic "trans-
mission mechanisms." The labour agreements under which national and private 
liner shipping companies of this region operate are a fruitful source of infor-
mation concerning possible avenues which might be pursued to strengthen macro-
economic goals through the "support mechanism" of cost control. Certain liner 
shipping companies of this region have ships that can be operated safely and 
efficiently with crews of 20, for instance, but are nonetheless required by 
union agreements to employ 34. In many countries, the number of crew members 
is determined by the armed forces who wish to maintain pools of trained person-
nel in case of national emergency, or by legal dispositions adopted 25-30 years 
ago.195 One liner operator finds itself bound by a historical union agreement 
that requires it not only to pay crew wages which are internationally competi-
tive and in U.S. dollars, but also to differentiate salaries according to indi-
vidual routes served. Another liner company finds itself with a labour agree-
ment which grants crew members one day free with pay, in addition to vacation, 
for each day aboard ship. This problem is not unique to Latin American and the 
Caribbean, since the shipping lines of Finland, for instance, are required to 
operate with slightly more than two persons for each position on some of its 
cargo ferries.198 
In an effort to ensure that national shipping lines more fully contribute 
to macroeconomic policies, the governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, among 
others, have begun to consider their privatization. With regard to ELMA, the 
national shipping line of Argentina, the government is studying proposals from 
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foreign shipping lines as well as the offer of five national ship operators.197 
The initiative to privatize national shipping lines is not limited to Latin 
American and the Caribbean. For example, the Government of New Zealand is in 
the process of selling the Shipping Corporation of New Zealand, and one of the 
six offers received is from Lloyd Brasileiro,198 
The discussions of those involved in these matters seem to focus on three 
recurring themes -the commercial aspects of shipping, national defence and 
economic security. The policies and plans of most countries for their merchant 
fleets customarily require that national lines be structured so as to comply 
with many aspects of these three areas. There is a trend, however, in indus-
trialized countries to utilize different means to satisfy each individually. 
In the U.S., for instance, national defence requirements are met with approxi-
mately 130 vessels of the Military Sealift Command and with its National Defense 
Reserve Fleet,199 while economic security needs are considered adequately cov-
ered by vessels which are nationally owned and registered either in the U.S. or 
in other countries. In theory, this would free its merchant fleet from numerous 
nontrade obligations and permit it to better respond to the commercial aspects 
of shipping. 
Other fruitful areas of "support mechanisms" for liner operators would be 
the selection of appropriate vessel technologies and the reduction of shoreside 
administrative costs. The selection of vessel technologies is a decision which 
directly influences the earning capacity of a shipping company for 20 years or 
more, and must be made with a strategic understanding of the trades one seeks 
to serve. For example, one major liner operator of this region has found that 
between the first semester of 1986 and 1987 its freight earnings had fallen from 
US$210 to US$120 million or 42.8%. This decrease in earnings was due not only 
to the freedom which liner operators were given to participate in the export 
trades of that country but also to the obsolete nature of its vessels, even 
though the average age of its fleet is only nine years.200 With regard to 
administrative costs, one successful Latin American liner company carefully 
studied the functions carried out by shoreside personnel and found that, due to 
duplications in activities, 10% could be eliminated at its head office and 
almost 50% at its offices in foreign countries.201 
Of the many problems involved in the operation of a liner shipping com-
pany, the most important relate to cargoes—types, volumes, units of presenta-
tion for carriage, origins and destinations, hauls, backhauls, and many others. 
If national cargo volumes are small and shippers demand a frequent service to 
a wide range of ports, a cost-effective operation might require complementary 
cargoes from other countries on the trade route so that partially loaded voyages 
could be avoided. With new levels of cost-effective operation and productivity 
resulting from the utilization of very large vessels and modern technologies, 
as well as "just-in-time" deliveries required by an ever growing number of ship-
pers and consignees, the volume of cargoes required for the establishment of an 
efficient and economical service can be substantial. 
In addition to cargo reservation regimes, numerous other measures such as 
combining parallel operations, contract carriage arrangements, slot-chartering, 
and carrying third-country cargoes ("cross trading") are used to obtain cargo 
volumes sufficient so that frequencies desired by shippers and economies of 
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scale required by the trade can be offered. To enlarge its cargo base. Trans-
portación Marítima Mexicana (TMM), for instance, carries an increasing portion 
of the Asia/U.S. trade in its service between the west coasts of Mexico and the 
U.S., and numerous ports in Asia. The president of TMM indicated that its 
greatest growth in cargo volumes had been those carried between the Far East 
and the U.S. west coast. During 1984, TMM earned US$138.9 million of freight 
Income from its liner operations (39.3% more than the previous year), of which 
US$67.7 million or 48.7% was earned as a cross trader carrying cargoes in its 
routes for other countries.202 TMM is not the only cross trader in U.S. foreign 
commerce, as data compiled by the Federal Maritime Commission for 1987 indicate 
that approximately 54% of total U.S. liner traffic is carried by cross traders. 
In a similar manner the national shipping line of Argentina, ELUA, takes 
advantage of SUNAMAM  Resolution 8364 (evaluated in greater detail in subsequent 
paragraphs), which permits nonconference vessels to engage in the export trades 
of Brazil, and for 1987 approximately 23.9% of all cargoes transported by E1MA 
were between Brazil and third countries. During the first six months of 1988 
that amount had Increased to 25%.203 Thus, combining cross trading with nation-
al services can provide liner shipping companies with a valuable source of both 
income and experience. 
During 1986 the state-owned shipping line of Chile, EMPREMAR,  discon-
tinued its service between countries on the west coast of South America and the 
U.S. east coast when the Government of Peru, by means of Supreme Decree 9/86, 
increased its reservation regime to include all national cargoes. This increase 
was made in order to provide a broader national cargo base for the Peruvian 
national shipping line, CPV. Until that time, EMPREMAR  had relied on Peruvian 
cargoes to obtain a large enough load factor to economically justify its ser-
vice. Before the Peruvian decree was repealed in early 1988, EMPREMAR  had nego-
tiated a contract with the national copper company of Chile, CODELCO, to trans-
port approximately 50% of the latter's products to the U.S., and during November 
1987 had reestablished a service every 25 days to that country with two semicon-
tainer vessels of 338 TEU each.20* 
4. Cargo reservation 
Most European countries adòpted cargo reservation regimes as early as the 15th 
century to facilitate the establishment of domestic fleets through the transpor-
tation of national cargoes.205 Latin American countries began to adopt such 
regimes to accomplish comparable objectives in the years between the end of the 
Second World War and the start of the container revolution. What all cargo res-
ervation regimes have in common, whether of industrialized or developing coun-
tries, is that they seek to direct the demand for ocean transport services to 
national carriers. The differences between cargo reservations regimes are 
largely centered on the cargoes or trades to which they are applicable. For 
example, numerous EEC-member states have eliminated such regimes in their deep-
sea trades, but continue to reserve for national lines their domestic trade 
flows as well as those with island territories and former colonies.206 The U.S. 
reserves for national vessels its coastal, military and economic assistance 
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The cargo reservation regimes of both developed and developing countries 
have been subject to increasing criticism from a variety of sources. The most 
outspoken are cargo owners, who claim that they increase freight rates and 
reduce the competitiveness of their goods in international markets. Probably 
the clearest example of the impact of a nation's export-oriented macroeconomic 
policy on its cargo reservation regime is that of Brazil. It will be recalled 
that, as early as 1958, the Government of Brazil adopted legislation which con-
templated the establishment of a regulatory body to ensure the participation of 
Brazilian vessels in its deep-sea trades. These early dispositions were comple-
mented by Decree Law 666 of 2 July 1969 and Decree Law 667 of the same month and 
year, which formally adopted a cargo reservation regime, created liner confer-
ences for Brazilian trades and established SUNAMAM  to regulate ocean transport. 
The cargo reservation regime of Brazil, except for bilateral agreements, applies 
the cargo division formula of 40% for importing and exporting countries and 20% 
for third country carriers (40/40/20). For a period of approximately 15 years, 
its national shipbuilding, ocean transport and international trade policies were 
economically interdependent, as show in the following diagram: 
In this environment, ocean carriers were beneficiaries of the directed 
demand of exporters and importers, and shipbuilders received carriers' demands 
for vessels. As a result, a series of five-year shipbuilding programs were 
undertaken and shipping lines were established in an effort to satisfy at least 
part of the demand which arose from Brazil's international trade. During the 
period 1967-1984, tonnages of Brazilian international trade carried by national 
ship operators rose from 10% to 50%. The fundamental question to be dealt with 
here is not whether the policy of economic interdependence was correct, as it 
most certainly was under the macroeconomic circumstances of that time, but 
whether the new macroeconomic policies adopted by Brazil following the first 
debt crisis in mid-1982, whose part related to shipping is embodied in SUNAMAM 
Resolution 8364 of 30 July 1984, provide a useful experience for other countries 
of this region. 
With the onset of the debt crises in mid-1982, Brazil had an external debt 
of US$91 304 million and by the end of 1987 it increased to about US$116 900 
million.208 In this context, the Government of Brazil sought to expand exports 
in order to earn sufficient foreign exchange for payment of external indebted-
ness and for investments in productive capacity, as well as to respond to the 
claims of exporters that the high cost of liner shipping was limiting the types 
and volumes of goods they could sell in international markets.209 Resolution 
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8364 authorizes the participation of nonconference vessels—whether belonging 
to domestic or to foreign operators—in its export trades to Europe and the U.S. 
The purpose of Resolution 8364 was to provide Brazilian exporters with another 
ocean transport option, lower liner shipping costs through the insertion of a 
new competitive element in two important trades, and stimulate exports.210 
This resolution partially eliminated the interdependent relation between 
international trade, on the one hand, and shipbuilding and ocean transport on 
the other. Of even greater importance for transport policy makers, however, is 
the implicit declaration of international trade's supremacy over the other two 







The impact of SUNAMAM  Resolution 8364 can be appreciated from the distri-
bution of cargoes transported. During 1984, the international trade of Brazil 
transported by ocean carriers amounted to 182 million tons, of which 78 million 
tons or 42.9% were carried by national ship operators and 104 million tons or 
57.1% by foreign operators. By the first half of 1985, foreign shipping lines 
were transporting 90% of exports and 52% of imports.211 For all of 1985, the 
international commercial exchanges of Brazil generated US$1 912.8 million in 
ocean freights for the carriage of general cargoes, of which US$612.5 million 
or 32% were captured by shipping lines of that country.212 In the period from 
1977 to 1986, the participation of Brazilian lines in the freight revenue gener-
ated by the international carriage of general cargoes was reduced from 44.3% to 
31.6%.213 
It is most difficult to determine if Resolution 8364 contributed to an ex-
pansion in the types and volumes of exports. There are a multitude of factors 
that can encourage expansion, contraction and alteration of a country's exports, 
such as exchange rate modifications, changes in consumption patterns, government 
subsidies and market access agreements. Notwithstanding the diversity of such 
factors, the resolution's impact on freight rates was immediate. The superin-
tendent of SUNAMAM  declared that the average freight rates of conference car-
riers had been reduced by about 30%.214 With reference to cacao, which was not 
included in the resolution, the president of the Brazilian Association of Cacao 
Exporters (ABEC) indicated in February 1987 that its members attempt to sell 
their products only on free-on-board (FOB) conditions in order to allow purchas-
ers a choice between conference and nonconference carriers, and 90% is exported 
under those terms.215 The ABEC has petitioned SUNAMAM  to authorize the partici-
pation of nonconference carriers in the transportation of cacao.216 
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The experience of Colombia is similar to that of Brazil, although more 
recent. On 25 January 1988, Colombia adopted Decree Law 143 which confirms the 
provisions of earlier regimes to the extent that 50% of imports are reserved 
for national vessels, but permits the carriage of import "Plan Vallejo" cargoes 
—capital goods and raw materials which will be utilized to produce or be incor-
porated into manufactures for export—by any vessel.217 With the exception of 
coffee, 50% of which is reserved for national vessels, all other exports may be 
carried by the vessels of other nations. Notwithstanding these provisions, 
national shipowners and operators have preference if they offer the same service 
conditions and freight rates. Control of this law is after the fact—shipowners 
and operators must file a complaint with the national maritime authority if 
cargo owners use a foreign shipping lines despite the offer of similar service 
conditions and freight rates by national shipping companies. Decree Law 143 was 
negotiated over a period of 18 months between representatives of the Government, 
shippers and national vessel operators and the latter are, according to the 
Colombian Council of Transport Users (CUTMA), in agreement with it. 
In summary, faced with enormous external indebtedness, international 
monetary and commercial uncertainty, and an Interdependent global economy, Latin 
American and Caribbean countries have sought to reformulate their macroeconomic 
policies in an effort to earn sufficient foreign exchange from exports so that 
they might make needed capital Investments and create employment opportunities. 
Due to the dominance of the external sector and the increasing exposure of Latin 
America and the Caribbean to a global economy, the costs of transporting their 
products to numerous geographically separate and yet related international mar-
kets has come under growing scrutiny. Liner vessel operators can make an essen-
tial and important contribution to the achievement of macroeconomic policies 
through their "support mechanisms" of (i) cost control, (ii) selecting the most 
appropriate transport, administrative and cargo-handling technologies, and 




THE NEED FOR A RESPONSE BY LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
TO ENSURE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THEIR EXPORTS 
At the beginning of this document, it was stressed that transportation is one 
element within a vast range of services that support international trade. Due 
to the introduction of containers in the liner shipping industry, a series of 
changes have been observed that include the growing integration of those 
elements in the transportation chain, the substitution of land transportation 
for ocean carriage, and the establishment of interaodal distribution systems. 
These changes combine with the formation of trading blocs and with an increas-
ing concentration of inhabitants, industrial capacity and purchasing power in 
the northern hemisphere to create a new reality in the international liner ship-
ping industry. Currently, this industry functions in an economic environment 
in which the external sector of the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
predominates over their internal sectors and in which, due to the weakening of 
liner conferences and cargo reservation regimes, traditional institutions cannot 
ensure carriers a stable profit. 
A new liner shipping industry policy that is responsive to these changes 
must meet national needs with respect to trade and to the industry itself, both 
of which form an important part of the macroeconomic and sectoral policies of 
each country. The most significant linkages between these two fields are 
freight rates, routes, technologies and frequencies offered by carriers. These 
four elements are the tools that the industry can use to fulfill its purposes 
and to improve and strengthen the transmission mechanisms of national macro-
economic policies. Correctly focussed, shipping services can add value to this 
region's exports and reduce the costs of its imports. For example, services 
offering adequate freight rates, routes, technologies and frequencies must pro-
vide consignees—among other advantages—with the opportunity to reduce inven-
tories, thereby freeing part of their investments for use in other activities. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the liner shipping industry—which has 
come to include not only vessels and ports but also inland transportation and 
ancillary services such as Customs and computerized information systems—has 
entered a decisive phase. The policies of the general cargo era, which were 
effective for more than 25 years, have to be adapted to the commercial and 
operational realities that the industry faces today. In order for the countries 
of this region to respond to the demands of their insertion in a world economy 
and compete in international markets, the frequencies and routes offered by 
shipping companies must be stable in the long term. Likewise, ocean freight 
rates and other related transportation costs must be stable and, at the same 
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time, as low as possible to ensure the broadest opportunities for competitive-
ness of exports and to minimize the prices of imports. 
During a period of structural changes in transportation, trade relations 
and macroeconomic goals, the objectives of a policy for the liner shipping in-
dustry must not only reflect trade needs and strengthen its overall objectives, 
but also ensure the countries of the region a commercially viable and lasting 
presence in the industry itself. In order to formulate a policy of this sort, 
it is necessary to consider the policies of the liner shipping industry itself, 
the role of governments in the industry, and the international, regional and 
national aspects of a policy for co-operation on shipping issues among the coun-
tries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
A. THE POLICIES OF THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY 
Historically, the policies of the shipping industry have been established 
independently by country, mode of transportation, type of cargo and—at times— 
route. Such a procedure was adequate for the initial development of trade and 
transport activities, but the structural changes evaluated in chapters I to IV 
of this document have radically transformed the setting of the industry. In 
order to identify the factors that must be considered by the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries when modifying their current policies, it is necessary to 
evaluate the assumptions that formed the basis of the policies the countries 
adopted between 1960 and 1980, and the elements that should be taken into 
consideration with a view to formulating a policy of co-operation for the last 
years of this century. 
1. The assumptions of policies adopted between 1960 and 1980 
Between 1960 and 1980, the countries of the region based their shipping policies 
on the following four assumptions: the dominant role of current institutions, 
including liner conferences and national cargo reservation regimes; strong oppo-
sition by diverse interest groups in the region to applying certain technolo-
gies, principally containers; the belief that the independent functioning of 
each means of transportation and support activity would not increase the total 
cost of service; and the conviction that the industrialized countries would 
remain dependent on the region's exports. These assumptions were shared in each 
country by the government and by carriers, exporters and labour unions. 
With the introduction of containerization, liner shipping companies lost 
control over the manipulation and stowage of general cargo, since these opera-
tions are carried out at factories and interior cargo terminals. With the grow-
ing and irreversible use of containers in the cargo throughput of this region, 
there will be strong pressure from exporters and importers to gradually impose 
the same operational guidelines. On routes where containers are used exclusive-
ly, liner shipping companies transport, stow and handle these units rather than 
the cargo they contain, thereby making liner services interchangeable. In this 
context, the liner conferences have much less control over shipping companies 
and shippers than they had during the times of general cargo ships, and non-
conference liner operators have acquired an appreciable part of the trade on 
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important routes.218 The supremacy of macroeconomic policies and the need to 
service the external debt of Latin America have created enormous incentives to 
use lower-cost shipping services in order to Increase exports and receipts of 
foreign exchange. This has been possible owing to the wide availability of 
interchangeable liner services that can go anywhere there are opportunities to 
do business, and that are capable of meeting the needs of exporters by providing 
better quality and more efficient services than national lines. In some coun-
tries of the region, then, there is a clear trend toward subordinating cargo 
reservation regimes to the needs of the external sector. 
The advantages of containers have reached the point that no one any longer 
disputes the need to use them to transport the region's general cargo. The 
integration of transportation services from origin to destination with other 
support activities has shown, through reductions in cost and time, that export-
ers need those distribution systems in order to compete successfully in inter-
national markets. Nonetheless, there persists a fragmentation of most transport 
operations in Latin American and Caribbean trades, so that when cargo is trans-
ferred among modes of transportation or other activities in the distribution 
chain, it is often necessary to change the transport unit and documentation, as 
well as to pay storage charges and to invest in cargo handling equipment. These 
costs, derived from fragmented operations, must be added to carriers' freight 
charges. However, the greatest costs come from loss of time while carrying out 
unnecessary activities during the transport of goods between origin and destina-
tion. Fragmentation of transport operations is also a stumbling block to 
gaining an overview of the industry and greatly impedes the formulation of a 
coherent policy, whether by individual countries or in an attempt at regional 
co-operation. 
In terms of land transport, ports and other services related to interna-
tional transport, most governments have based their policies on semi-isolated 
and highly protected economies. This may have been an appropriate criterion 
before the first oil crisis of October 1973, when the external sector was sub-
ordinated to the internal sector. Since then, however, the countries of this 
region have been increasingly exposed to a world economy with ever more demand-
ing international markets. The foreign debt crisis of Latin America and, par-
ticularly, the problems of obtaining external investments have strengthened the 
role of foreign trade in financing the economic growth of each country. Tra-
ditionally, the costs of domestic land transport and of ports were considered 
to be purely national concerns. However, with the changes in the world economy, 
those costs—and many others—have come to have a direct impact of enormous 
importance on foreign trade. That impact causes a loss of competitiveness of 
a nation's foreign trade, since the price at which its goods can be placed in 
external markets increases with all the costs of both national and international 
movements from origin to destination. 
2. Elements of a policy that would permit the countries 
of this region to reconcile their interests 
in the final years of this century 
The evolution of the liner shipping industry and of the economies of the region 
has combined to create a reality different from that of the 1960-1980 period, 
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which requires the formulation of new policies appropriate for today's Industry 
and capable of ensuring its survival tomorrow. For example, the preeminence of 
the external sector and the need for national products to compete in demanding 
international markets are some of the elements that have made the interests of 
shippers predominate over those of the liner shipping industry. In order to re-
spond to this reality, an industry policy must consider the following elements: 
the internationalization of the shipping industry; the aggregate impact of indi-
vidual decisions by governments, carriers and unions on all the countries of the 
region; the relationship between macroeconomic policy and liner shipping; the 
geographic spread of partial transport deregulation; and intermodalism and 
changes in the geographic dimensions of transport and market parameters. 
a) Internationalization of the liner shipping industry 
With the goal of reducing production costs, a growing number of manufac-
turers in industrialized countries have constructed factories in developing 
countries. These manufacturers produce their components in several places and 
assemble them at or relatively close to the final destination points in loca-
tions that present dynamic comparative advantages. Operations of this sort are 
carried out in many countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. For example, 
due to Mexico's lower labour costs and its easy access to the United States of 
America, such activities were initiated in the north of that country around 
1965. The growth in the number of factories has been extraordinary, doubling 
in number between 1982 and 1987 to around 1 250, which now provide employment 
to approximately 300 000 people. Construction of an addition 250 factories was 
proposed for 1988.219 
Producers in industrialized countries have internationalized their activi-
ties for economic reasons, and carriers have done the same for similar reasons. 
The widespread use of new technologies, the establishment of intermodal net-
works, and ship overcapacity, problems that have confronted shipping companies 
for quite some time, have generated enormous pressures to reduce operating costs 
by employing crews and flags of lesser cost and to limit risks by creating con-
sortia, intermodal enterprises, space-charter agreements and others. The grow-
ing utilization of those technologies and operating systems is permanent rather 
than transitory, and constitutes a new economic base for the liner shipping 
industry. This base is composed of all the low-cost elements that shipowners 
can incorporate into their operations, such as ships and containers constructed 
in Asian shipyards, crews from developing countries, the "flagging-out" of ships 
to open-registry countries, and intermodal networks. If the total elimination 
of excess vessel capacity were assumed, the new base would not be affected be-
cause the technologies and operating systems that increase efficiency or reduce 
costs can be considered permanent until something better appears to replace it. 
b) The regional consequences of individual decisions 
The fragmentation of liner shipping industry policies during the period 
1960-1980 caused the various activities that support the foreign trade of the 
Latin American and Caribbean countries to develop in isolation. Each parti-
cipant in these activities tended to think that its own was the most important 
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and to work individually and not jointly with the others in the distribution 
chain. The lack of a common understanding among those participants and of 
harmony among their activities increased the cost of each. This situation can 
be seen in the measures adopted by governments, labour unions and carriers— 
whether from the same country or from the entire region—which may make sense 
individually but are often mutually contradictory when analyzed from an overall 
perspective, 
Before containerization, the lack of co-ordination among foreign trade 
activities was accepted due to the nature of available technologies and the 
operating systems used. There was an enormous range of units in which cargo 
was presented for transportation, each of which had its own handling technology, 
documentation and operating demands. Each port had its warehouse that acted as 
a "waiting room" or "burying place" for both imports and exports, and Customs 
applied its legal procedures as if it were a sovereign state. However, the use 
of containers, computers and satellite communications has created a base upon 
which all the activities of the distribution chain can be co-ordinated. The 
application of macroeconomic policies stressing the promotion of exports demands 
that such co-ordination be carried out as a means to strengthen the ability of 
the products involved to compete in international markets. 
In a global economy with highly competitive international markets, it is 
very difficult for a country acting alone to have efficient, low-cost transpor-
tation services. For example, the size of modern ships demands larger and more 
regular volumes of cargo, ports and terminals equipped with multiple gantry 
cranes, ample space for storing containers, computerized information systems, 
and land and water-borne feeder services integrated into deep-sea movements. 
All of these factors function on the basis of dynamic external sectors and 
require large investments. 
If the countries of the region are to obtain sufficient volumes of cargo 
to warrant the establishment of scale-economy intermodal systems on each link 
of the distribution chain, they must consider the integration of their trade 
flows. The greatest obstacles for such integration are related to the nontrade 
objectives that the governments assign to their liner shipping industries, and 
to the individual interests of carriers and unions in each country. If coun-
tries are unable to perceive the progressive interdependence of their interests 
in the transportation of their extraregional trade, both the competitiveness of 
their exports and the viability of their own presence in the liner shipping 
industry could be adversely affected. In order to successfully confront their 
insertion into a global economy composed of highly demanding international 
markets, trading blocs, and scale-economy intermodal transport systems at the 
disposition of competing countries, the region must base its liner shipping 
policies on an understanding of the consequences of individual decisions by 
governments, carriers and unions. 
The need for all countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to reinforce 
the competitiveness of exports takes precedence over any differences in their 
shipping policies. This presents governments with the difficult task of harmo-
nizing their policies to eliminate existing barriers to the organization of 
shared regional intermodal networks capable of competing in terms of routes, 
frequencies, technology and prices with those available to their competitors of 
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other regions. For all elements of the distribution chain, it is vitally 
important to be able to take immediate advantage of the opportunities that har-
monization grants them, and it would be beneficial for them to put the lasting 
foreign trade interests of their countries—which in the long run coincide fully 
with their own—before their short-term private interests, particularly if they 
consider how the liner shipping industry can survive in the hands of citizens 
of their own countries. 
c) The relationship between macroeconomic policy and liner shipping 
The capacity of the shipping industry either to neutralize or to actively 
support the "transmission mechanisms" of macroeconomic policies would seem to 
be little understood. Excessive transportation costs reduce the quantities of 
goods that can be exported and the amount of foreign exchange that can be 
earned. Decreases in foreign exchange receipts lead to lower investments in 
capital and intermediate goods necessary for domestic production. These con-
cepts are a generalization, but it is still true that the results of macroeco-
nomic policies are determined at the sectoral level, that liner shipping has 
many "support mechanisms" which can be used to strengthen the macroeconomic 
"transmission mechanisms," and that renewed and rigorous thinking is needed in 
order to further close the gap between sectoral and macroeconomic goals. 
Probably the most important result of this evaluation is that a sub-
ordinated, derived-demand  sector such as liner shipping can make an important 
contribution to the achievement of macroeconomic goals. This idea, despite its 
simplicity, can be used by governments to strengthen the efficiency of their 
macroeconomic policies. Therefore, the problem posed to the governments of 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the final years of the twentieth century is 
to focus—in a stable and long-term manner—the "support mechanisms" (freight 
rates, routes, frequencies and technologies) of liner shipping so that they 
strengthen macroeconomic "transmission mechanisms" and national economic goals. 
d) The geographiç spread of partial transport deregulation 
The partial deregulation of transportation in some industrialized coun-
tries has proven to be beneficial for both the domestic and foreign trade of 
those countries. The deregulation by a country of its liner shipping industry, 
which provides international services, transmits trade benefits to shippers and 
consignees in other parts of the world. Upon receiving such benefits, those 
shippers and consignees request their governments to grant them the same condi-
tions for their transport services, or the opportunity to use those of other 
nations. Governments that have adopted export-oriented macroeconomic policies 
are willing to consent to such requests, since they wish to increase the flow 
of foreign exchange generated by reduced freight charges and by all improvements 
in the productivity and efficiency of transport services in general. As a re-
sult, deregulation will spread geographically to gradually encompass many other 
countries. This phenomenon is observed not only in industrialized countries, 
but also through Resolution 8364 of the National Superintendency of the Merchant 
Marine (SUNAMAM)  in Brazil, Decree Law 143 in Colombia and the application of 
the principle of reciprocity in Chile. 
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e) IntermodalIsm and changes in the géographie dimensions of transport and 
market parameters 
The concept of intermodalism includes many activities that must be under-
stood both globally and sectorally by each participant in the distribution chain 
in order to take advantage of its benefits. Intermodalism is not the mere 
integration of all the elements and activities which encompass the support that 
transport provides to the foreign trade of Latin America and the Caribbean, but 
rather a redimensioning of those elements and activities. These new dimensions 
can be seen from changes such as the uniting of a country's ports with its 
national railway system, the expansion of the hinterlands of ports, the purchase 
of a shipping company by a railway, the use of communications systems that con-
tinually report on the location of cargo, and the exploitation of land transport 
services by shipping companies as public carriers that do not operate trucks or 
trains. 
These dimensions and others are striking, but they say very little about 
the most important change: the creation of distribution networks that permit a 
significant improvement in the quality of service. Intermodalism is rapidly 
eliminating the fragmentation of transport services and the isolation of mar-
kets. Before intermodalism, markets were served by ships that called directly 
at the port closest to the final destination of the cargo. Despite this close-
ness, movements from port to final destinations entailed two transportation 
operations—between the port and the warehouse and between the warehouse and the 
final destination—adding unnecessary costs. Intermodal transport systems have 
broadened market parameters, thus permitting the use of more distant ports and 
a cutback in the costs of both intermediate storage and transport operations. 
Today, shipping companies choose ports on the basis of factors such as speed of 
loading and unloading ships, size of hinterland served, and availability of land 
transport services to the final destinations desired by shippers. 
The change in market parameters and services creates new sources of com-
petition among manufacturers that can benefit consumers, among carriers that can 
benefit shippers, and among ports that can benefit consignees. Such competition 
comes from concentrating consumers, shippers and consignees that previously were 
served independently. Moreover, these new frontiers modify the factors that 
carriers must take into account in offering efficient, low-cost services, and 
could result in the use of different technologies and the creation of combined 
services through space-charter agreements and consortia. 
B. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY 
The formulation of policies for national liner shipping industries has almost 
universally taken into account a combination of trade and nontrade goals. With 
the advent of modern technologies, intermodal networks, partial deregulation and 
the debt crisis, those policies now involve a choice between integrating cargo 
bases and merchant marines, and remaining isolated from the main routes and pro-
viding only feeder or coastal shipping services. In order to take full advan-
tage of the benefits of integration, the governments of Latin America and the 
Caribbean might consider a policy which recognizes that national economic secu-
rity has become increasingly dependent on the other countries of the region. 
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Such integration also increases the competitiveness of exports in regional and 
international markets, which links the liner shipping industry to macroeconomic 
policies balances the interests of all participants in the industry. Support 
for the liner shipping industry by the region's governments could come from the 
inclusion of appropriate elements in the policies of other sectors that affect 
it, and from the updating of shipping industry regulations. 
1. Policies of other sectors that affect the liner shipping industry 
In order to establish a policy to regulate the liner shipping industry, three 
elements are taken into account: the commercial aspects of transportation, 
national defense, and economic security. There is close relationship among 
these elements that allows their utilization to meet the needs of other sectors 
such as shipbuilding, labour unions and the navy. That relationship comes from 
the very nature of transportation—that is, ships, ports, trucks and trains can 
be used for trade, for national defense, or for both simultaneously. For exam-
ple, shipbuilding is an appropriate activity for developing countries due to its 
employment of intermediate technology and its intensive use of labour for pro-
cessing or assembling components, and it has a fundamental importance in nation-
al defense policies as well. The objective of unions is to protect the jobs and 
improve the benefits of their members, while governments try to create employ-
ment through an excess of personnel on board ships and in ports, and navies wish 
to maintain a reserve of trained manpower adequate to fulfill national defense 
goals. The commercial aspects of liner shipping are important, but the other 
two elements often create greater justification for investments and state sub-
sidies in the industry. 
When the liner shipping industry is used to meet nontrade goals such as 
reduction of unemployment and establishment of a critical mass of skills for 
strategic purposes, the cost of its services increases. Such increases affect 
the foreign trade of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, and must 
be evaluated from the standpoint of importers in other regions. In a world of 
highly competitive markets, importers must calculate the total delivered cost 
of each good before buying it. If calculations indicate that its cost would be 
so high as to endanger its market competitiveness, importers simply do not buy 
the good. Recognizing this situation, the U.S. Government has taken steps to 
separate the policies applied to its liner shipping industry from those that 
regulate its national defense and economic security. Thus, it has divided its 
fleets by function, so that one is dedicated to provisioning its armed forces, 
while the other is used for trade and is registered in third countries. In 
order to reduce liner shipping costs, the governments of this region should try 
to apply a similar procedure. 
2. The updating: of liner shipping industry regulations 
Innovations such as containers, computers, intermodalism, landbridges and the 
partial deregulation of land and sea transportation by industrialized countries 
have changed the liner shipping industry worldwide. Despite a growing use of 
such innovations by the industry in Latin America and the Caribbean, however, 
many countries still apply regulations for shipping and related services that 
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date back to the last century or even to colonial times. Antiquated regulations 
strengthen the tendency to rely on institutions and types of services prevalent 
in the past, rather than to apply those innovations to solving problems in a 
totally new world where intermodalism and "just-in-time" delivery take on ever 
greater importance. It is necessary to update regulations in order to create 
a new shipping mentality. This task demands a careful review of not only 
national regulations, but also those of other countries that have succeeded in 
making their fleets viable. 
In a world economy with highly competitive international markets, trading 
blocs and intermodal transport systems, regulations and procedures must recog-
nize that the interests of the liner shipping industry are becoming increasingly 
subordinate to those of shippers, who play a significant role in the selection 
of routes, technologies and frequencies and in cost control. Regulations must 
stimulate carriers to use new technologies such as modern ships and information 
processing systems. In order to promote the establishment of intermodal sys-
tems, they must support the integration of all activities in national and inter-
national distribution chains through the use of intermodalism, consortia, com-
bined enterprises, space charters and other joint operating agreements. Regula-
tions must balance negotiating powers among unions, carriers and port authori-
ties with a view not only to facilitating greater control of labour costs but 
also to permitting an increase in productivity. So that the region's products 
can compete in international markets, regulations must create conditions for 
establishing multimodal transport operators able to organize distribution sys-
tems between the point at which the cargo is received from the exporter and the 
place of delivery at the final destination. 
With respect to international agreements and conventions, the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean must ensure that they respond to both national 
and regional needs. In this context, they must guarantee access to the distri-
bution systems of other countries and regions, participation in the institutions 
and operations of liner transport, and national control over international 
activities that occur within a country. The fundamental principle is to ensure 
that the region's exporters enjoy regular services with characteristics which 
are not inferior to those of their competitors in other regions. 
C. ASPECTS OF A POLICY FOR CO-OPERATION ON LINER SHIPPING ISSUES 
AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
In the liner shipping industry, which is evolving at an ever more accelerated 
rate, it is not possible to formulate policies using the same assumptions em-
ployed during the period of general cargo ships. The evolution of the industry, 
from sailing ships and the first steam railways up to the present, indicates 
that technological and operational changes which increase competitiveness, effi-
ciency and productivity or which reduce service costs are irreversible and will 
come to dominate the industry. It is thus less expensive to accept them from 
the start, since sooner or later they will have to be accepted in any event. 
Each country should evaluate new technologies and operating systems in the light 
of their applicability to its own trade flows. However, it can be said with 
great certainty that—in the near future—containers, large ships, intermodal 
networks,, landbridges and computerization will dominate the industry worldwide. 
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If the countries of this region wish to maintain an operational presence in the 
industry, they must consider policies that take advantage of the opportunities 
presented by this situation while avoiding or minimizing risks. It is particu-
larly vital that they join forces to co-operate at both the governmental and 
entrepreneurial levels, in order to confront future challenges through common 
positions. 
In the past, carriers determined the scale economy of transport equipment 
based on the volume and frequency of the cargo offered by shippers for carriage 
on the routes served. Today, on the other hand, they must also consider aspects 
related to the scale economies of the transport systems used by their shippers' 
competitors. The structure of liner shipping costs Is determined not only by 
cargo but also by the economies of scale and the efficiency of distribution net-
works. Although transport equipment is an important element in the efficiency 
of these networks, there are other elements of equal or greater importance. For 
example, ports may be very efficient for shipping companies and, in turn, very 
inefficient for importers and exporters; land transport services may be effi-
cient nationally yet inefficient as part of a regional or international network; 
and human skills often determine the profitability of any technology. The ports 
that contribute most to the efficiency of intermodal networks have ceased to 
perform activities that can be conducted outside the port area, except for those 
directly related to the loading and discharge of ships. The use of scale-econ-
omy vessels, trains and trucks, ports that maximize their contribution to trans-
port efficiency, and support services that are correctly focussed adds value 
both to the goods transported and to the activities of exporters and consignees. 
In order to translate these elements into a co-ordinated policy that can 
help the region's liner shipping industries to successfully confront the chal-
lenges of the final years of this century, carriers, governments, maritime 
authorities, ports and Customs must consider expanding their bases of collabora-
tion. The Latin American and Caribbean countries must be willing to abandon 
nationalistic definitions they apply to the liner shipping industry, systems 
that tend to fragment activities involved in transport operations, and tradi-
tional approaches that equate increases in registered tonnage with success. 
Before containerization, carriers structured their scales of operation, routes, 
frequencies, prices and technologies to meet the needs of trade in the countries 
where they established their businesses. Such structures were correct for the 
time, but the evolution of trade and transport has made them inadequate for 
solving current problems. With the advent of a world economy and highly demand-
ing international markets, together with containers, intermodal networks, large-
scale transport equipment and computers, the region's liner shipping industries 
should jointly consider other structures for their services. 
In formulating a co-ordinated policy to establish a new structure for the 
industry that contributes to harmonizing all Its activities and that is suffi-
ciently flexible to take advantage of trade opportunities, the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean must consider Integrating their cargo bases, 
forming consortia, employing technologies that provide economies of scale, and 
exploiting intermodal networks, as well as establishing support systems that 
include the use of computers, complementary maritime and land transport ser-
vices, and facilitation of trade and transport procedures and documentation. 
This sort of policy would have international, regional and national aspects. 
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1. International aspects 
During the last ten years, the countries of the region increased their partici-
pation in extraregional shipping consortia and have begun to act as terminal 
operators in ports located in other regions. These activities allow shipping 
companies to share needed investments, broaden their knowledge of the business 
through the experience of their partners from countries outside the region, and 
—-what is more important—ensure their access to markets in those countries. 
With the growing trend among the industrialized countries to form trading blocs 
and adopt measures limiting the access of other nations to their domestic 
markets, international consortia in which extraregional shipping companies are 
partners tend to establish this region's presence in those markets and thus 
should support its participation in their foreign trade. 
The trend to form trading blocs must be considered from the perspective 
of the internationalization of production and transportation. Modem transport 
technologies and operating systems have created a basis for the international-
ization of production and transportation that has modified the dimensions of 
markets and the international competition between them. Furthermore, such tech-
nologies have transformed the character of each carrier's services from unique 
to more homogeneous, thereby creating a global competition that has replaced the 
previous competition based on routes. Global competition can be seen not only 
through the integration of all activities involved in moving cargo from origin 
to destination but also through new operating structures. For example, a ship-
ping company that has dedicated its vessels to trans-Pacific routes now offers 
services to the U.S. east cost, as well as trans-Atlantic services to Europe via 
that country's landbridge and space charters on the ships of other companies. 
Feeder services, whether by sea or by land, permit shipowners to expand their 
access to new cargoes and extend the coverage of their main routes. Some ship 
operators establish very low freight charges for feeder services in order to 
attract more cargo to their main routes. 
The internationalization of shipping means that, if a particular company 
is not part of a system which includes feeder and other support services, its 
access to cargo could be increasingly limited. For the moment, international-
ization occurs principally on east-west routes among industrialized countries, 
but the activities of extraregional consortia in the trade flows of Latin 
America and the Caribbean have increased a great deal since the beginning of the 
foreign debt crisis. The operational participation of the region's shipowners 
in extraregional consortia ensures the acquisition of experience and access to 
trading blocs, and is thus an element of co-ordinated policy. 
2. Regional aspects 
Latin American and Caribbean countries share the same origins and destinations 
for their imports and exports. These countries also use the same technologies 
in their liner shipping systems and run the same risks for their economic 
security. Therefore, the region's liner shipping companies might consider the 
following elements for co-ordinating their policies: (i) establishment of sub-
regional consortia that provide services between the countries of this region 
and the markets of North America, Europe and Asia—for example, one on the west 
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coast of Latin America, another on the east coast of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and finally one covering the broader Caribbean basin; (ii) use of one 
transshipment port at an appropriate location on the Central American isthmus, 
and another in the Caribbean, to facilitate the interchange of containers be-
tween consortia; (iii) use of intermodal transport systems in Asia, Europe and 
North America to reduce the number of ports of call, and (iv) establishment of 
intermodal systems or networks to support the services mentioned in items (i) 
through (iii). 
As an example of the way in which the above elements could function, the 
east-coast consortium would provide a single north-south service between the 
countries on that coast and North America, and then would continue in a east-
west direction to and from European destinations. At the Caribbean transship-
ment center, this consortium would Interchange containers with the Caribbean 
consortium, which would handle their pick-up and delivery for countries of the 
basin as well as interchange them with the west-coast consortium over a land-
bridge joining the Pacific coast with a port in the Caribbean. In a like man-
ner, the west-coast consortium would have a single north-south service between 
the countries on that coast and North America, together with an east-west ser-
vice to Asia. The west-coast consortium would interchange containers with the 
Caribbean consortium over the landbridge. Thus, in the same way as the east-
coast consortium would provide the countries of the region with access to the 
east coast of North America and to Europe, the west-coast consortium would give 
access to the west coast of North America and to Asia. 
Should cargo volumes not be sufficient to commercially justify the con-
tinuation of north-south services from North America to Asia or Europe, the 
consortia could act as carriers between third countries and participate in the 
trade between those regions, as authorized by section 19 of the U.S. Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920. The benefits that accrue from acting as a carrier between 
third countries should not be underestimated since, as previously noted, an 
appreciable part of Transportación Marítima Mexicana's annual income is gener-
ated by the traffic between the U.S. and third countries. Furthermore, if cargo 
volumes were insufficient to permit their transport by regional consortia, space 
could be chartered on ships of other companies. The control of cargo through 
space chartering offers flexibility to undertake new transport services and to 
call at new ports, provided cargo volumes so warrant. 
As indicated, the interchange of containers between the east- and west-
coast consortia could be handled by the Caribbean consortium. However, if this 
option proved not to be cost effective, interchange could still be made through 
feeder services between Valparaiso and Buenos Aires. Even if the latter option 
were chosen, however, there would still be a need for the Caribbean consortium 
to link the Caribbean and Central American countries and Mexico with the east-
coast consortium. In addition, the east- and west-coast consortia could be 
linked over any of the land routes across South America, although any such route 
would be faced with numerous obstacles, including very irregular topography that 
enormously increases costs, the lack of modern infrastructure, and the scarcity 
of traffic, among others. 
Taking into account that these consortia would together cover nearly all 
the ports of South America, Central America and the Caribbean, and that the 
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operating mechanisms described would permit them to combine their distribution 
networks for the interchange of containers with destinations in other regions, 
the system could also be used for the shipment of containers having both origin 
and destination within the region. It would thus be possible to significantly 
improve the supply of liner services among the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, while increasing the cargo bases of the consortia to improve 
their viability. 
Regional consortia form the second element of a co-ordinated policy, and 
can be distinguished from their extraregional counterparts by the objectives 
each seeks to accomplish. Extraregional consortia operate strictly to make a 
profit and have no obligation or loyalty to the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. If, for example, the United States were to change the sources 
of its manufactured products by replacing Latin America with Asia, extraregional 
consortia might try to reduce their presence in the first region and increase 
it in the second. Regional consortia, on the other hand, would have to seek 
other cargoes or increase their activities in the traffic of third countries or 
both, but their commitment  to the region's trade flows would be permanent. 
3. National aspects 
The national aspects of a co-ordinated shipping policy for Latin America and the 
Caribbean include international and regional considerations, since all elements 
of such policies—ships, regulations, ports, Customs and land transport—come 
from the countries. In this context, if the countries of the region wished to 
co-ordinate their policies, such action would be the result of closer co-opera-
tion in both the governmental and the entrepreneurial spheres. In this docu-
ment, the intention has been to present certain ideas which could contribute to 
stimulating and supporting that co-operation, so as to be able to formulate a 
regional policy through an evaluation of the structural changes which are occur-
ring in the liner shipping industry. This evaluation is the departure point for 
identifying goals to which the liner shipping industry of each country should 
aspire, so that through adequate harmonization it may be possible to translate 
them into a co-ordinated policy. From what has been expressed in this document, 
it would appear that these goals are to maximize the contributions of the liner 
shipping industry to the macroeconomic policy and economic security of each 
country. If the countries were to succeed in achieving these goals, the region 
would strengthen its trading presence in the liner shipping industry , thereby 
creating a long-lasting basis for its continued growth. 
In order to attain these national goals in the framework of a co-ordinated 
regional policy, it is necessary for the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
to commit themselves to co-operating on both the national and regional levels. 
In the national setting, governments, maritime authorities, Customs, ports, 
carriers and labour unions must take into consideration the aspects evaluated 
in this document in order to structure their co-operation. These aspects are 
very broad, ranging from the internationalization of shipping to the regional 
impact of national decisions, and from the effect of partial deregulation of the 
industry to changes in the geographic dimensions of transport and market para-
meters. Today's liner shipping industry demands independence from other related 
sectors, together with up-to-date regulations. Moreover, all participants in 
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this industry must contribute to improving the competitiveness of exports in 
international markets. They must maintain a continuing dialogue with shippers 
and consignees when wishing to raise freight rates or when encountering diffi-
culties in doing so, as well as with planning agencies In order to anticipate 
and avoid problems. In co-ordinating policies at the regional level, an impor-
tant national aspect is foreseeing initiatives by competitors—whether exporters 
or carriers from other regions—for which consultations between shippers and 
carriers would be most useful. 
A commitment  to co-operation among the countries of the region demands a 
dedicated effort by well-trained individuals of each country to carry out an 
evaluation of shippers' needs with respect to trade flows, routes, frequencies 
and technologies, in order to orient the establishment of consortia and the 
harmonization of support services. If the countries of the region do not 
co-operate to integrate their cargo bases, to use modern technologies, and to 
organize their own intermodal networks, they run the risk that the role of Latin 
American and Caribbean liner shipping will be limited to minority participation 
in extraregional consortia, or simply to supplying feeder services to ports 
where cargo would be transshipped to larger vessels, and to providing land 
transport services within the region. 
85 
Notes 
1 Article 1 (e) of the International Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, commonly known as the Hague 
Rules. These Rules were adopted at a conference held in Brussels 25 August 1924 
and entered into force on 2 June 1931. See Registro de textos de convenciones 
y otros instrumentos relativos al derecho mercantil internacional. Volume II, 
United Nations, New York, 1973, pp. 136-147. 
2 Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 24 March 1988, p. 31. 
3 For an evaluation of overtonnaging and freight-rate fluctuations, see 
ECLAC, Structural changes in ocean-liner transport: Prospects and implications 
for policy formulation (LC/G.1463), 15 June 1987, pp. 23-26. 
* Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 8 July 1982, p. 12. 
5 The Journal of Commerce. 13 September 1988, p. 10B, Fairplav Interna-
tional Shipping: Weekly. 18 June 1987, pp. 28 and 33, and 11 April 1985, p. 19, 
and Via Port of NY-NJ. April 1986, pp. 27-28. 
5 Cargo Systems. April 1985, p. 66. 
7 Transport 2000. May/June 1986, pp. 12 and 13. 
8 Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 7 March 1985, p. 23, and Contain-
erisation International Yearbook. 1988, p. 202. 
9 The Journal of Commerce. "Gulf Ports: Shipping and Trade Survey", 27 
April 1988, pp. 1B-10B, 20 July 1988, p. IB, and 28 September 1988, pp. 3B and 
10B. 
1 0 The Journal of Commerce. 12 September 1988, p. 18B. 
1 1 Seatrade Business Review. January/February 1988, pp. 121-123. 
1 2 Seascape, Introductory Issue, May 1987, pp. 28-29. Passengers are also 
a homogeneous as well as time-sens i tive cargo, and in 1887 the world's first 
cruise ship was constructed; see Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 13 
August 1987, p. 4. 
1 3 Seascape. Introductory Issue, May 1987, pp. 28-29. 
1 4 Containerlsation International. September 1986, p. 55. 
1 5 The Journal of Commerce. 2 June 1988, p. 10B. See also Containerisation 
International. October 1987, p. 55, where the traffic manager of a major Euro-
pean shipper indicates that the conference system may have outlived its useful-
ness and doubts whether it can survive in the traditional sense. 
1 6 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 11 August 1988, p. 28, and 31 
March 1988, p. 29. 
1 7 Containerisation International. September 1986, p. 34. 
86 
1 8 Croner's World Directory of Freight Conferences. Croner Publications 
Limited, United Kingdom, September 1987, p. 142, and Containerisation Interna-
tional, September 1988, p. 30. 
1 9 The Journal of Commerce. 5 August 1988, p. IB, 20 July 1988, p. 3B, 14 
July 1988, p. IB, and 1 June 1988, p. 3B; and Containerisation International. 
August 1988, pp. 8-9. 
2 0 Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 5 May 1988, p. 14, and 11 Feb-
ruary 1988, p. 6, Seatrade Business Review. March/April 1988, p. 59, The Journal 
of Commerce. 14 April 1988, p. 10B, and 5 April 1988, pp. 1A and 12B, and Con-
tainerisation International. April 1988, pp. 31-35, and March 1988, p. 5. 
2 1 Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 15 September 1988, p. 6. 
2 2 Containerisation International. October 1988, p. 5. 
2 3 Fairplav Ship Manager?. August 1986, p. 2. 
Z A Seatrade. May 1985, 103. 
2 5 Containerisation International, July 1985, pp. 11-12, and Fairplav 
International Shipping Weekly. 21 February 1985, p. 6. 
2 6 The Journal s£ Commerce. 21 September 1988, p. 10B. Fairplav 
International Shipping Weekly. 28 March 1985, pp. 2 and 32. Containerisation 
Intematipnal, November 1984, p. 5. 
2 7 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire. Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1981, pp. 143 and 167. 
2 8 Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 6 October 1988, p. 8. 
2 9 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 27 October 1988, p. 6, The Jour-
nal of Commerce. 14 October 1988, 10B, and Containerisation International. Octo-
ber 1988, pp. 33-39. 
3 0 Poyt Development International. March 1987, p. 21. 
3 1 The Journal of Commerce. 21 October 1988, p. 4B, and Containerisation 
Internationa^- August 1988, pp. 40-45, and October 1986, pp. 14 and 25. 
3 2 The Journal of Commerce. 29 February 1988, p. 1C. 
3 3 Cargo Systems. January 1986, pp. 12-13, and December 1985, pp. 30, 31, 
33 and 35. 
3 U The Journal of Commerce. 12 September 1988, p. 4B. 
3 5 Economic Commission for Europe, Introduction to the United Nations rules 
for electronic data interchange for administration, commerce and transport 
(TRADE/WF.4/INF.105), 12 July 1988, p. 12. 
3 5 The Journal of Commerce. "Transportation and the Computer", 29 February 
1988, pp. 1C-12C. 
3 7 The Journal of Commerce. 31 October 1988, p. 5B. 
3 8 The Jouynal of Commerce. 28 September 1988, pp. 9A and 13A, Fairplay 
International Shipping Weekly. 28 July 1988, p. 17, and Containerisation Inter-
national . January 1987, p. 15. 
87 
3 9 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 25 August 1988, p. 20. 
4 0 The Journal of Commerce. 19 October 1988, p. 2B. 
See Richard F. Poist, "Evolution of Conceptual Approaches to Designing 
Business Logistics Systems", Transportation Journal. Autumn 1986. 
4 2 Containerisation International. June 1983, pp. 37-39. 
4 3 Containerisation International. September 1988, p. 56. 
Loplstics: Change and Synthesis. Results and proceedings of the Logis-
tics Resource Forum 1984, sponsored by Leaseway Transportation, p. 8. 
4 5 Shipping World 6. Shipbuilder. December 1987, p. 423, and Cargo Systems. 
February 1987, pp. 40-41. 
4 6 Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 24 July 1986, p. 32. 
4 7 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 5 November 1987, pp. 30 and 31. 
4 8 Cargo Systems. July 1988, p. 17. 
4 9 Atlantic Container Line, Hapag-Lloyd, Senator Linie and the now defunct 
United States Lines have all made such declarations. See Seatrade Business 
Review. July/August 1986, pp. 83-89; The Journal of Commerce. 10 August 1988, 
p. 10B; and Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 10 July 1986, pp. 14-15, 
1 October 1987, p. IV, and 30 June 1988, p. 35. 
5 0 Containerisation International. September 1988, p. 51. 
5 1 Netherlands Economics Institute, Interior Cargo Terminals in Western 
Europe (LC/L.442), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), 4 March 1988, p. 12. 
5 2 Ibid. . p. 14. 
5 3 Brian Slack, The Locational Determinants of Inland Load Centres. Ottawa, 
Transport Canada, July 1988, p. 4. 
5 4 Cargo Systems. August 1980, p. 20, and Containerisation International. 
1967-1988, "Telling the story for 21 years", pp. 31 and 42. 
5 5 Cargo Systems. January 1986, p. 21, and Containerisation International. 
August 1984, p. 83. 
5 6 Slack, op.cit.. p. 6. 
5 7 The Journal of Commerce. 8 July 1988, and Progressive Railroading. May 
1985, p. 20. 
5 5 Cargo Systems. October 1987, p. 67. 
5 9 Ibid, p. 6. 
6 0 For a brief review of these acts, see Via Port of NY-NJ. August 1986, 
pp. 5 and 22; Nicholas A. Glaskowsky, Effects of Deregulation on Motor Carriers. 
The Eno Foundation for Transportation, Inc., 1986, pp. 5-43; and Christopher C. 
Barnekov and Andrew N. Kleit, The Costs of Railroad Regulation: A Further Analy-
sis , U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission and Federal Trade Commission, May 1988. 
5 1 Containerisation International. November 1986, pp. 49-55, and Transport 
2000. May/June 1986, p. 21. 
88 
6 2 Recommendation  688. 
8 3 William L. Worden, Cargoes. Matson's First Century in the Pacific. 
Honolulu, The University Press of Hawaii, 1981, pp. 143-145. 
6 4 Cargo Systems. September 1988, p. 5, and Containerisation International. 
September 1988, p. 28. 
6 5 Container Management. November 1986, p. 14, Containerisation 
International. September 1986, p. 27, and April 1986, p. 70, and Cargo Systems, 
June 1986, p. 81, and January 1986, p. 17. 
6 6 96 Stat. 2097 and 23 United States Code 101. 
6 7 See the US Federal Register. 29 January 1988, Vol. 53, No. 19, pp. 2597-
2599. 
6 8 Containerisation International. June 1988, p. 7, and Careo Systems. 
February 1988, pp. 5 and 6. 
6 9 Containerisation International. March 1986, p. 64. 
7 0 The Journal of Commerce. 5 October 1988, p. 2B, and Containerisation 
International. June 1988, pp. 7-8, and January 1988, p. 13. 
7 1 U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Inventory 
of American Intermodal Equipment 1987. (0MB No. 2133-0503), June 1988, p. 2, 
and Containerisation International. June 1988, p. 7, and January 1988, p. 13. 
7 2 Cargo Systems. March 1988, p. 65, September 1987, pp. 31 and 33, July 
1987, p. 5, and December 1986, p.13. 
7 3 Cargo Systems. October 1987, pp. 25 and 27. 
7 4 Cargo Systems. May 1987, p. 7, and February 1987, p. 30. 
7 5 Cargo Systems. June 1988, pp. 21-22. 
7 6 Containerisation International. October 1986, p. 59 gives a figure of 
39 km, while the issue of January 1988, p. 42, quotes the Japan Container Asso-
ciation as estimating the distance to be 43 km. 
7 7 Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 2 May 1985, p. 4. 
7 8 Except where otherwise specified, all data in this section were taken 
from document LC/L.442, op. cit. 
7 9 John H. Mahoney, Intermodal Freight Transportation. Eno Foundation for 
Transportation, Inc., Westport, Connecticut, 1985, p. 70. 
8 0 Cargo Systems. May 1986, pp. 65 and 67. 
8 1 Cargo Systems. February 1985, p. 32. 
8 2 Progressive Railroading. November 1985, p. 46. 
8 3 Cargo Systems. May 1986, pp. 65 and 67, and Seatrade, May 1985, p. 101. 
8 4 Slack, op.cit.. p. 5. 
8 5 Ibid., p. 27. 
89 
0 6 Clarence F. Jones, and Gordon G. Darkenwald, Economic Geography, revised 
edition, 1954, The Macmillan Company, New York, p. 7, and Derek Gregory, Ideo-
logy. Science and Human Geography. 1978, Hutchinson & Co., London, pp. 16, 122 
and 171. 
8 7 R. Buckminster Fuller, Critical Path. St. Martin's Press, New York, 
1981, p. 205. 
8 8 Based on the World Bank Development Report. 1987, pp. 206-207. 
8 9 The Journal of Commerce. 29 February 1988, p. IB, and The Journal of 
Commerce Special Anniversary Report. "Evergreen", 1 September 1988, p. 13T. 
Unless otherwise indicated, statistical data in this section are taken 
from UNCTAD, Handbook of international trade and development statistics: 1987 
supplement. 
9 1 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
Yearbook 1987. and United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 
various years between 1974 and 1985. 
9 2 Dusan Sidjanski, "Del Proyecto de Tratado de Unión del Parlamento 
Europeo al Acta Unica Europea", Integración latinoamericana. January-February 
1988, No. 131, pp. 3-17. 
9 3 The New York Times. Business, 9 October 1988, p. 2. 
9 4 Business Week. 19 September 1988, pp. 46 and 47. For a French view of 
the Single European Act, see The Economist. 5 November 1988. pp. 25-26. 
9 5 Seatrade Business Review. May/June 1988, pp. 51 and 53. 
9 6 The New York Times, Business, 23 October 1988, pp. 1 and 24. 
9 7 The Economist. 8 October 1988, pp. 73-74. 
9 8 Seatrade Business Review. May/June 1988, p. 51. 
9 9 For shipbuilding see Shipping World & Shipbuilder. July/August 1988, 
p. 241; U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Subsidies. June 1988, 
pp. 171-172; Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 21 May 1987, p. 8; and 
Seatrade. January 1985, pp. 21-25. 
1 0 0 Seatrade Business Review. July/August 1988, p. 21. For one country's 
efforts to take advantage of its earlier quota, see ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 
558, 16-30 September 1988, p. 4. 
1 0 1 Seatrade Business Review. September/October 1988, p. 135. 
1 0 2 Andrés Inotai, The EEC at the End of the Seventies. Hungarian 
Scientific Council for World Economy, Budapest, 1979, pp. 47-50 and 74-77. 
1 0 3 The Economist. 1 October 1988, p. 36, and The Journal of Commerce. 
28 September 1988, p. 14A. 
1 0 A Cargo Systems, March 1987, pp. 26-27 and 29. 
1 0 5 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 17 December 1987, p. 11. 
1 0 6 International Association of Ports and Harbors, Ports & Harbors. 
October 1988, p. 15, and Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 21 July 1988, 
p. 5. 
90 
1 0 7 Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 4 June 1987, p. 20, and 
Containerisation International. June 1986, p. 55. 
1 0 8 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 13 October 1988, p. 12, and 
15 September 1988, p. 41. 
1 0 9 Seatrade Business Review. September/October 1988, p. 85, and 
Containerisation International. November 1986, p. 25. 
1 1 0 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 18 September 1986, p. 9. 
1 1 1 International Railway Journal. February 1988, p. 14. For the 
distortions caused by such subsidies on the competition between barges and the 
Germany Federal Railway for the carriage of containers, see Containerisation 
International. August 1987, pp. 35-43 and Faiyplay International Shipping 
Weekly. 23 July 1987, pp. 2-3. 
1 1 2 Business Week. 26 September 1988, p. 66. 
1 1 3 Containerisation International. October 1988, p. 6. 
1 1 4 Port Development International. March 1987, p. 11. 
1 1 5 The Journal of Commerce. 13 October 1988, p. IB, and Container Manage-
ment. September 1988, p. 67. For earlier plans of the port of Rotterdam to 
initiate a block train service to Munich, see Port Development International. 
April 1987, p. 47. 
1 1 6 Cargo Systems. February 1985, p. 10. 
1 1 7 The Journal of Commerce. 5 October 1988, p. 3B. 
1 1 8 Cargo Systems. September 1988, pp. 23, 25 and 27; Containerisation 
International. August 1988, pp. 8 and 21, and July 1988, p. 5; and Fairplay 
International Shipping Weekly. 21 July 1988, p. 7, 16 June 1988, p. 5, and 4 
June 1987, p. 8. 
1 1 9 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 1 September 1988, p.2, 26 May 
1988, p. 14, 27 August 1987, p. 6, and 28 May 1987, p. 9; and Careo Systems. 
February 1987, pp. 18-19. 
1 2 0 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 15 September 1988, p. 25. 
1 2 1 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 13 October 1988, p. 7, and 
Containerisation International. October 1988, p. 49. 
1 2 2 Containerisation International. September 1988, p. 17. 
1 2 3 The Journal of Commerce. 13 September 1988, p. IB. 
12<t Seatrade Business Review. September/October 1988, p. 109, and Fairplay 
International Shipping Weekly. 23 June 1988, p. 7. 
1 2 5 Business Week. 29 August 1988, p. 42. 
1 2 6 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire. Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1981, p. 150. 
1 2 7 Eric Jennings, Cargoes. A centenary story of the Far Eastern Freight 
Conference. Meridian Communications, Singapore, 1980, p. 19. 
91 
1 2 8 George Bogaars, "The effect of the opening of the Suez Canal on the 
trade and development of Singapore", Journal of the Malaysian Branch of Thp 
Roval Asiatic Society. Vol. XXVIII, Part 1, 1954. 
1 2 0 Ingresos del Canal de Panama y estimación del ahorro que significa para 
los usuarios. (CEPAL/MEX/71/29/Add.1),  December 1971. 
1 3 0 ALAMAR.  Informativo. No. 544, 1-15 February 1988, p. 5, and Fairplav 
International Shipping Weekly. 26 November 1987, p.8, and 9 April 1987, p. 
XXVIII. 
1 3 1 The Journal of Commerce. 23 September 1988, p. 10A. 
1 3 2 International Association of Ports and Harbors, Ports & Harbors, 
October 1987, pp. 9-14. 
1 3 3 The Journal of Commerce. 14 October 1988, p. 10B, and Seatrade Business 
Review. September/October 1988, p. 131. 
1 3 4 The Journal of Commerce. 28 October 1988, p. IB. 
1 3 5 The Journal of Commerce. 1 September 1988, p. 6B, and Fairplav Inter-
national Shipping Weekly. 31 July 1986, p. 5, and 8 May 1986, p. 46. 
1 3 6 The Journal of Commerce. 5 July 1988, p. 3B, and Containerisation 
Internationa^. August 1988, pp. 5-7, and March 1986, p. 7. 
1 3 7 The Journal of Commerce. 18 April 1988, pp. IB and 10B, Fairplav Inter-
national Shipping Weekly. 4 August 1988, p. 2, and 7 April 1988, p. 5, and Cargo 
Systems. September 1987, p. 19. 
1 3 8 The Journal of Commerce. 7 October 1988, p. 16B, and 3 May 1988, p. 
12B, and Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 28 July 1988, p. 8. 
1 3 0 Seatrade Business Review. July/August 1988, pp. 91 and 95. 
The Journal of Commerce. 17 October 1988, p. 5B, and Containerisation 
International. October 1988, pp. 9 and 12. 
1 4 1 Cargo Systems. February 1985, p. 32. 
1 4 2 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 555, 1-15 August 1988, p. 7. 
1 4 3 Seatradç, May 1985, p. 101, and Fairplav International Shipping Week-
ly, 11 April 1985, p. 12. 
The Journal of Commerce. 15 September 1988, p. 10B, 
1 4 5 The Journal of Commerce. 13 June 1988, p. 2B. 
1 4 6 Economic Commission for Europe, Operating experience in the field of 
combined transport (TRANS/WP24/R.10), 6 September 1988, p. 16, paragraph 90. 
Double-stack train departure locations are based on information provided by the 
Office of Port and Intermodal Development, U.S. Department of Transportation. 
1 4 7 The Journal of Commerce. 31 August 1988, p. 10B. 
1 4 0 Seatrade Business Review. July/August 1988, p. 93. 
1 4 9 The Journal of Commerce. 29 April 1988, p. 10B. 
1 5 0 Containerisation International. January 1988, p. 53, and December 1987 
p. 43. 
92 
1 5 1 Containerisation International. March 1988, pp. 47-49. 
1 5 2 Containerisation International. November 1986, p. 9. 
1 5 3 Containerisation International. March 1987, pp. 7-8, and Cargo Systems. 
March 1987, pp. 7 and 9. 
1 5 A The completion of the Baikal-Amur Magistral (BAM) was announced by the 
Soviet State Railways and reported in the International Railway Journal. June 
1986, p. 17. Due to difficulties in boring two major tunnels, which were 
described in International Railway Journal. January 1988, p. 14, inauguration 
of this line was delayed until 1990. However, the temporary 15 km bypass for 
the Severomuyskiy tunnel on the BAM could become permanent, as indicated in the 
International Railway Journal. August 1988, p. 8, because of highly complex and 
dangerous geological conditions which scientists and engineers say may preclude 
its completion. 
1 5 5 The Journal of Commerce. 20 April 1988, p. 9B. 
1 5 6 Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 20 November 1986, p. 11. 
1 5 7 International Railway Journal. November 1987, p. 14, and February 1987, 
pp. 16-18. For truck and rail ferry links, see Falrp^y International Shipping 
Weekly. 8 September 1988, pp. 26 and 27, and 10 March 1988, pp. 36, 37 and 39; 
Cargo Systems. February 1988, pp. 49 and 51; Port Development International. May 
1987, pp. 44-45; Shipping World & Shipbuilder. November 1987, pp. 399 and 401; 
International Railway Journal. March 1987, p. 4, November 1986, p. 4, and Novem-
ber 1985, p. 34; and Container Management. November 1986, p. 22. 
1 5 9 International Railway Journal. October 1987, p. 4. 
1 5 9 Seascape. January 1988, pp, 31-33. 
1 6 0 Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 1 September 1988, p. 8. 
1 6 1 Seatrade Business Review. January/February 1988, pp. 41-43. 
1 6 2 Cargo Systems. January 1988, p. 49, and Fairplay International Shipping 
Weekly. 24/31 December 1987. pp. 27-29. 
1 6 3 International Railway Journal. October 1987, p. 8. 
1 6 4 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 29 October 1987, p. 4. 
1 6 5 J.W. Mullen, World oil prices: Prospects and implications for energy 
policy-makers in Latin America's oil-deficit countries. "Cuadernos de la CEPAL", 
1978, pp. 15-16. 
1 6 6 Official price of Saudi Arabian light. See, Petroleum Intelligence 
Weekly, 7 March 1983, p. 6. 
1 6 7 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly. "Special Supplement", 31 October 1988, 
p. 2. This is an estimate of the price at which Saudi Arabian light crude oil 
is being sold FOB on tern! sales. Spot prices can be much less. For example, 
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly. 10 October 1988, p. 6, reported that during early 
October 1988 the spot price for Oman crude oil was US$9.90 per barrel. 
1 5 8 D. Blumenhagen, Shipping: and the Balance of Payments. Institute of 
Shipping Economics, Bremen, No. 32, 1981. 
1 6 9 Portos e Navios. February 1987, p. 9. 
93 
1 7 0 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 530, 1-15 July 1987, p. 3. 
1 7 1 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 546, 1-15 March 1988, p. 2. 
1 7 2 Folha de São Paulo. "Portofolha", 29 September 1988, p. H-2. 
1 7 3 The Journal of Commerce. 8 September 1988, pp. 3B and 4B. 
1 7 4 El Mercurio. "Transporte Marítimo", 22 November 1987, p. 7. 
1 7 5 Cargo Systems. March 1985, p, 41. 
1 7 6 Falrplav International Shipping Weekly. 1 October 1987, p. XVIII. 
1 7 7 Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 16 October 1986, p.6. 
1 7 8 The Journal of Commerce. 12 September 1988, pp. 5B, 9B and 10B, For a 
review of the same problems in the ports of France, Italy, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, see Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 17 March 
1988, p. 5, 19 November 1987, p. 13, 4 December 1986, p. 12, and 16 October 
1986, p. 20, and Cargo Systems. October 1987, pp. 36, 37 and 39, September 1987, 
pp. 38 and 40, and January 1985, pp. 50-51. 
1 7 9 International Association of Ports and Harbors, Ports & Harbors. March 
1985, p. 19, and Cargo Systems. March 1985, p. 57. 
1 0 0 The International Association of Ports and Harbors, Proceedings of the 
Fifteenth Conference. 25 April-1 May 1987, Seoul, Korea, p. 67. 
1 8 1 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 545, 16-29 February 1988, p. 6. For an ap-
praisal of this situation in two other Latin American countries see The Journal 
of Commerce. 7 April 1988, pp. IB and 10B, and ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 480. 
1-15 June 1985, p. 11. 
1 8 2 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 10 December 1987, p. XXXVII. 
1 8 3 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 534, 1-15 September 1987, p. 5. 
1 8 4 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 477, 16-30 April 1985, p. 10; No. 543, 16-31 
January 1988, pp. 2-3; and No. 557, 1-15 September 1988, p. 6. 
1 8 5 The Journal of Commerce. 29 June 1988, p. 3B; Seatrade Business Review, 
November/December 1986, p. 99; The Journal of Commerce. 27 April 1988, p. 10B; 
Fairplay International Shipping. Weekly. 9 October 1986, p. 34, 9 April 1987, 
p. XXIII, and 13 November 1986, pp. 4 and 46; Containerisation International. 
March 1985, p. 63 and January 1987, p. 55; and Cargo Systems. May 1987, pp. 33 
and 39. For an evaluation of the same problem in the U.S. and New Zealand, see 
Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 16 October 1986, p. 20, and 9 April 
1987, p. XXX; and The Journal of Commerce. 26 August 1988, p. 3B. 
1 6 6 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 560, 16-31 October 1988, pp. 6-7. 
1 8 7 Shipping World & Shipbuilder. January/February 1988, p. 27. 
1 8 8 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 542, 1-15 January 1988, p. 5. 
1 8 9 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 523, 16-31 March 1987, p. 6, and No. 518, 1-
15 January 1987, p. 6. 
1 9 0 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 522, 1-15 March 1987, p. 5. For a comparison 
with another South American country, see No. 545, 16-29 February 1988, p. 6. 
94 
1 9 1 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 526, 1-15 May 1987, p. 6, and No. 510, 1-15 
September 1986, p. 3. 
1 9 2 T^e Journal of Commerce. 17 October 1988, pp. 5C, 7C and 9C, and 8 Sep-
tember 1988, p. 5B, ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 559, 1-15 October 1988, pp. 6-7, 
No. 558, 16-30 September 1988, p. 7, and No. 550, 16-31 May 1988, p. 11, and 
Folha de Sâo Paulo. "Portofolha", 6 October 1988, p. H-l and 29 September 1988, 
p. H-l. The port of Miami has entered into an agreement with the Government of 
Venezuela to provide its National Ports Institute (INP) with a wide range of 
technical assistance in areas that include labour requirements and the privati-
zation of certain port services. See Cargo Systems. September 1988, p. 9. The 
initiative to privatize port facilities is not limited to Latin America. For 
an evaluation of such activities in New Zealand see Containerisation Inter-
national . September 1988, p. 23, and Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 
7 January 1988, p. 8; for Malaysia and Thailand, see Cargo Systems. February 
1985, pp. 51-53. 
1 9 3 For similar activities at the ports of Liverpool and London see 
Fairplay International Shipping Weekly. 4 June 1987, pp. 8 and 10, and 19 
February 1987, p. 8. 
1 9 4 ALAMAR,  Informativo, No. 556, 16-31 August 1988, pp. 4-5, and No. 526, 
1-15 May 1987, p. 6. 
1 9 5 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 545, 16-29 February 1988, p. 3, and 
Containerisation International. March 1987, p. 39. For coastal trades, see 
ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 553, 16-31 June 1988, p. 5. 
1 9 6 Cargo Systems, October 1985, p. 85. 
1 9 7 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 558, 16-30 September 1988, p. 2, and No. 556, 
16-31 August 1988, p.2. For Brazil and Chile, see ALAMAR,  Informativo, No. 558, 
16-31 August 1988, p. 3, No. 552, 16-30 June 1988, pp. 3 and 6, No. 536, 1-15 
October 1987, p. 3, and No. 529, 16-30 June 1987, p. 4. 
1 9 8 Containerisation Intérnational. October 1988, p. 12. 
1 9 9 The Journal of Commerce. 20 June 1988, Special Report, "Containeri-
zation/Intermodalism", p. 1C, and Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 
14 August 1986, p. 6. 
2 0 0 Folha de Sâo Paulo. "Portofolha", 4 August 1988, p. DIO. 
2 0 1 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 502, 1-15 May 1986, p. 2, and Containerisation 
International. April 1986, p. 11. 
2 0 2 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 495, 16-31 January 1986, p. 2. 
2 0 3 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 557, 1-15 September 1988, p. 2, and No. 545, 
16-29 February 1988, p. 2, and Navitecnia y Comercio Marítimo. July 1988, p. 
10. 
2 0 4 ALAMAR, Informativo. No. 548, 16-30 April 1988, p. 10, No. 538, 1-15 
November 1987, p. 5, No. 536, 1-15 October 1987, p. 3, No. 529, 16-30 June 1987, 
pp. 6-7, No. 502, 1-15 May 1986, pp. 2-3, and Containerisation International 
Yearbook. 1988, p. 242, 
95 
2 0 5 For the British Navigation Acts, the first of which was adopted 8 Octo-
ber 1651, see Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black Jr., The Law of Admiralty, 
second edition, The Foundation Press, Mineóla, New York, 1975, pp. 960-961. 
2 0 6 For an interesting summary of the difficulties in removing cabotage 
restrictions in the Community, see Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 
13 October 1988, p. 9. 
2 0 7 U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Subsidies. June 1988, 
pp. 163-164, and Insight. 6 June 1988, pp. 8-15. 
2 0 8 CEPAL, Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe. 1987: Síntesis 
preliminar (LOAMS!!), ll April 1988, p. 48. 
2 0 9 For a ship operators position on the claims of exporters, see ALAMAR, 
Informativo. No. 556, 16-31 August 1988, p.3. 
2 1 0 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 524, 1-15 April 1987, p. 4, and Portos E 
Navios. February 1987, pp. 16-18. 
2 1 1 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 487, 16-31 September 1985, p. 6. 
2 1 2 Ministry of Transport, National Superintendency of the Merchant Marine 
(SUNAMAM),  Yearbook. 1985, p. 85. 
2 1 3 Portos e Navios. December 1987, p. 10. 
2 1 4 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 524, 1-15 April 1987, p. 4. 
2 1 5 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 546, 1-15 March 1988, p. 3. 
2 1 8 ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 558, 16-30 September 1988, p. 4, No. 546, 1-
15 March 1988, p. 3, and No. 524, 1-15 April 1987, p. 4. 
2 1 7 For a summary of Decree Law 143, see ALAMAR,  Informativo. No. 551, 1-
15 June 1988, p. 3. 
2 1 8 The Journal of Commerce. 25 November 1988, pp. 1A and 10A, and 
Fairplav International Shipping Weekly. 24 November 1988, pp. 18-19. 
2 1 9 Business Week. 6 June 1988, pp. 48-50. 

